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Abstract: 
The following narrative traces the political lives of James Sullivan, Christopher 
Gore, Rufus King and John Quincy Adams, four Massachusetts men who were 
actively involved in the creation of state and national policy during the 
formative years of the new republic.  Their years of public service bridged the 
critical period between the Revolution and the period of Democratic-
Republican dominance.  Because they knew each other so well, corresponded 
with one another on a regular basis, and held so many different state and 
national government posts, their lives provide an ideal vehicle to explore and 
better understand the changes that were taking place in post-Revolutionary 
Massachusetts.  Their stories help trace the evolution of Massachusetts from a 
Federalist stronghold into a legitimate multi-party state firmly committed to the 
national union.   
The primary figure in this study is Sullivan, the oldest of the four men, who 
was the state’s highest ranking Republican leader during much of the Federalist 
Era.  A staunch opponent of the Federalist assumption that government should 
be in the hands of the natural gentry and ruling class, he spent his adult life 
promoting equal access to power.  After serving as a member of the 
Massachusetts Provincial Congress from 1774 to 1776, Sullivan was an active 
participant in the creation of the new state government.  He later served as 
attorney general for seventeen years, from 1790 to 1807, through several 
Federalist administrations and served as a member of state legislature for many 
years.  He also was a member of the Supreme Judicial Court and, in the final 
years of his life, governor of the Commonwealth.  Because he participated in or 
observed firsthand the most significant political events of his day, his words 
also help trace, as few others could, the gradual transformation of 
Massachusetts from a one party state to a multi-party state.  His election as 
governor in 1807 was clear evidence of the growing strength of the Republican 
Party in Massachusetts and of the extent to which the emerging national 
consensus had grown.  
Christopher Gore, whose stature and perspective were more deeply rooted in 
the colonial past, stood in stark personal as well as political contrast to Sullivan.  
As a conservative Federalist who often served as spokesman for his party 
during this period, Gore was a major player in the Massachusetts legal 
community and government between the American Revolution and early years 
of the nineteenth century.  He stubbornly adhered to the aristocratic belief that 
the government should only be managed by the propertied class and traditional 
 ruling elite.  Where Sullivan was a sentimental moralist who hated everything 
British, Gore was the stern and unyielding spokesman for the merchant class 
who seemingly admired everything British.  Where Sullivan’s father had 
emigrated from Ireland, the victim of oppressive Penal Laws, Gore’s father was 
a Tory, who fled Boston with the British in March 1776.  Though Gore himself 
supported the Revolution, he was never able to shed, or indeed temper, his 
attachment to Great Britain in later years.  As perhaps the most passionate 
defender of everything British in the years after the Revolution, Gore’s habits 
and customs reflected the old deferential order and embodied everything 
Sullivan opposed.  
Despite their personal and political differences, Sullivan and Gore shared a 
close personal friend.  Rufus King was a longtime confidant of both men, 
corresponding with each of them over many years.  Though King’s habits and 
background were more similar to those of Gore than Sullivan, he was less 
rooted in the colonial past than his conservative friend.  Though an ardent 
Federalist, he was respected by men on both sides of the political aisle and 
served not only as a bridge between the two parties, but as a bridge between 
the two branches of his own party.  It is because he enjoyed such a close 
personal relationship with Sullivan and Gore, and corresponded with both men 
on a regular basis, that King provides a unique vehicle to explore the 
differences between the two parties during this critical period in Massachusetts 
political history.  
The fourth subject of this study is John Quincy Adams.  The fiercely 
independent one-time Federalist, who, though born many years after Gore, 
King, and Sullivan, became active in politics at a very young age and crossed 
political paths with all three men on a regular basis.  Although born a member 
of the second generation of political leaders, Quincy Adams identified with the 
first generation of Revolutionary leaders.  He matured early and took part in 
every critical debate that took place after the ratification of the Constitution.  
From the beginning, Quincy Adams charted an independent course and played 
a critical role in the growth of the Republican Party.  John Quincy Adams is 
particularly relevant to this study because his political transformation reflected 
the change in attitude that was taking place in Massachusetts and the country in 
the early years of the nineteenth century.  He represented a commitment to the 
interests of union over sectional concerns.  A strong and independent unionist 
throughout his life, Quincy Adams eventually came to represent a new global 
nationalism.  In many respects, Quincy Adams was the ‘transition man’ in post-
Revolutionary America.  The son of a colonial who was very much a product of 
the deferential society of the eighteenth century, young Adams came to 
 embrace the principle of majority rule.  His elevation to the highest political 
posts in the country marked the final stage in America’s transition from colony 
to union to nation. 
James Sullivan, Christopher Gore and Rufus King each played significant roles 
in the establishment of constitutional government in Massachusetts and in the 
United States.  Though he was considered a member of the so-called Hancock 
faction, a group viewed as primarily anti-Constitutionalist, Sullivan was an 
independent thinker. He would call for greater legal safeguards for the benefit 
of the more vulnerable and for the end of the practice of multiple office 
holding which had long been a tool of the ruling elite to maintain power and 
influence.  A vocal proponent of the national government before King, Gore 
and Hancock, Sullivan had long recognized the importance of strengthening 
the central government.  His embrace of participatory government and of law 
aimed at protecting all classes of people naturally appealed to a wider audience 
would continue to contribute to the democratization of Massachusetts politics.  
With a new national government in place and a new political era begun, 
Sullivan, King, Gore, and soon Quincy Adams, were uniquely positioned to 
play significant, if competing, roles in the coming struggle.  
This narrative differs from other secondary works on post-colonial 
Massachusetts in several respects.  Firstly, the significant role played by Sullivan 
in the growth of Republicanism in Massachusetts has been largely overlooked 
by historians.  His persistent calls for equal access to power stood in stark 
contrast to the views of the Federalists who dominated Massachusetts 
government in the years after the American Revolution.  His active 
participation in regional politics both during and after the Revolution helped 
the people of Massachusetts in their transition from colony to state.  
Furthermore, he was one of the first Massachusetts political leaders to insist on 
placing the new central government on a sound financial footing.  Indeed, his 
call for a strengthened and sufficiently financed national government predated 
the efforts of Massachusetts Federalists, including King and Gore. He was, I 
contend, one of the first political leaders of either party to be considered a true 
‘nationalist.’          
While Quincy Adams’ support for Jefferson’s Embargo and his conversion to 
Republicanism have been well documented, this work explores the link 
between Sullivan and Quincy Adams, and details the critically important role 
they played in the national debate over how to respond to British aggression 
towards American shipping and American sailors.  Though Gordon Wood and 
other historians point to the Embargo as the single biggest failure of Jefferson 
and his Republican supporters, I contend the opposite is true.  The Embargo 
 highlighted the central difference between the two parties, and though it 
provided Federalists with a temporary victory, it also sowed the seeds of their 
defeat.  The Embargo enabled men like Sullivan and Quincy Adams to clarify 
one of the central issues of the post-Revolutionary period, … national honor.  
Though Paul Goodman correctly points out that Republicanism tapped into 
the growing sense of nationalism in the country, I carry the discussion further 
and detail the growing disconnect between the Federalist Party and the 
American people.  Quincy Adams, in particular, articulated the need to 
announce to the world that the United States would not submit to foreign 
aggression.  Furthermore, his call for a stronger and expanded union, even if it 
meant a loss of power and prestige for Massachusetts, would soon strike a 
chord with a growing majority of Americans.  Quincy Adams personified the 
shift in the national mood and represented a new national perspective.  When 
John Quincy Adams left the Federalist Party, many Americans left with him.   
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Introduction 
When newly elected President James Monroe named Massachusetts native and 
former Federalist John Quincy Adams as his secretary of state in the spring of 
1817, a significant milestone in the political history of the United States had 
been reached.  While some Republican leaders believed this important position, 
which had always served as a springboard to the presidency, should have gone 
to a Southern party loyalist instead of to the independent minded New England 
diplomat, Monroe’s decision reflected the extent to which a national consensus, 
which had just begun to coalesce a decade earlier, had progressed.   
By 1816, Americans had subordinated the notion that state and regional 
concerns were more important than national goals and embraced the idea that 
the people had a vested interest in the success of the national government.  In 
addition, Americans were more egalitarian than they had been in the past and 
no longer deferred to rank and inherited privilege.  James Madison spoke of 
these changes in his first inaugural address, noting how gratifying it was “to 
witness the increased harmony of opinion which pervades our Union.”  He 
referred to a “happy government,” “under which every citizen may by his merit 
obtain the highest trust recognized by the Constitution; which contains within 
it no cause of discord, none to put at variance one portion of the community 
with another; a Government which protects every citizen in the full enjoyment 
of his rights, and is able to protect the nation against injustice from foreign 
powers.”  He described America as “one great family with a common interest.”1  
While Monroe may have overstated the degree to which Americans were 
thinking as one, his defeat of Federalist Rufus King a few months earlier did 
mark the end of the party of Washington and Hamilton as a national force, 
ushering in a new political era.  Only three decades before the election of 
Monroe, the Federalist Party had been the undisputed national ‘Party,’ 
responsible for the creation and ratification of the United States Constitution.  
Yet, by 1816, it had ceased to exist as a national force.   
The seeds of this national consensus, which grew during the first decade of the 
nineteenth century, were planted and took root in Massachusetts.  As the 
center of Federalist strength and influence throughout the post-Revolutionary 
period, Massachusetts was also home to a strong Republican element.  The 
arguments and actions of Massachusetts’s political leaders in both parties                                                         
1 Sean Wilentz, ed., Major Problems in the Early Republic (Lexington, 1992), 336. 
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helped shape national debate.  It was perhaps inevitable that the most bitter of 
the exchanges in the debate between Federalists and Republicans would take 
place in the crucible that was Massachusetts’s politics.   
After the Revolution, many Federalist leaders in Massachusetts acted on the 
presumption they were society’s natural leaders and should therefore continue 
to govern as they had in colonial Massachusetts.  This anti-democratic attitude, 
which on its face contradicted the ideals of the American Revolution and ran 
counter to the actual changes that were taking place in American society, would 
prove critical to the future of the party.  After the war, there were a large 
number of newcomers who became involved in government.  Paul Goodman 
notes, “Those who had formerly been alienated from established authority 
were no longer outsiders,” and that “in state and nation aspiring newcomers 
enjoyed public office and civic esteem.”  He added that “as the party of 
opportunity, the Democratic-Republicans [hereinafter ‘Republicans] had been 
the instrument by which restless and ambitious men on the make formed a 
powerful coalition among those anxious to share more fully in the fruits of self-
government.”2  These new ‘ambitious men’ had little patience for the 
presumptive arrogance of many Federalist leaders.  The two parties were simply 
operating on different levels, with different views of what American society 
should stand for and where it was going.  As the years passed, many Federalists 
leaders remained doggedly committed to a culture that no longer existed.  As 
Gordon Wood has observed, “the Federalists actually never thought of 
themselves as a party; instead they saw themselves as the natural gentry rulers 
of the society.”3  
Wood has argued that the Revolution “reconstituted what Americans meant by 
public or state power and about an entirely new kind of popular politics and a 
new kind of democratic officeholder.”4  Wood asserts that by the early 
nineteenth century “American society had been radically and thoroughly 
transformed,” in that societal relationships had been decisively altered.5  He 
suggested that before the war, America “took for granted that society was and 
ought to be a hierarchy of ranks and degrees of dependency,” but that within a 
short time, it had been transformed into a republic with millions of “egalitarian 
minded bustling citizens.”6  Wood observed, “historians have delighted in                                                         
2 Paul Goodman, The Democratic-Republicans of Massachusetts: Politics in a Young Republic (Westport, 
1964), 204. 
3 Ibid., 293. 
4 Gordon S. Wood, The Radicalism of the American Revolution (New York, 1991), 8. 
5 Ibid., 5. 
6 Ibid., 6. 
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pointing out that the ‘Era of Good Feeling’ under James Monroe’s 
administration was filled with bitter factional contention that belied the name 
people gave to the era.”  But, he added, “The title was meaningful to most 
people because it seemed that earlier party competition and hateful party spirit 
had indeed finally disappeared.” 7  
The turning point for the Republican Party came during the decade of the 
1790s.  The passage of the Jay Treaty in 1795 marked the beginning of the end 
of Federalist dominance not only in the federal government, but in 
Massachusetts state government as well.  Mobilization by Republicans in 
opposition to the treaty ushered in a period of intense partisan conflict, both 
nationally and locally, and coincided with the departure of George Washington 
from the Federal scene.  Despite the election of Federalist John Adams to the 
presidency in 1796, Republican organizations continued to grow as the tone of 
political debate in the United States deteriorated.  After the election of Thomas 
Jefferson in 1800, political power shifted from New England to the South, the 
proportional share of Massachusetts power diminished, and party differences 
grew even more intense and more personal.  Over the course of the next ten to 
fifteen years, a political consensus, centered on a national as opposed to a 
regional view of interests and goals, slowly but deliberately developed.  As the 
Republican Party came to dominate national debate and national offices, the 
Federalist Party faded into the background and then disappeared altogether.  
The defeat of Rufus King in 1816 marked the last time a member of the 
Federalist Party would compete for the presidency.   
The following narrative traces the political lives of four Massachusetts men 
who were actively involved in the creation of state and national policy during 
the period when this national consensus took root.  Republicans James Sullivan 
and John Quincy Adams, and Federalists Christopher Gore and Rufus King 
were major players in Massachusetts politics for much of the period between 
the Revolution and Quincy Adams’ election as president of the United States in 
1824.  As attorneys, the four men were linked by profession and by their 
commitment to law and order during a time of fear and uncertainty.  They 
strongly disagreed, however, on many issues; ranging from matters of 
representation and how state and national elections should be administered, to 
whom the national government should ally itself for purposes of trade and 
commerce.  They also disagreed over how the United States government 
should respond to foreign, and in particular British, interference with American 
shipping and American seamen, and perhaps most significantly, they differed                                                         
7 Ibid., 298. 
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on their level of commitment to union over region when local commercial 
interests were threatened.  The positions taken by each of the four men on 
these issues can be viewed as markers along the road from colony to union to 
nation.  This is the story of how the growth of Republicanism in Massachusetts 
coincided with, and indeed contributed to, a growing national consensus. 
The primary figure in this study is Sullivan, the oldest of the four men, who 
was the state’s highest ranking Republican leader during much of the Federalist 
Era.  A staunch opponent of the Federalist assumption that government should 
be in the hands of the natural gentry and ruling class, he spent his adult life 
promoting equal access to power.  Early in his political career, Sullivan jealously 
guarded local autonomy and defended state’s rights against national intrusion.  
Once he understood the difficulties faced by the new federal government and 
the dire consequences of inaction, however, he became a staunch advocate for 
a strong central government and embraced the concept of Union.  After 
serving as a member of the Massachusetts Provincial Congress from 1774 to 
1776, Sullivan was an active participant in the creation of the new state 
government.  He later served as attorney general for seventeen years, from 
1790 to 1807, through several Federalist administrations and served as a 
member of state legislature for many years.  He also was a member of the 
Supreme Judicial Court and, in the final years of his life, governor of the 
Commonwealth for two consecutive one-year terms.   
A prolific writer who regularly submitted letters to several newspapers, Sullivan 
corresponded with state and national leaders of both parties for over forty 
years.  Because he participated in or observed firsthand the most significant 
political events of his day, his words also help trace, as few others could, the 
gradual transformation of Massachusetts from a one party state to a multi-party 
state.  His election as governor in 1807 was clear evidence of the growing 
strength of the Republican Party in Massachusetts and of the extent to which 
the emerging national consensus had grown.  
Christopher Gore, whose stature and perspective were more deeply rooted in 
the colonial past, stood in stark personal as well as political contrast to Sullivan.  
As a conservative Federalist who often served as spokesman for his party 
during this period, Gore was a major player in the Massachusetts legal 
community and government between the American Revolution and early years 
of the nineteenth century.  After independence had been achieved, he 
embraced and promoted strong Anglo-American commercial and diplomatic 
ties and doggedly fought for the interests of Massachusetts merchants and 
businessmen, who were critically important to the success of the new 
government.  Nonetheless, the lens through which Gore viewed events and 
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judged policy was much different than that used by Sullivan.  Indeed, as the 
years passed, he stubbornly adhered to the aristocratic belief that the 
government should only be managed by the propertied class and traditional 
ruling elite.  When circumstances changed and the nation seemed to move in a 
more egalitarian direction, Gore grew increasingly impatient and frustrated.  
After the election of James Madison in 1812, Gore’s denunciation of 
Republican policy and his advocacy of Federalist principles and regional 
concerns grew particularly bitter and even militant, pushing him further and 
further away from moderate members of his party. 
Though Gore was younger than Sullivan by fourteen years, their paths would 
cross many times in the turbulent years after the Revolution.  As attorneys and 
politicians, Gore and Sullivan challenged one another in the courtroom and at 
the ballot box.  While hotly debating the critical issues of the day in several 
different newspapers, each was the chief spokesman for his party in the closing 
years of the eighteenth and the early years of the nineteenth centuries.  
Furthermore, it was Gore who Sullivan defeated for the governorship in 1807, 
and after Sullivan’s death in 1808 it was Gore who defeated Sullivan’s 
Republican successor in 1809. 
Where Sullivan was a sentimental moralist who hated everything British, Gore 
was the stern and unyielding spokesman for the merchant class who seemingly 
admired everything British.  Where Sullivan’s father had emigrated from 
Ireland, the victim of oppressive Penal Laws, Gore’s father was a Tory, who 
fled Boston with the British in March 1776.  Though Gore himself supported 
the Revolution, he was never able to shed, or indeed temper, his attachment to 
Great Britain in later years.  As perhaps the most passionate defender of 
everything British in the years after the Revolution, Gore’s habits and customs 
reflected the old deferential order and embodied everything Sullivan opposed.  
Despite their personal and political differences, Sullivan and Gore shared a 
close personal friend.  Rufus King was a longtime confidant of both men, 
corresponding with each of them over many years.  It was King to whom 
Sullivan had first vented his anguish following the death of his first wife, and 
Gore, a Harvard classmate of Kings, remained extremely close to King and his 
wife for over four decades.  Though King’s habits and background were more 
similar to those of Gore than Sullivan, he was less rooted in the colonial past 
than his arch-conservative friend.  He began his political career in 
Massachusetts and represented the Commonwealth at the Constitutional 
Convention in 1787, but moved to New York after the Constitution had been 
ratified.  While serving in the United States Senate, he developed strong 
relationships with and earned the confidence of the nation’s leading Federalists, 
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including George Washington and Alexander Hamilton.  Though younger than 
many Revolutionary leaders, King was by temperament very much a part of the 
Revolutionary generation, and like many of them never became comfortable 
with the party system.  
Because many who worked with King praised him as amicable and thoughtful, 
he not only served as a bridge between the two parties, but as a bridge between 
the two branches of his own party.  Though an ardent Federalist, he was 
respected by men on both sides of the political aisle, as evidenced by his close 
ties to both Sullivan and Gore, and by the fact that President Thomas Jefferson 
retained him as Ambassador to Great Britain during the early years of his 
administration.  It is because he enjoyed such a close personal relationship with 
Sullivan and Gore, and corresponded with both men on a regular basis, that 
King provides a unique vehicle to explore the differences between the two 
parties during this critical period in Massachusetts political history.  His letters 
provide an opportunity to see events through the eyes of man with close 
friends in both camps.  Although late in his career King became much less 
tolerant of Republican policy, his continued high profile role in Federalist Party 
politics help paint a more complete picture of the growth of the Republican 
Party and development of a national consensus.  Indeed, King was center stage 
at the exact time in history when the American people decided between the two 
competing political philosophies.  
The fourth subject of this study is John Quincy Adams.  The fiercely 
independent one-time Federalist, who, though born many years after Gore, 
King, and Sullivan, became active in politics at a very young age and crossed 
political paths with all three men on a regular basis.  Although born a member 
of the second generation of political leaders, Quincy Adams identified with the 
first generation of Revolutionary leaders.  He matured early and took part in 
every critical debate that took place after the ratification of the Constitution.  
From the beginning, Quincy Adams charted an independent course and played 
a critical role in the growth of the Republican Party, and his elevation to the 
highest political posts in the country marked the final stage in America’s 
transition from colony to union to nation.  Like Sullivan and Gore, Quincy 
Adams enjoyed a close personal relationship with King, and though he and 
Sullivan initially had a rocky relationship, they too became good friends.  Upon 
Sullivan’s death in 1808, it was Quincy Adams who delivered his eulogy.  He 
did not enjoy as close a relationship with Gore, however, as the two men had 
very different views on American foreign policy and on the proper role of 
political parties in setting policy.  Their political paths crossed on numerous 
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occasions over many years and the two men came to dislike one another 
intensely. 
John Quincy Adams is particularly relevant to this study because his political 
transformation reflected the change in attitude that was taking place in 
Massachusetts and the country in the early years of the nineteenth century.  He 
represented a commitment to the interests of union over sectional concerns.  A 
strong and independent unionist throughout his life, Quincy Adams eventually 
came to represent a new global nationalism.  He saw the world as few others 
did.  His education in Europe and exposure to diverse cultures resulted in a 
more cosmopolitan perspective that set him apart from other Americans.  
Viewed by many of his contemporaries as occupying the fringe of national 
politics, he was, in retrospect, far ahead of his time.  Indeed, in many respects, 
Quincy Adams was the ‘transition man’ in post-Revolutionary America.  The 
son of a colonial who was very much a product of the deferential society of the 
eighteenth century, young Adams came to embrace the principle of majority 
rule and later represented the final step in the transition from colony to union 
to nation.  By 1817, much of the nation had begun to catch up with him.  
President Monroe understood that Quincy Adams was not only a talented 
diplomat, but also someone who took a global view of policy that coincided 
with his own.  Eight years later, with several diplomatic successes under his 
belt, Quincy Adams was elected President of the United States.  
The lives of James Sullivan, Christopher Gore, Rufus King and John Quincy 
Adams intersected at several different and significant points during the 
formative years of the new republic.  Their years of public service bridged the 
critical period between the Revolution and the development of the national 
consensus and all four played a significant role in shaping the political debate in 
Massachusetts.  Because they knew each other so well, corresponded with one 
another on a regular basis, and held so many different state and national 
government posts, their lives, taken together, provide an ideal vehicle to 
explore and better understand the changes that were taking place in post-
Revolutionary Massachusetts.  Their stories help trace the evolution of 
Massachusetts from a Federalist stronghold into a legitimate multi-party state 
firmly committed to the national union.   
This narrative differs from other secondary works on post-colonial 
Massachusetts in several respects.  Firstly, the significant role played by Sullivan 
in the growth of Republicanism in Massachusetts has been largely overlooked 
by historians.  His persistent calls for equal access to power stood in stark 
contrast to the views of the Federalists who dominated Massachusetts 
government in the years after the American Revolution.  His active 
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participation in regional politics both during and after the Revolution helped 
the people of Massachusetts in their transition from colony to state.  
Furthermore, he was one of the first Massachusetts political leaders to insist on 
placing the new central government on a sound financial footing.  Indeed, his 
call for a strengthened and sufficiently financed national government predated 
the efforts of Massachusetts Federalists, including King and Gore. He was, I 
contend, one of the first political leaders of either party to be considered a true 
nationalist.          
In addition, while Quincy Adams’ support for Jefferson’s Embargo and his 
conversion to Republicanism have been well documented, this work explores 
the link between Sullivan and Quincy Adams, and details the critically 
important role they played in the national debate over how to respond to 
British aggression towards American shipping and American sailors.  Though 
Gordon Wood and other historians point to the Embargo as the single biggest 
failure of Jefferson and his Republican supporters, I contend the opposite is 
true.  The Embargo highlighted the central difference between the two parties, 
and though it provided Federalists with a temporary victory, it also sowed the 
seeds of their defeat.  The Embargo enabled men like Sullivan and Quincy 
Adams to clarify one of the central issues of the post-Revolutionary period, … 
national honor.  Though Paul Goodman correctly points out that 
Republicanism tapped into the growing sense of nationalism in the country, I 
carry the discussion further and detail the growing disconnect between the 
Federalist Party and the American people.  Quincy Adams, in particular, 
articulated the need to announce to the world that the United States would not 
submit to foreign aggression.  Furthermore, his call for a stronger and 
expanded union, even if it meant a loss of power and prestige for 
Massachusetts, would soon strike a chord with a growing majority of 
Americans.  Quincy Adams personified the shift in the national mood and 
represented a new national perspective.  When John Quincy Adams left the 
Federalist Party, many Americans left with him.   
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Chapter I    
Massachusetts During the Revolutionary Era 
James Sullivan, Christopher Gore, Rufus King and John Quincy Adams were 
born in Massachusetts, but the circumstances into which they were born were 
markedly different.  In family origin, political affiliation, and economic status, 
they came from very different worlds, but each made significant contributions 
to the development of the commonwealth and the new nation.  
A. Introduction to James Sullivan 
On the afternoon of June 6, 1807, James Sullivan was sworn in as governor of 
the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.  The new chief executive, a Republican, 
had defeated the Federalist candidate Christopher Gore by a large margin, 
marking the first time the Federalists had been denied the governor’s office 
since the retirement of Samuel Adams in 1797.  Sullivan’s triumph came one 
year after the Republicans had taken control of the Massachusetts General 
Court following years of Federalist domination and seven years after Thomas 
Jefferson had been swept into the White House.  Though the Republicans did 
not firmly establish their dominance in Massachusetts until many years later, 
the election of Sullivan to the governor’s office in 1807 marked a significant 
turning point in Massachusetts political history.  In his inaugural speech, 
Sullivan reaffirmed his belief that the power of government should be exerted 
to give equal advantages to its people, and not “to create wealth or exclusive 
privileges to any.”8  This sentiment represented a fundamental change in 
direction.  Since the departure of Adams ten years earlier, the office had been 
controlled by Federalists who were in Sullivan’s estimation committed to the 
idea that government should be run by and for the traditional ruling elite.  
Sullivan’s elevation to the governor’s office was both historic and unlikely given 
his humble beginnings and the fact that he belonged to a political party that 
had enjoyed little electoral success in Massachusetts.  
Born on April 22, 1744, in the town of Berwick, Maine, which was then a part 
of Massachusetts, James Sullivan was the fourth son of John S. and Margery 
Sullivan.  John had been born in Limerick, Ireland, in 1692, and because he was 
a Catholic, was denied access to an education in his native land.  According to 
Sullivan biographer, Thomas Amory, John was likely educated on the continent 
where “several scholarships founded at different seminaries of learning” were                                                         
8 Paul Goodman, The Democratic-Republicans of Massachusetts: Politics in a Young Republic (Westport, 
1964), 181.  
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available.  Because life in Ireland offered little promise, Sullivan decided to 
leave Ireland for the British American colonies.  John immigrated in 1723 with 
a large company of his countrymen and women, including his future wife, then 
only a child.9   
Upon his arrival in America, John Sullivan settled in York, in the District of 
Maine, where he became a respected schoolteacher.  After he was married in 
1735, he purchased land in the frontier town of Berwick where he lived for 
over sixty years until his death in 1796, at age 105.10  He and his young wife had 
four sons, including John Sullivan who later served as a general in the colonial 
army during the Revolutionary War, and James, the youngest.  Judging from 
James Sullivan’s lifetime of writings, including his support of the Irish 
Rebellion in 1798, it would appear that he never forgot where his father had 
come from.  It is uncertain, however, as to whether or for how long the elder 
Sullivan remained a Catholic after his arrival in America.  What is known is that 
his son James became an active member of the Congregationalist Church and 
became openly critical of the Catholic faith. 11    
Sullivan suffered crippling injuries to both legs as a child, resulting in a 
permanent disability.  His left knee was destroyed when he was ten years old by 
a “fever sore” that “accidentally got a backward bend by not being supported 
straight in bed.”  The injury resulted in one leg being two inches shorter than 
the other, necessitating the lifelong use of a high-heeled shoe.  His other leg 
was broken when, while cutting down a tree, the tree slipped back from the 
stump, breaking two bones in the leg and leaving it perforated with splinters.  
While the surgeons wanted to amputate the leg, Sullivan, believing in his 
“strong constitution,” preferred to take his chances with rehabilitation.  
Although he recovered from the injury, Sullivan suffered through a long 
convalescence and was left with a permanent and pronounced limp.  He would 
later claim that but for these injuries, his 5’7” frame would have been 6,’ like his 
father, brother and son.  In addition to diminishing his physical stature, his 
injuries also prevented him from serving in the military.  Furthermore, it is 
believed that Sullivan suffered from epilepsy and that while practicing law he 
suffered many attacks while on circuit, including occasional episodes in court.12  
As a result of the second injury to his leg, Sullivan was confined to his house 
for two years.  While restricted to bed he read a great deal and pursued his                                                         
9 Thomas C. Amory, Life of James Sullivan (Boston, 1859) I, 7-10. 
10 Amory, Sullivan, I, 12. 
11 Ibid., 16. 
12 Amory, James Sullivan, I, 21 
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studies under his father’s direction.13  He decided upon a career in the law like 
his older brother John.  In exchange for the use of the family farm in Berwick 
as well as half of the produce, the younger John agreed, among other things, to 
supply his brother James with books, forms, and pleadings and to otherwise 
assist him in getting started with the law.14  By the time James joined his 
brother as a student, John had moved his practice to Durham, New 
Hampshire.  Sullivan family lore referred to a bizarre incident soon after John 
Sullivan opened his new law office in this frontier town.  Allegedly a number of 
Durham residents took exception to having lawyers in their midst and 
suggested in no uncertain terms that John Sullivan and his brother James 
should leave their community.  Sullivan said he wouldn’t consider leaving and 
warned that if anyone were disposed to press the matter, he would be ready.  
The quarrel intensified and townspeople began taking sides, until, incredibly, it 
was agreed that the matter should be settled by a fistfight.  Because John 
Sullivan was bigger and more athletic than any of his adversaries, however, it 
was agreed that James would stand in for his older brother.  The fight took 
place, and despite James’ size and obvious physical handicap, he defeated his 
opponent.  From that day forward, family legend has it, John Sullivan became 
an enormously popular and successful citizen in Durham.15   
James Sullivan began practicing law with his brother in 1765, just as the Stamp 
Act was being debated throughout the American colonies.  He not only 
developed his legal skills quickly, but also began expressing his opinions on the 
political questions of the day, taking a strong stand against Parliament and 
against the use of arbitrary power.  While in Durham, Sullivan met and 
proposed marriage to Mehitable Odiorne, the daughter of William Odiorne, a 
shipbuilder.  It was agreed that the marriage was to be put off for two years 
while Sullivan established himself as an attorney.16  
After he was admitted to the bar, Sullivan moved to Georgetown, in the 
District of Maine.  The area was mostly wilderness at the time, with very few 
inhabitants.  When asked later “what on earth could have induced you to settle 
in such an out of the way place,” Sullivan responded that “wishing to break 
into the world somewhere,” he concluded “to assail it at its weakest point.”17  
Though he didn’t stay in Georgetown long, he did well enough to convince                                                         
13 Ibid., 20-21. 
14 Charles P. Whittemore, A General of the Revolution: John Sullivan of New Hampshire (New York, 
1961), 4. 
15  Amory, Sullivan, I, 25-26. 
16 Ibid., 27-28. 
17 Ibid., 30. 
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himself that he could make a living as an attorney, and returned to Durham, 
New Hampshire.  After marrying “Hetty” Odiorne in February 1768, the 
twenty-four year old Sullivan purchased a home in the busy manufacturing 
town of Biddeford, Maine, on the Saco River.  He quickly developed a 
reputation as a skilled attorney and built a good practice.  He was the first 
attorney to open his practice in this remote region, as lawyers from larger 
towns who rode the circuit had previously handled most cases in the Biddeford 
area.  In 1772, the nearby town of Limerick, Maine, in which Sullivan had a 
share, was settled.  Sullivan must have been well regarded by his neighbors as 
he was permitted to select the name of the town, which he took from the 
region in Ireland where his father had been born.18  Later, in 1774, when 
patriots objecting to the Coercive Acts closed the courts, Sullivan spent a week 
chopping down trees in Limerick alongside other settlers, to clear land for the 
new development.  By the age of thirty, Sullivan has established himself as one 
of the most influential men in the District of Maine.”19  
Besides Sullivan, there were only five other practicing attorneys in the entire 
province of Maine.  They included William Cushing and David Sewall, both of 
whom would later serve with Sullivan on the bench.20  There were, however, 
several attorneys from ‘lower’ Massachusetts who traveled the eastern circuit 
and spent considerable time in the district of Maine.  Over the course of several 
years, Sullivan entertained and became close friends with several of the leading 
lawyers of the province, including among others, John Lowell, Jonathan Sewall, 
James Otis and John Adams.21  Sullivan often opened his home to his 
colleagues from Massachusetts.  John Adams noted in 1771 that while in 
Biddeford attending court, Jonathan Sewall and John Lowell stayed at Sullivan’s 
home and spent the Sabbath with Sullivan.  Lowell became a very close friend 
of Sullivan and remained so for the rest of his life.22  
As Amory has noted, “professional habits were decidedly convivial,” in the 
years leading up to the Revolution, “and gentlemen thrown together for several 
weeks, often under the same roof, were quite disposed to be amused.”23  They 
also sought relief from boredom.  In a diary entry dated, July 2, 1770, John 
Adams related that after drinking punch at Sullivan’s home and having dinner 
at a local tavern he and Sullivan and three other lawyers walked ¼ mile down                                                         
18 George Folsom, History of Sacco & Biddeford (Portland, 1975), 270. 
19 Amory, Sullivan, I, 31. 
20 Amory, Sullivan, I, 34. 
21 Ibid., 32-33. 
22 Ibid., 34. 
23 Ibid., 35. 
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to a house on the Saco River to look upon a woman who was rumored to be 
“at least 110 years of age, some say 115.”  Adams noted that since no one was 
home except the old woman who was then asleep in bed, the five attorneys 
took turns gazing through the window at the “Object of Horror.”  After 
remaining there for “some time,” Adams recorded that the woman’s daughter 
returned home and invited the five lawyers into the house to meet her 
mother.24   
When they attended court in Maine, the attorneys from ‘lower’ Massachusetts 
had the opportunity to learn something about the personal lives of their 
colleagues.  In a letter to his wife, Abigail, dated June 29, 1774, for example, 
John Adams described in detail, and not without a little envy, the various 
business interests of the Sullivan brothers.  He wrote: “There is very little [legal] 
business here, and David Sewall, David Wyer, John Sullivan and James Sullivan, 
and Theophilus Bradbury, are the lawyers who attend the inferior courts, and, 
consequently, conduct the causes at the superior.”  He added that John 
Sullivan, “who is placed at Durham, in New Hampshire, is younger, both in 
years and practice, than I am,” and that “he began with nothing, but is now said 
to be worth ten thousand pounds, lawful money;” and “his brother James 
allows five or six, or perhaps seven, thousand pounds, consisting in houses and 
lands, notes and mortgages.”  He also observed that John “has a fine stream of 
water, with an excellent corn-mill, saw-mill, fulling-mill, scythe-mill, and others, 
in all, six mills, which are both his delight and his profit,” and that “as he has 
earned cash in his business at the bar, he has taken opportunities to purchase 
the farms of his neighbors, who wanted to sell and move out further into the 
woods, at an advantageous rate, and in this way has been growing rich.”25   
With a limited number of cases to handle, an attorney practicing in Biddeford 
during this period would have had plenty of time to engage in activities not 
related to the practice of law.  John Adams, who had already established 
himself as one of the leading legal and political lights in the colony, explained 
that James Sullivan “began with neither learning, books, estate, nor anything 
but his head and hands, and is now a very popular lawyer, and growing rich 
very fast, purchasing great farms, and is a justice of the peace and a member of 
the General Court.”  
When the revolutionary struggle began, Sullivan took the side of the “popular 
party,” and “was among the most active and early in Maine to commit himself 
                                                        
24 Butterfield, Diary of John Adams, I, 357. 
25 John Adams Papers, June 29, 1774, Sullivan, I, 33. 
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unequivocally in open opposition to the aggressions of Parliament.”26  In 1774 
and 1775, Sullivan was elected to the Massachusetts Provincial Congress where 
he was assigned to the committee responsible for publishing the actions taken 
by the second Congress and to prepare an address to the people.  It would 
appear the finished product was substantially the work of Sullivan himself, as 
the address was similar in tone to many of Sullivan’s writings.  It began: 
“Friends and Fellow-sufferers: When a people, entitled to that freedom which 
your ancestors have nobly preserved as the richest inheritance of their children, 
are invaded by the hand of oppression, and trampled on by the merciless feet 
of tyranny, resistance is so far from being criminal that it becomes the Christian 
and social duty of each individual.”27  In addition to serving as moderator and 
member of the Committee of Public Safety in Biddeford, he also played an 
active and important role in the Provincial Congress.  Among other committee 
assignments, Sullivan was assigned to confer with the general officers on 
matters relating to the health of the soldiers, and to determine how best to 
distribute supplies to the army.28  At this same time Sullivan was appointed to 
the court of admiralty in the District of Maine. 
In addition to utilizing his legal skills, Judge Sullivan also managed to take an 
active part in the revolutionary struggle, despite his physical limitations.  
Following the outbreak of hostilities in Lexington and Concord on April 19, 
1775, he was sent to New Hampshire to inform that colony of what had 
happened and to discuss what steps were being taken in Massachusetts.  He 
also participated in the fortification of Falmouth Harbor and in the raising of 
troops in Maine.  In a letter addressed to the “People of the Massachusetts 
Bay,” Sullivan voiced his praise for the “grave and noble purpose of the war,” 
and spoke of the great difficulties that confronted everyone.  He blasted the 
British soldiers for acting like ‘robbers and murderers,’ and “for daring to 
assault [our] peaceful homes.”29  Sullivan also was appointed by the Congress to 
participate in an expedition to Fort Ticonderoga to evaluate and report on the 
state of that fortress.30  
After the Provincial Congress was reconstituted as the Provincial Assembly in 
1776, Sullivan was elected to that body where he again actively served on 
several committees.  Among his accomplishments were the drafting of laws 
“for the regulation of the militia, for the commencement and prosecution of                                                         
26 Ibid., 38. 
27 Amory, Sullivan, I, 44. 
28 Ibid., 50. 
29 Box 1, Folder 3,  James Sullivan Papers, Massachusetts Historical Society. 
30 Amory, Sullivan, I, 50. 
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civil actions, for the confiscation of estates of refugees and others inimical to 
their country.”31  Sullivan’s skill as a legislator and stature as a member of the 
bar was further rewarded in 1776 with an appointment to the state’s highest 
court, the Superior Court of the Judicature.  Though John Adams and James 
Warren were also selected by the Council to serve on the court, they declined 
to serve; Adams being an important member of the Continental Congress and 
Warren because he was presiding over the state assembly.  Sullivan, who was 
thirty-two years old at the time, would continue to serve on the state’s highest 
court until 1782.32  
In addition to serving on the court, Sullivan became one of the colonies most 
prolific contributors to the local newspapers.  At a time when newspapers and 
pamphlets served as the primary means of communication, Sullivan regularly 
submitted letters on any number of subjects that impacted the war effort.  In 
October 1776, for example, writing under the name Americanus, he spoke of the 
need to secure foreign assistance if the Americans were to have any chance of 
defeating Britain.  He argued that it would be in the “interest of the American 
states to depend, under the patronage of Heaven, upon themselves and such 
alliances as they may be able to come into with foreign states, for security in the 
enjoyment of those liberties we have an inalienable right to as men and as 
Christians, and not upon the British King and his Ministers, from whom we 
have suffered more than might have been expected had we been under the 
most arbitrary Government in Europe.”  Sullivan’s contempt for the British 
government, which remained with him until the day he died, always seemed to 
return to the theme of a jealous tyrant unwilling to tolerate American 
prosperity.  He observed, “no people or nation … could exist in a state of ease 
and affluence, without becoming the envy of some rapacious despot.”  At that 
time, he stated, “the king and parliament of Great Britain have been fatally 
persuaded to claim this whole continent, with its three millions of inhabitants, 
as their own property, and to be at their disposal.”33   
Sullivan not only condemned British imperial policy, but its defenders in 
America as well.  He branded everyone who opposed independence a “Tory.” 
In July 1776, writing under the name Plain Truth, he advised against treating 
friends of Britain too leniently, warning that they could “betray us into a fatal 
neglect.”34  He warned of subversive activity throughout the war, and in 
particular of Tory spies who, he alleged, were attending county conventions to                                                         
31 Ibid., 64. 
32 Ibid., 79. 
33 Box 1, Folder 3, Sullivan Papers, MHS. 
34 Box 1, Folder 15, Sullivan Papers, MHS. 
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complain of high taxes and otherwise stir up trouble.  He referred to them as 
wolves in sheep’s clothing that had to be exposed and rooted out.  Referring 
specifically to a letter written by a man identified as Walter, whom he 
considered a traitor and a ‘Tory priest,’ Sullivan warned that such individuals 
were there to foster dissention and promote opposition to the revolutionary 
government.  Sullivan declared Tories were “the servants and instruments of 
the tyrant and Satan,” and that “they will ever seek to disturb the peace and 
prosperity of our country, even after peace shall be agreed to and independence 
acknowledged by Britain.”  Therefore, he warned, everyone had to guard 
against “their evil machinations.”  After all, he added, “A sincere conviction in 
Tories is never to be expected.  They commonly discover themselves, by 
hypocritical lamentations for the “distress of heavy taxes,” and a whining wish 
“that we were not now as happy as in former days,” and by long faces and 
groaning queries “whether Britain would have laid on us a burden equal to our 
taxes.”  These traits, he concluded, were “Tory marks, and they should be 
noticed by the people, and reproved.”35  
“It is childish,” he instructed readers in 1782, “to complain of evils that are 
unavoidable, … [particularly when] the crown of independence and glory is in 
full view before us.”  He would often return to the familiar and optimistic 
theme that: “there is not a nation or people in the world that has so great and 
so glorious a prospect as the United States,” and that “all the nations of the 
world are our natural friends excepting only the British.”  Therefore, he asked, 
how could “we complain of the price which we give for such superlative 
blessings.”36  
In the years after the Revolution, Sullivan continued to participate actively in 
public affairs.  His habit of taking a practical view of events, coupled with his 
practice of writing about and debating issues of government and public finance, 
made him an ideal person to help the people of Massachusetts come to terms 
with the changing political dynamic, as the Commonwealth transitioned from a 
colony to a state in a federal system of government.  Sullivan utilized his legal 
skills and the political lessons he learned during the war to provide much 
needed support and encouragement to the new federal government.  As the 
most visible Republican in a state dominated by Federalists, Sullivan initially 
served as an important voice to those who were reluctant to cede authority to 
the new national government.  Once he heeded the dire warnings of Federal 
officials, however, Sullivan’s advocacy for a properly financed national                                                         
35 Box 1, Folder 15, Sullivan Papers, MHS. 
36 Box 1, Folder 14, July 18, 1782, Sullivan Papers, MHS. 
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government was unmatched.  Thereafter, his consistent promotion of the 
union, even when national policy collided with regional concerns, made 
Sullivan a respected and influential leader during the Jeffersonian Era.   
B. Introduction to Christopher Gore 
James Sullivan was a studious fourteen year-old learning to live with his 
deformed legs in a small farming village in the District of Maine when 
Christopher Gore was born in Boston, in September 1758.  Gore’s family had 
deep roots in colonial America.  Unlike Sullivan, whose parents had emigrated 
from Ireland, making James a first generation colonial, Gore’s great-great 
grandparents, John and Rhoda Gore, had immigrated to Massachusetts from 
Hampshire, England in the 1630’s.  They settled in Roxbury where they 
became active members in the Puritan community.  Although he started out 
with only four acres of land, John Gore eventually accumulated 188 acres, 
making him one of the largest landowners in the community.37   
In 1710, John’s son Obadiah Gore, a carpenter, moved from Roxbury to 
Boston where there were greater opportunities.38  Thereafter, Obadiah’s son, 
and Christopher’s father, John, became an artisan who specialized in painting 
coaches and coats of arms for the colony’s aristocrats.39  Although not a rich or 
powerful man, John Gore had, like his father and grandfather before him, 
improved his family’s position in Boston.  The family owned a pew in the 
Brattle Street Church, and John “held minor offices in government, and he 
acquired his own shop and other property.”  He and wife Frances had 13 
children, of which Christopher, born on September 21, 1758, was the tenth.40  
Christopher Gore grew up in Boston at a time when political debate was 
becoming increasingly bitter and partisan.  While Christopher’s older brother 
Samuel joined the Sons of Liberty, his father was an unabashed Tory like most 
of his customers.  John Gore irrevocably aligned himself with the British 
government in 1774 when he signed an address with 120 other Loyalists in 
support of former Governor Thomas Hutchinson, following the governor’s 
recall to London.41  The division in the family was made complete when the 
elder Gore was obliged to take flight from Boston with the British troops, 
along with eleven hundred other Loyalists, in March 1776.  The General Court 
listed John Gore as one of the most notorious Loyalists and confiscated his                                                         
37 Helen R. Pinkney, Christopher Gore: Federalist of Massachusetts (Waltham, 1969), 4-5. 
38 Pinkney, Gore, 5. 
39 Ibid., 3. 
40 Ibid., 4. 
41 Ibid., 11. 
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property. 42  Meanwhile, Christopher, not yet eighteen years old and attending 
Harvard College, remained in Boston with the rest of his family.  Shortly after 
his father’s departure and while still in school, Christopher joined the 
Continental Army as a clerk with an artillery unit.  Gore would later be 
successful in petitioning the General Court for the release of a portion of the 
confiscated funds and property for the support of himself and his three 
unmarried sisters.43  
During his senior year at Harvard in 1778, Gore joined a group of students 
who regularly met to discuss politics and literature.  It was as a member of this 
group that he first came into contact with several men who would later make 
names for themselves in law, politics, and medicine.  Among them, was Rufus 
King, a young man with whom Gore had a lifelong friendship.  Upon 
graduation from Harvard, Gore studied law with John Lowell, one of the 
attorneys who had frequented James Sullivan’s home when riding the circuit in 
the District of Maine in the years leading up to the Revolution.  Moreover, and 
more importantly for Gore, Lowell was a respected and highly influential judge 
whose family would help shape New England’s history for two centuries.44  
Unlike Sullivan, who had to win a fistfight in a backwoods New Hampshire 
town in order to begin his legal studies, Gore was welcomed into the law office 
of the one most esteemed men in Boston.  Indeed, Gore’s relationship with 
John Lowell would open many doors for the young attorney and provide 
access to an exclusive club of business and banking leaders.  As a member of 
this select group, Gore would frequently take advantage of numerous business 
and financial opportunities unavailable to the vast majority of citizens, and his 
inclusion in this group certainly helped shape his economic and political views 
in the years to come. 
Gore’s apprenticeship was shorter than most.  Although the Suffolk County 
Bar usually required three years of study with a member of the bar before a 
student could practice as an attorney before the court of common pleas, Gore 
was allowed to plead cases before the Superior Court of Judicature, on which 
Sullivan served, after only two years of study.  After John Lowell presented the 
necessary recommendations of “ability, achievement, and character,” the 
Suffolk County Bar admitted Gore as a member.  He opened an office in State 
Street and began the practice of law.45 
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Unlike his father who had fled Massachusetts with other Loyalists in 1776, 
Christopher Gore supported the Revolutionary cause.  Like his father, 
however, who had worked with and catered to the wealthy merchants and 
ruling elite of Boston, the younger Gore identified with Boston’ upper class.  
His view of the world was shaped largely in this environment of privilege and 
deference.  He embraced the ideals of custom, tradition, stability and order.  
Although Gore believed in representative government, he also believed that 
government should be run by men of property and wealth, and/or men who 
had proven themselves in the world of business, and who had a stake in the 
success of the government.  To that end, after securing his own financial 
future, Gore entered politics and served as a passionate advocate for the 
merchant class and ruling elite.  
Gore’s public career would be defined by his efforts to defend and maintain the 
old order, to promote regional commercial interests and to oppose any measure 
that would harm those individuals and business entities that had made 
Massachusetts prosper for so many decades.  As a Federalist, he defended the 
need for a strong national government and actively promoted the ratification of 
the Constitution.  After Republican candidates began to enjoy more and more 
electoral success at the national level, however, Gore began to focus his energy 
on preserving the power of the state government where he and other 
Federalists continued to exercise power and influence. 
C. Introduction to Rufus King 
Christopher Gore’s good friend and Harvard classmate, Rufus King, was born 
in Scarborough, Maine, in 1755.  His grandfather, John King had emigrated 
from England shortly after 1700, and settled in Boston.  John’s son, Richard, 
was born in 1718, and by 1740, lived in Watertown, Massachusetts.  Richard 
established himself as a trader and worked as a purchasing agent for Ebenezer 
Thornton, one of the wealthiest merchants in Boston.  It was while he was 
purchasing timber for Thornton in Scarborough, Maine, that Richard King 
decided to settle in that area.  Over the next thirty years, the elder King would 
not only become a successful merchant, but a successful farmer as well.46  He 
eventually owned over three thousand acres of land and became the largest 
exporter of lumber in Maine, and also one of the wealthiest creditors in the 
region.  On the evening of March 19, 1766, King’s home was attacked by a 
large group of rioters, which included several men who owed him money.  
Disguised as Indians, and calling themselves ‘Sons of Liberty,’ they ransacked                                                         
46 Charles R. King, The Life and Correspondence of Rufus King (New York, 1894), I, 1. 
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and set fire to the house, destroying most of King’s private papers, including 
deeds and notes. Attempts to bring the assailants to justice resulted in years of 
frustration for King.47   
Though much of the antagonism towards Richard King stemmed from the fact 
he was a wealthy creditor, he was also an avowed loyalist.  At the time of the 
tea riots in Boston in 1773 and 1774, King criticized political radicalism.  He 
wrote “Our only safety is in remaining firm to that stock of which we are a 
branch; and as a prudent man guards against a pestilential air when a plague is 
in the city, so should we guard against those false patriots … who advise us to 
resist, break off, and prevent that grand circulation whereby we are become a 
great plant, contributing to the strength and glory of the stock.”  King paid a 
price for his loyalist leanings.  In June 1774, a group of rioters in Scarborough 
again attacked his home.  They forced King to his knees and compelled him to 
recant his loyalist beliefs.  King died nine months later in March 1775, one 
month before the Battle of Lexington and Concord.48 
Richard King’s son, Rufus, was just shy of his eleventh birthday at the time of 
the first attack on his home.  One year later, at the age of twelve, he began 
attending the prestigious Byfield Academy in Newburyport.  Six years later, in 
1773, at the age of eighteen, he was admitted to Harvard College, where he was 
exposed to the revolutionary political ideas then being debated in Boston.  He 
had only been there a short time when Samuel Langdon was appointed 
president of Harvard, in July 1774.  According to then governor Thomas 
Hutchinson, Langdon’s appointment reflected the growing ‘influence of 
politics on the affairs of the college.’49  In fact, Langdon joined with Hancock 
and the other Massachusetts patriots in openly and boldly opposing the British 
Government, and may well have won the Harvard presidency for that reason.50 
It was into this world that King entered and came of age, together with his 
fellow classmate and best friend, Christopher Gore.  
When King’s father died in March 1775, he owned a great deal of land but little 
cash.  King’s brother-in-law, Dr. Robert Southgate, settled the estate, sold off 
land, and advanced money to the young King to complete his education.51  A 
few months later, in April 1775, following the battle of Lexington and 
Concord, King and his classmates were asked to vacate the buildings at 
Harvard so they could be used to house American troops.  Classes were                                                         
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48 Ernst, Rufus King, 12-13.  
49 King, Rufus King, I, 3. 
50 Quincy, History of Harvard, II, 162.) 
51 Ibid., I, 4. 
 21 
suspended and King moved to Newburyport where he began expressing his 
strong views on the subject of the ‘cause.’  In a letter to his brother-in-law, he 
observed that “[General] Gage has at this period sent out a most scandalously 
false relation of known facts, and after offering in his poor way safety and 
protection to every one who shall be so wicked and so abandoned a villain as to 
desert his country’s cause, he with great appearance of pomp and pious sanctity 
denounces death and confiscation to every one who shall not comply with his 
despicable request.”  “But,” he added, “America spurns the production of the 
petty tyrant, and treating it with deserved contempt, stands firm upon the 
pillars of liberty, immovable as Heaven and determined as fate.”52  Within a 
year, King’s best friend’s father would be one of those who accepted Gage’s 
offer and fled from Boston. 
King graduated form Harvard in 1777 and began studying law in Newburyport 
under the esteemed Theophilus Parsons, who served for many years as Chief 
Justice of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court.  Like his good friend, 
Gore, King could not have been better situated as he began his legal career.  
Unlike Sullivan, Gore and King began their legal studies under the best of 
circumstances and under the guidance of the premier and most financially 
successful attorneys in the country.53  
While he studied law, King gave his full support to the patriot cause.  During 
the summer of 1778, a detachment of troops under the command of General 
Glover, who joined General John Sullivan in an attempt to retake Rhode 
Island, came through Newburyport.  King immediately volunteered to serve 
and soon became aid-de-camp to Glover.54  His tenure as a soldier during the 
Revolution was brief, as he was dismissed soon after the failure of Sullivan’s 
expedition.  One incident, however, did impress upon him the reality of the 
war.  While sitting with General Glover and several other soldiers at the 
breakfast table in a house more than a mile from the front, firing was heard in 
the distance.  General Glover asked King to mount his horse and find out from 
where the firing was coming.  After King got up from the table, his friend and 
fellow volunteer, Henry Sherburne, sat down in his vacated chair at the table.  
As soon as King left the room, a spent cannon ball came crashing through an 
open window and struck Sherburne, injuring him badly, and necessitating the 
amputation of his leg.55  After his brief tenure in the military, King returned to 
Newburyport and resumed the study of law.  He was admitted to the bar in                                                         
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1780 and soon gained a reputation as an excellent attorney and a particularly 
gifted speaker.   
Although King did not see further wartime action, he followed events closely 
and didn’t hesitate to express his political opinions.  In particular, he wrote 
contemptuously of England’s military commanders, noting “their land 
commanders are debauchers and [are] ambitious of fortunes & pleasure more 
than fame & the glory of their nation.”  He further observed that “the immense 
fortunes which the land & sea commanders have extorted from the wretched 
defenseless East Indians, have proved a fountain of corruption that has 
poisoned the British Nation,” and that “I think their glory is in the wane & that 
her naval power is critically situated.”56  
King’s politics were very much in line with those of his Harvard classmates and 
with Parsons, the conservative jurist who served as his legal mentor.  These 
men, who would later be referred to as Federalists, viewed the role of 
government similarly, as they did the qualifications needed for government 
leaders.  Like Gore, King understood society was comprised of those with 
property and those without.  He was equally certain that only those who were 
properly educated and financially secure should run government, and saw no 
contradiction in embracing the idea of a republican form of government run by 
a prosperous and well-educated elite.  Having been born into affluence, King 
was comfortable with the habits of privilege and deference.   
D. Introduction to John Quincy Adams 
John Quincy Adams was born on July 11, 1767, in Braintree, Massachusetts.  
At the time of his birth, his father John Adams was already a highly respected 
lawyer and recognized throughout the colony as the author of the “Braintree 
Instructions,” written in 1765, in opposition to the Stamp Act.  The 
Instructions were quickly adopted by forty towns in Massachusetts and played a 
pivotal role in Parliament’s repeal of the Stamp Act in the spring of 1766.  The 
elder Adams was not the only political leader in Quincy Adam’s lineage.  His 
great-grand grandfather, Colonel John Quincy, who died on the same day 
Quincy Adams was christened, had been Braintree’s leading citizen when John 
Adams was a boy, serving as speaker of the Massachusetts Assembly, colonel 
of the militia, as well as a member of the Governor’s Council.  Colonel 
Quincy’s impressive home and property, known as ‘Mount Wollaston,’ had 
already been a Braintree landmark for decades when John Quincy Adams was 
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born.  John and Abigail Adams were paying honor to his memory when they 
gave their first son his middle name.57  
It didn’t take long for the young Quincy Adams, who was taught to read and 
write at home, to reveal his uniquely serious and critical personality.  Shortly 
after learning to write, he expressed concern at his progress in a letter to his 
cousin.  He wrote that he “made But veray (sic) little proviciancy(sic) in 
reading,” and suggested that perhaps “to(o) much of my time in play (th)ere is a 
great Deal of room for me to grow better…”58  Quincy Adams was only six 
years old at the time.  Shortly thereafter, he began his more formal education.  
Instead of having their son educated in the town school, John and Abigail 
Adams had him taught by John’s law clerks, and it was prophetic that John 
Adams would insist that his son be taught French, the language of diplomacy.   
Two months after the Revolutionary War began at Lexington and Concord, 
and a few weeks before his eighth birthday, Quincy Adams and his mother 
watched the Battle of Bunker Hill from a hilltop near their Braintree home.  
This event must have had a profound impact on the boy, as he referred to it in 
vivid detail more than seventy years later.  Though very young, he was able to 
contribute to the revolutionary struggle in his own way, serving as a mail carrier 
between Boston and Braintree.  Quincy Adams was ten years old when he 
traveled to Europe with his father in February 1778, after the elder Adams had 
been appointed American Envoy to France.  While on board ship, at the 
direction of his father and with the help of a French army surgeon, he was able 
to continue his study of the French language.59  Upon arriving in France, 
Adams began attending school with the grandson of Benjamin Franklin, who 
had already been serving as a commissioner in France when Adams arrived. 
While in France, Quincy Adams and his father paid a visit to Joshua Johnson, a 
successful merchant who had decided to settle in France with his large family 
rather than risk a trip back to the United States in time of war.  Twelve year old 
John Quincy Adams may or may not have been introduced to Johnson’s four 
year old daughter, Catherine, whom he would marry seventeen years later.60  
After returning home briefly to Braintree in late summer 1779, the elder Adams 
was again asked by the government to return to Paris.  This time, he took not 
only Quincy Adams, but also his younger son Charles.  Joining the Adams’ on 
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this trip was Francis Dana, a young Harvard lawyer and former delegate to the 
Continental Congress, who was assigned to be the secretary to the commission. 
While John Adams traveled through Europe, trying to borrow money for the 
United States government, Quincy Adams began studying at the ancient 
University of Leyden, one of the most prestigious universities in Europe.61  
Much younger than the other students, the precocious Quincy Adams received 
private tutoring and attended as many lectures as he wanted.  Though lacking a 
formal curriculum, he enjoyed the life of an independent scholar with access to 
the leading thinkers in Europe.  The elder Adams had in the interim, been 
appointed Minister to Holland.  Then, in 1781, before his fourteenth birthday, 
Quincy Adams was offered the position of secretary to Francis Dana, who had 
been assigned to serve as the first United States Minister to Russia.  It would be 
Dana’s job to convince Empress Catherine II to recognize the new republic, 
and he needed someone who could speak French, the language of the Russian 
court.62  Dana and his fourteen-year-old assistant traveled over 2,400 miles by 
land to reach St. Petersburg.  Young Quincy Adams spent almost two difficult 
years away from his family in the cold and isolated Russian capital.  Though he 
would later regret that his education during this time had been haphazard and 
informal at best, it did provide him with a rare opportunity and a tremendous 
learning experience.  
Quincy Adams was sixteen years old when he left St. Petersburg, spending the 
next several months traveling alone before being reunited with his father in 
Holland, in 1783.  The elder Adams wrote to his wife that their son had 
matured incredibly during their separation: “He is grown to a Man of 
Understanding as well as Stature.”63  John Adams had been successful at 
gaining Dutch recognition and was referred to as the American Ambassador 
from the United States.  Then, after being directed to help negotiate a treaty 
with Britain, John Adams took his son to London, leading him on a tour of 
Buckingham Palace and the Houses of Parliament.  As he had in Paris, Quincy 
Adams also enjoyed going to the theater on a regular basis. His critique of a 
1783 performance of Hamlet at the Drury Lane Theater in London, evidenced 
his sophistication: “I must confess,” he wrote in his diary, “I do not think they 
act Tragedy so well here as in Paris: the Tragedy was not acted, as I expected it 
would be: there is I think something like affectation; throughout the actors.  
They lay an emphasis upon almost every word; yet in some places they speak,                                                         
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both too low and too slow.”64  Day after day, his diary entries referred to visits 
to bookstores, museums, and lectures, in addition to several different theaters.  
John Quincy Adams, at sixteen, was very much a European gentleman, and 
much changed from the ten year old boy who left Braintree, Massachusetts in 
1777. 
E. A New Government in Massachusetts 
While Christopher Gore and Rufus King were beginning their legal careers in 
Boston, James Sullivan was actively engaged in the debate over the creation of 
a new state constitution.  From 1776 through the end of the war, all but two 
American states debated and drafted new constitutions.  The Commonwealth 
of Massachusetts was in the forefront of this effort, commencing its 
constitution making initiative in 1777.  The General Court appointed a joint 
committee comprised of house and council members to prepare a first draft for 
consideration.  Massachusetts was the only state to require the people to ratify 
the draft constitution, a process that represented a significant step forward in 
the building of the new republic.    
Historian Lawrence Friedman suggests “Constitutionalism answered to a deep-
seated need, among members of the articulate public, for formal, outward signs 
of political legitimacy.”65  Indeed, not everyone was pleased with the idea of 
creating a new government, particularly while the country was at war.  Sullivan, 
for example, who was serving on the state’s highest court and had just been re-
elected to the Provincial Assembly, wrote from his Biddeford home to Speaker 
Warren that he was “very uneasy since I heard that you were upon a plan for a 
new constitution.”  In particular, he was concerned that controversial issues 
could so alienate one side or the other that it would hurt the war effort. “I 
dread the controversy about the qualifications of electors,” he wrote, “and am 
apprehensive that, whenever it is determined, let it be in favor of the men of 
estate, or to give all an equal vote, one party or the other will be disaffected, if 
not lost.”  He insisted, “This is surely no time to make divisions among 
ourselves.”66 
Perhaps more than any Massachusetts political leader of the time, Sullivan 
stressed the importance of unity and argued that all parties must remain 
focused on the war until the cause was won.  Undeterred by Sullivan’s warning, 
the General Court’s joint committee presented their report in January 1778,                                                         
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and submitted it to the voters.  Just as Sullivan had feared, the proposed 
constitution was hotly debated and ultimately rejected by the voters by a large 
margin.  Most notably, the proposed constitution contained a property 
qualification, which Sullivan opposed.  As he would many times later, Sullivan 
supported the promotion of rights for the common citizen and the idea of 
universal manhood suffrage.67  In a letter to Elbridge Gerry two years earlier, 
he set forth his view on the matter of suffrage: 
Every member of Society has a Right to give his Consent to the Laws of 
the Community or he owes no Obedience to them.  This proposition 
will never be denied by him who has the least acquaintance with true 
republican principles.  And yet a very great number of the people of this 
Colony have at all times been bound by Laws to which they never were 
in a Capacity to Consent not having estate worth 40/ per annum & c … 
Why a man is supposed to consent to the acts of a Society of which in 
this respect he is absolutely an Excommunicate, none but a Lawyer well 
dabbled in the feudal System can tell.68   
The person who would most influence the drafting of the Massachusetts 
constitution disagreed with Sullivan on this issue, however.  In a letter written 
to Sullivan after Gerry shared Sullivan’s letter with him, John Adams argued 
that there were certain individuals, including women, children and those 
without property who didn’t have the proper understanding of public affairs to 
have the vote.  In the case of those who were wholly destitute of property, he 
insisted they were “too dependent upon other men to have a will of their own” 
and “too little acquainted with public affairs to form a right judgment.”  He 
further reasoned that it was appropriate to fix a property limit, just as it is right 
to set an age requirement.  After all, he argued, “you must fix upon some 
period in life, when the understanding and will of men in general, is fit to be 
trusted by the public.  Will not the same reason justify the state in fixing upon 
some certain quantity of property, as a qualification?”69  Though Sullivan lost 
his initial fight for universal suffrage, he remained actively engaged in the effort 
to ratify a state constitution.   
In February 1778, Sullivan sold his house in Biddeford and moved to Groton, 
in Middlesex County.  It was while he was living in Groton that he was chosen 
to be that town’s representative to the convention that had been called to make                                                         
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another effort at drafting a constitution.70  Not surprisingly, as soon as the 
group of approximately 250 convened in Cambridge in September 1779, 
Sullivan took an active role in the proceedings.  In addition to serving on the 
five-member committee responsible for the drafting of the rules for the 
convention, he also served on the all-important committee assigned to draft the 
bill of rights and constitution.  The committee agreed that John Adams, 
perhaps better schooled in political theory than anyone in the country, would 
write the first draft. 71  Though Adams, who completed his work in late 
October 1779, before departing for his new assignment as Minister to France, 
is rightfully credited with being the chief architect of the Massachusetts 
Constitution, Sullivan played an active and substantive role in the proceedings 
and his influence was evident.  In particular, Articles VI and VII of the 
Declaration of Rights spoke directly to Sullivan and his republican politics.  
Article VI stated “No man, nor corporation, or association of men, have any 
other title to obtain advantages, or particular and exclusive privileges, distinct 
from those of the community, than what arises from the consideration of 
services rendered to the public; and this title begin in nature neither hereditary, 
nor transmissible to children, or descendants, or relations by blood, the idea of 
a man born a magistrate, lawgiver, or judge, is absurd and unnatural.”  Article 
VII declared “Government is instituted for the common good; for the 
protection, safety, prosperity and happiness of the people; and not for the 
profit, honor, or private interest of any one man, family, or class of men …”  
In addition to drafting several resolves relating to the business of the 
convention, Sullivan served on the committee responsible for making the final 
revisions to the document and then worked with Samuel Adams on an address 
to the people.  The people of Massachusetts ratified the constitution in 1780.72  
Although the final document contained a property qualification, the proposed 
constitution was strongly supported by Sullivan.  His commitment to hard 
work and his willingness to compromise made Sullivan the ideal person to 
serve on such a committee.   
After the constitution went into operation in October 1780, the people of 
Massachusetts selected a chief executive for the first time.  The honor went to 
John Hancock, who was re-elected twelve times thereafter, from 1780-1785, 
and again from 1787 until his death in 1793.  Hancock, the quintessential 
politician, was, according to historian Paul Goodman, “a master of factional 
politics,” who “achieved pre-eminence by isolating rivals, cultivating allies,                                                         
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carefully nurturing personal popularity, and avoiding difficult decisions.”73  
Among the more important allies he would cultivate, Goodman noted, was the 
“inveterate newspaper polemicist,” and noted judge, James Sullivan.74  Sullivan 
soon became one of Hancock’s closest friends as well as key political ally and 
advisor.  As Hancock biographer William Fowler noted, “the person with the 
most influence” over the governor was Sullivan because he had “keen political 
instincts and he was well acquainted with the sometimes convoluted nature of 
Massachusetts politics.”75  The two men were close friends and political allies 
for over twenty years.  Like Sullivan, Hancock was a man of the people, but 
unlike Sullivan, he was born into wealth.  Goodman argued “Hancock was a 
master of the art of popularity,” and described the Commonwealths first 
governor as “a punctilious provincial aristocrat glorying in pomp, pageantry, 
and high born manners,” who “shrewdly added the common touch, providing 
firewood for the poor in winter and music on the Common in summer.”76  
Sullivan, however, saw him as a genuine defender of the common man and 
remained loyal to the state’s first governor for the rest of his life.   
In the months following the adoption of the Massachusetts constitution, there 
was much public debate over such philosophical issues as to how government 
officials should conduct themselves and how citizens should behave in a 
republican society.  To many older patriot leaders like Samuel Adams, 
Hancock’s rise to power signified the emergence of “a new crew” that had won 
power by “forming a Coalition of Parties and confounding the Distinction 
between Whigs and Tories, Virtue & Vice.”77  Adams was president of the 
Senate in 1781, and somewhat utopian in his views, given his advocacy of 
impractical social and political ideals.  He wrote a series of articles under the 
name Consistent Republican in which he was critical of the governor for his 
entertainment expenditures and for his distribution of a large number of 
justices of the peace.  Adams believed the governor was simply looking to gain 
popularity while turning his eye away from immoral behavior.  
Many people, including Sullivan, came to the governor’s defense. Having been 
a judge for many years and having heard every manner of case, Sullivan would 
have been witness to the darker side of human nature and understood the 
legitimacy of competing claims.  He respected Hancock’s ability to compromise 
and to bring people together, just as he had done in the debate over the state                                                         
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constitution.  As a successful politician, he understood the need to make 
friends and create alliances, and he recognized the importance of compromise.  
As a businessman in the District of Maine before the war, he also understood 
the need for progress and creative thinking.  In short, Sullivan was a pragmatist 
who understood what could and could not be expected of elected officials.   
Writing under the name Honest Republican, Sullivan consistently defended the 
governor, and, responding to Adams criticism that the governor was spending 
far too much time entertaining his friends and supporters, suggested that ‘social 
entertainments were necessary, particularly during difficult times,’ and that it 
was important for ‘public cheerfulness.’  Sullivan, though somewhat of a prude 
himself, did agree that “dancing, within reasonable limits, was an innocent 
diversion, and not to be discouraged,” as Samuel Adams had suggested.  More 
importantly, however, Sullivan believed that such petty criticisms were 
detrimental to the war effort and counter-productive to the operation of 
government.  After all, Sullivan would contend, they were still at war and it was 
necessary for all parties to come together and act as one.  To that end, Sullivan 
was somewhat successful in bringing the two old friends and patriots back 
together.  Amory observed that Sullivan’s “relations with both became 
exceedingly intimate and confidential, and continued uninterrupted while they 
lived.” 78  Sullivan sympathized with Adams in many respects, but he supported 
John Hancock as he did no other.   
Sullivan further proved his loyalty to Hancock by remaining on the state’s 
highest court, even when it was financially burdensome to do so.  Shortly after 
his election as governor in the fall of 1780, Hancock issued a proclamation 
declaring that all persons holding judicial appointments should continue at their 
posts.  Sullivan was still a member of the state’s supreme court – the Supreme 
Judicial Court, along with Cushing, Sargent, and Sewall.79  The justices were 
paid very little, and what pay they did receive was in depreciated paper.  In 
addition, they were obliged to travel a great deal which required further 
expenditures of their own funds.  As a result, Sullivan noted, it was increasingly 
difficult to serve as a judge during this period unless you were independently 
wealthy.  Nonetheless, he continued to serve on the bench for almost two 
more years. 
In 1782, after the justice’s request that their allowance be increased was denied, 
Sullivan, “finding the amount decided upon altogether unequal to the 
increasing demands” upon him, reluctantly submitted his resignation to                                                         
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Governor Hancock. 80  Sullivan noted that he had gone into debt because of his 
service to the Commonwealth, in part because he hadn’t been reimbursed for 
his expenses.  In a letter to a friend in 1782, Sullivan spelled out his financial 
difficulties: “until the last year I have not, since the year 1776, had as much of 
the government as would pay my traveling expenses, including horse-hire, and 
for those articles which were unnecessary at home, but absolutely indispensable 
while going on circuit,” and “this has involved me in a debt that cannot be paid 
with three hundred a year, for I find that the three hundred is not quite equal to 
two.”81  
Sullivan, however, did not blame the governor for this injustice, but the 
General Assembly.  He observed “those whom I thought to be the active and 
leading members of the Assembly promised to do us justice, or I should have 
quitted years before.”82  Clearly frustrated with the lack of financial support 
from the legislature after several years of service, Sullivan took stock of his 
precarious financial situation.  At the time of his resignation from the bench, 
Sullivan was almost thirty-eight years old with a growing family to support.  He 
would later explain to his son that he had no choice but to resign from the 
bench and begin making a living to provide for his family.83  As further 
evidence of his apparent frustration, Sullivan also declined to serve as a 
delegate to the Continental Convention at Philadelphia, a position to which he 
had been elected.  Though he opened an office in Boston and began the full-
time practice of law, Sullivan did not remove himself from public life.   He 
actively participated in the growing debate over public finance and the 
economic issues threatening the life of the new republic.84   
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Chapter II     
Post War Challenges in Massachusetts  
In the years following the ratification of the Massachusetts Constitution, James 
Sullivan, Christopher Gore, Rufus King, and, eventually and briefly, John 
Quincy Adams practiced law.  All four men also were drawn into politics.  
Each sought solutions to the republic’s pressing political and economic issues, 
Gore and Sullivan in Massachusetts and King and Quincy Adams with the 
fledgling national government.  Three of the four men would initially steer a 
traditional and conservative path through several years of debate and 
controversy over the proper meaning of republican government.  The fourth, 
Sullivan, would emerge from the revolutionary struggle with a much broader, 
more inclusive, egalitarian view of republicanism. 
A. Sullivan, Gore and King Adjust  
Following his resignation from the Supreme Judicial Court in 1782, Sullivan 
built his legal practice, but he did not withdraw from public life.  In addition to 
serving in the General Court, where he could make policy, he also published 
dozens of essays and made regular contributions to the region’s newspapers, 
promoting his views about the cluster of new issues to which independence 
and the new political order had given rise.  As was customary at the time, 
regular contributors to these newspapers used pen names.  These gazettes, 
which were published weekly, were circulated widely throughout the colonies.85  
No liberty was more widely enjoyed than that of freedom of the press, as it 
provided an informative and entertaining forum to discuss the critical issues of 
the day.  Sullivan wrote almost daily, and among the names under which he 
wrote were Plain Truth, Americanus, Zenas, Honest Republican, and Independent 
Freeholder.  While he lived in Groton, many of his essays appeared in the 
Worcester Spy, whose first editor, Isaiah Thomas, was a good friend of Sullivan’s.  
His articles were also seen in such Boston papers as the Gazette, Independent 
Chronicle, and Evening Post.  In particular, Sullivan was a regular contributor to 
the Independent Chronicle, which was considered ‘republican in creed.’  He 
contributed articles to this paper with little interruption for nearly forty years, 
on religion, politics, law, public finance, municipal reform, and the “habits, 
manners and morals of the people.” 86  These writings not only provide detailed 
evidence of how well versed Sullivan was in several disciplines, but also may 
help to explain his future success at the polls in Massachusetts.                                                           
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Sullivan addressed the issues that people were concerned about, and he spoke 
with authority.  Like an attorney arguing before a jury, Sullivan would 
methodically lay out his case before giving his closing argument.  The majority 
of his writings revolved around the goals of free, responsive and efficient 
government.  In particular and not surprisingly, given where he had come from, 
he embraced the promise of freedom and opportunity, and spent his adult life 
promoting them.87  Sullivan’s reaction to events taking place in Ireland during 
this period gave some indication as to how he would respond to British acts of 
aggression against the United States in the coming years.  He saw the British as 
the great threat to freedom and independence throughout the world.  His vocal 
and lifelong support of the Irish cause was certainly consistent with his belief in 
republican government and freedom of opportunity.  Even though Sullivan 
rejected “Popery,” he did not reject the land of his father’s birth or the people 
whom he believed had been under the thumb of British oppression for 
centuries.  In a letter addressed to “The Irish Nation,” in 1782, Sullivan, writing 
under the name Consideration, declared, “…every true American is delighted 
with the rising freedom of Ireland, and … anticipates her independence and 
Hibernian sovereignty.”  He added, “It has ever been a matter of astonishment 
to the enlightened, that a nation so liberal, so spirited and wise as the Irish 
should, for multiple ages, be the footstool of a tyrant neighbor.”  But, he 
continued, “everything has its time; and the period of Irish bondage seems to 
be past, the glorious dawn of freedom rises in her political sky.  This is a period 
marked out by providence for great events.  America is already independent; 
and she [waits] for the auspicious hour to arrive, when her gallant sister Ireland 
shall triumph in the same independence and sovereignty.”  He concluded his 
letter with a customary anti-British flourish, observing “it is time that the 
insolent, the perfidious and cruel tyrant, Britain, should be brought down, and 
her haughtiness lick the dust; her crimes have reached unto heaven and she 
hath filled the earth with blood.”  Now was the time, Sullivan declared, 
“Providence opened the pearly gate to America, [which had] taken her seat in 
the temple of liberty.”  He asked: “shall Ireland pause while the portals are 
open and her American sister beckons her to come in and join the triumphant 
circle of the free?”88    
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As a means of encouraging Americans in their fight against the British, and 
suggesting to them that they were not alone, Sullivan reminded his readers: 
The gallant sons of Ireland have sacrificed rivers of blood in fighting the 
battles of freemen in every country, and can they suffer their own to 
remain under the yoke?  Shall America again weep for her sister, in 
British chains, and say, ‘she had not the spirit to be free’?  The blessed 
opportunity now offers, but the offer may never be repeated.”  He 
encouraged the people of Ireland to do as the Americans had done six 
years earlier; to “declare yourselves independent, and independent you 
will be.  Britain cannot now oppose it; and the rest of the world are your 
friends.89  
As critical as many Americans were of the British government during these 
years, few could match the wrath of James Sullivan.  He argued, for example, 
that Britain “considers herself as the rightful mistress of the world, and that the 
other nations should be subservient to her views and interests,” and that “she 
has trampled under foot all the laws of god and nature, set honor, justice, truth 
and humanity at defiance, and by every means of desolation, laid waste and 
murdered all who have opposed her diabolical will.”  He believed that English 
historians had lied and distorted England’s past and that “the true history of 
British conduct towards Ireland for many ages, and towards America during 
this war, will demonstrate the truth of all that is here told of her.90   
Sullivan was not only critical of the British Parliament, but of the king himself, 
suggesting the sovereign had “left no crime uncommitted,” and that “every 
engine of cruelty and abomination has been by him employed, and seven years 
of murder and desolation have not satiated this malicious tyrant.”  The king, 
Sullivan argued, “still thirsts for blood and is now exerting every power to 
detach all other nations from the United States, that he may still [glut] his 
vengeance in their destruction.”91  
By 1782, when Sullivan was returning to the practice of law in front of the 
bench instead of behind it, Christopher Gore had firmly established himself in 
the Boston legal community.  Opening a law office in Boston after the 
outbreak of war was surprisingly easy for Gore, given the fact that so many of 
the region’s best lawyers had fled the city with the other Tories.  Therefore, it 
was an ideal time to begin the practice of law, as he received a larger share of                                                         
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the town’s business than he otherwise would.  The primary focus of Gore’s 
practice was in the area of collection law, representing both local and distant 
creditors in the collection of debts.   
Because of the sharp increase in trade during the war, Gore had certainly 
chosen an opportune time to begin this type of practice.  Despite Britain’s 
blockade, there was a great deal of privateering taking place in and around the 
ports of Boston, which resulted in general prosperity for area merchants and 
their legal representatives.  In time of war some individuals benefit financially, 
and the American Revolution was no exception.  For the young and well 
connected Gore, who represented numerous banking and merchant interests, 
both foreign and domestic, the war years were quite profitable.  As his business 
began to thrive, Gore, writing to a friend and referring to himself in the third 
person, observed, “…C.G. has more business than he had reason to expect.  
He has maintained himself very comfortably, has argu’d several causes at the 
bar, and has been much flatter’d, too much, I fear, for his own happiness.”92 
Once the war had ended, merchants on both sides of the Atlantic quickly 
looked to reestablish ties and recapture their old customers.  British merchants 
were just as eager to begin trading with Americans again as Americans were to 
buy British goods.  Within a short time, Attorney Gore found himself 
extremely busy.  According to court records, Gore practiced before the Suffolk 
County Court of Common Pleas and before the Supreme Judicial Court of 
Massachusetts as often as any other attorney in Boston during this period.  He 
served as legal counsel to many commercial houses in the United States and 
Great Britain, as well as Massachusetts Loyalists who had fled to Nova Scotia.  
He represented the London merchant firms of Joy & Hopkins, Blanchard & 
Lewis, and Bredell & Ward and Hugh Mossman of ‘Edinburgh in Great 
Britain.’  His largest account was the British supplier for American importers, 
Champion & Dickason.  In addition to serving as attorney for these businesses, 
he often served as agent as well, collecting rents, signing deeds, distributing 
payments and otherwise handling their claims in the United States.  Within the 
United States, Gore did legal and financial work for the firm of Winthrop and 
Todd of South Carolina. 93  Writing to Rufus King later in the decade, Gore 
observed that he had a profitable and honorable practice, noting that ‘my 
clients are generally of the class which is able to pay, and I think I can say, 
without vanity, that my conduct is not dissatisfactory to them.’”94                                                         
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Because Gore had built a good reputation and because of his brother’s 
activities on behalf of the Sons of Liberty, the return of their father to Boston 
was made possible.  Samuel Adams informed Gore that it was “out of ‘pure 
regard’ for him,” [Christopher] that “he was ‘always willing’ that John Gore 
should return to Boston.”95  The elder Gore eventually returned to Boston in 
1785, after nine years in exile.96  In the same year his father returned from 
England, twenty-six year old Christopher Gore married Rebecca Payne, who 
came from a distinguished Boston family.  Rebecca was descended from the 
influential Winslow and Amory families; and her father, Edward Payne, was a 
financial leader in Boston.  John Quincy Adams would later remark, “Gore was 
a ‘very fortunate man’ who had won remarkable success in his profession and 
whose family connections had ‘been extremely serviceable to him.’”97  
Like Gore, Rufus King had, since his graduation from Harvard, dedicated 
himself to the practice of law.  In 1783, however, King decided to take a more 
active role in public affairs.  He was elected as Newburyport’s representative to 
the General Court in the spring of that year, and quickly displayed his unique 
ability to make fast and close friends.  King was well liked and highly regarded 
by men on both sides of the political aisle.  The famed patriot, and governor, 
John Hancock wrote to the young King in close, personal terms, in September 
1783.  He informed King that he and Mrs. Hancock had visited with King’s 
younger sister who had recently been inoculated for small-pox, and that the 
Hancock’s stayed with the young girl and then brought her back to Boston.98   
King also developed a close friendship with Sullivan, despite the difference in 
their age, background and political outlook.  The fact that they were both raised 
in the District of Maine may have served as an initial bond between the two 
men.  More significantly, however, they seemed to share a real love for public 
policy and a desire to make the government run as efficiently as possible.  A 
source of Sullivan’s appeal must have been his seemingly inexhaustible 
attention and interest in the details of government.  King seems to have 
appreciated Sullivan’s knowledge and skill as a legislator and didn’t hesitate to 
seek his counsel.  In the coming years, the two men would correspond with 
one another on a regular basis, sharing not only information about government 
and policy, but about their personal lives as well.  Therefore, unlike Gore, who 
was still dedicating himself exclusively to the private practice of law at this time, 
King had become a ‘public servant,’ establishing friendships with the leading                                                         
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political figures of the state, and, like Sullivan, completely immersed in the 
critical political issues of the day.  
B. State and Federal Finances 
If there was one issue of particular concern to King, Sullivan and other 
members of the General Court in the early 1780s, it was the dire condition of 
the state’s finances.  As King quickly discovered, there was perhaps no person 
in Massachusetts who wrote as often on the subject of state finances as 
Sullivan.  Whenever the issue of oversight over public funds was being 
discussed, the always practical and thrifty Sullivan looked for ways to lessen the 
public tax burden.  Not surprisingly, Sullivan had been appointed in July 1782, 
to serve on a committee to consider “what measures were to be taken to reduce 
the expenses of government,” and to determine the “best method of supplying 
the public treasury, and reforming the state of finances.”  The committee’s 
report issued in October of that year offered a bleak though clear picture of the 
condition of state finances, concluding with the recommendation for “the 
establishment of customs and imposts as the sole resource remaining for 
sustaining public credit and meeting the public obligations.”99  
Of more interest to Sullivan, however, was determining where money could be 
saved and identifying measures that could be adopted to promote greater 
efficiency in government.  Sullivan believed that there were so many people and 
so many committees involved in managing the state’s finances that a great deal 
of time and money was being wasted.100  He observed in January 1783, for 
example, “the mode of conducting our finances has been at every session of 
the general court, to choose a committee to enquire into the state of the 
treasury, and to call upon all other persons entrusted with public money or 
state property, which committee make a report some time in the session – this 
report, from the nature of things, must have ever been a very imperfect sketch 
of the business.”  He suggested that this might have worked in simpler times, 
but not then, in “our advanced state of national greatness.”  “So extensive and 
complicated is the dept. of finances,” he added, “that the most enlightened 
committee of the most consummate legislature cannot comprehend the whole, 
in the space of a session.”  By way of example, he noted that almost two years 
had passed “since the state sustained the loss of about one hundred and fifty 
thousand pounds, by the neglect of the other states to call in their quota of the 
continental money!”  He warned that the “lethargic state of our department of 
finance” had to be addressed because the majority of the legislature, for many                                                         
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years, while men of integrity, “suffered our finances to go to ruin,” for lack of 
energetic spirit.  Above all else, he insisted, the public credit had to be restored, 
and if done correctly, “might save one third of our annual expense.”101   
To initiate efficiency and credibility, Sullivan supported the idea of having one 
man oversee the state’s financial department and advocated hiring a 
professional ‘financier’ to handle this task.  A single individual would not only 
be more accountable, he argued, but also could arrange matters “in one clear, 
consistent system,” and result in great savings.  This individual would have the 
authority to “investigate all money matters in dispute, and establish by proper 
voucher the just claims of the state,” and would make an annual report to the 
General Court on the current state of finances.102  In addition, because of the 
complex financial relationship that existed between the state and national 
governments, Sullivan stressed the importance of being able to present “the 
accounts of the commonwealth against the United States, and to settle the 
same.”  He insisted that a streamlined financial department headed by a single 
‘financer’ would greatly reduce the business of the General Court, resulting in 
greater savings.  
In addition to poor state finances another critical issue facing the General 
Court as the war was coming to a close was the separation of powers between 
the state and federal governments.  Members of the Massachusetts legislature 
were accustomed to exercising power with little interference from a central 
authority.  After fighting a war to protect the right to determine their own 
future, many state leaders were reluctant to cede any of that authority to the 
new central government.  Representatives Sullivan and King were, in 1783, of 
like mind in this regard.  Though they both embraced the concept of union, 
they were troubled by the growing power given to the national government.  
Writing under the name Grotius in February 1783, Sullivan addressed the 
question of the federal impost that had recently been passed by Congress.  In 
an often repeated argument, he warned against the danger of placing too much 
power in the hands of Congress because it failed to appreciate the “deadly 
mischief which others have so fully discovered: nor do they perceive it to be in 
each state, a relinquishment of the sovereignty so carefully preserved in the 
Confederation.”  If it was necessary “for the existence of independence of the 
states that Congress should have this power, why was it not made part of the 
                                                        
101 Ibid. 
102 Massachusetts Spy, February 13, 1783. 
 38 
confederation?  And why was it not asked of the people, who alone had a right 
to grant it?”103  
Sullivan was particularly critical of “scribblers” who, speaking in support of the 
federal impost, were warning readers of the possibility of having to disband the 
army, lose credit or otherwise subvert independence if the impost weren’t 
passed.  “It is no wonder,” he declared, that “our General Court, in the anxiety 
of their minds, surrendered to Congress the sovereignty of the State, and gave 
one stroke towards subverting the design both of the Confederation and 
Constitution.”  Sullivan could not abide what he considered to be scare tactics 
and was consistent in his criticism of those who painted such a poor picture of 
things in order to frighten the General Court into action.  Furthermore, as a 
practical matter, he was not buying the argument that unless the state acted 
quickly the army would have to disband.  “Nearly two years have elapsed since 
this requisition was made by Congress,” he argued, “and our army is so far 
from being disbanded, that it is more full, better fed, and better clothed, than 
they have ever been before.”  He was adamant that the state governments 
retain their sovereignty, arguing “if the General Court have no constitutional 
power to make a grant to Congress of five percent upon any part of the 
property of the citizen of this state, it will certainly follow, that they have 
attempted to surrender the sovereignty of the State to hands where the people 
have never intended to deposit it.” 104   
Sullivan argued in February 1783, that “the confederation takes [the] place of 
the Constitution, because by an article in the Declaration of Rights, the people 
say, that they have all the power as a body, which are not given to the United 
States in Congress assembled by the confederation.”105  He added “the 
confederation declares each State in the union, to be separate, free, sovereign 
and independent State.”  Sullivan didn’t think the Massachusetts General Court 
could or should relinquish their authority, insisting that the representatives had 
no more right to give away their authority to a distant Congress, 
“uncontrollable by the Legislature of this state, over a citizen, or any part of his 
property, than they have to sell all their constituents as slaves, and the very 
attempt to do it, determines their power.”  With respect to the proposed 
federal impost, Sullivan declared, “in all these debates, the idea of the want of 
power to assign over the persons or property of the freemen of Massachusetts, 
did not occur; for had it been attended to but one moment, the impost act                                                         
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would never have been passed.”106  While it was certainly appropriate, 
according to Sullivan, for the state to levy imposts for the general welfare, he 
remained alarmed at the prospect of conceding such a power to Congress, 
either informally or by implication.  If they were to do this, he argued, these 
powers could be abused or serve as a precedent for their future and perhaps 
arbitrary extension.  As far as Sullivan was concerned, “the people could not 
well endure any further direct taxation than had been already imposed, but our 
foreign trade was increasing and returning large profits.”  Furthermore, he 
argued, this method of raising revenue was little different from measures 
enacted by Parliament, which of course led to the recent “separation.”107 
The passage of the Impost Act was recognized by Sullivan as a significant 
turning point in the legal relationship between the national and state 
governments.  In 1783, he believed the legislation contained the “sprouting 
seeds of vassalage,” because it would “introduce corruption to our Congress, as 
well as to all parts of each particular government;” and that a similar measure 
had not only ruined Britain, “but has been the cause of this present war; and 
also that it changes the complexion of all our government, and it a total 
departure from the principles we began with.”108   
By 1784, however, Sullivan would come view things quite differently.  The 
issue of the federal impost continued to dominate public debate, as Congress 
again asked each state to grant to the federal government a five percent impost 
to help cover expenses.  The most significant problem facing the desperately 
struggling national government during this period was the enormous debt, 
which by some estimates exceeded forty two million dollars.  Efforts by 
Congress to raise funds and strengthen the Confederation were repeatedly 
defeated, as many Americans feared what they perceived to be the danger of an 
expanded national government.  Nonetheless, it was also becoming increasingly 
clear that without the much-needed funds, Congress could not meet the needs 
of the general government.  Despite this recognition, most state legislatures, 
including the Massachusetts General Court, were still reluctant to relinquish 
additional state autonomy, and more particularly, state funds.  Sullivan, 
however, had a change of heart.  His concern over the federal impost 
disappeared and his fear of expanded national authority dissipated.  He not 
only supported the Congressional measure, but also stood out as its strongest 
advocate in the Massachusetts General Court.  He was particularly interested in 
solving problems associated with public finance.  For years he had written                                                         
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about different means to improve financial management in government.  He 
understood the country’s finances were by 1784 in perilous shape.  This 
realization coupled with his conviction that Britain was doing everything it 
could to undermine the American economy, prompted Sullivan’s change of 
heart with respect to the federal impost.  
The Massachusetts General Court convened its first of three sessions for the 
1784-1785 legislative season on May 26, 1784.  A close reading of the Journal 
of the House of Representatives for this period suggests that Representatives 
Sullivan and King worked well together.  On the issue of the federal impost, 
however, they now found themselves in different camps.  Those who 
supported the impost were considered friends of the federal government and 
those who opposed it were considered friends of the state government.  
Ironically, the leader of the ‘federal’ cause in the General Court was Sullivan, 
while “Mr. King led the party … which opposed the duty and necessity of 
conceding this impost to the General Congress.”109    
In the first week of June, King was assigned to a three-person committee to 
consider the legislation and report back to the full House.110  On the last day of 
the month and just a week before the session adjourned, however, King and his 
committee had not made its report.  The record suggests that only Sullivan 
stepped forward to press the matter of the impost.  Looking to have the House 
take up the measure, Sullivan inquired as to whether the Senate had acted on 
the bill, and also asked to resolve a procedural matter between the House and 
Senate relating to the bill.111  A week later, on July 7th, just two days before the 
General Court adjourned for three months, Sullivan requested the Senate to 
“send down the tax bill,’ and the matter was soon brought before the full 
House.  Considering the dire needs of the federal government at this time, it is 
surprising to note the scant time and attention given by the General Court to 
the impost.  The one sentence entry into the Journal recorded only that the 
three-man committee made their report, and after debate, “the House adhered 
to their last vote [against] the said bill.”112  
While the House Journal provides no detail of the debate, King did note several 
years later: “My impression now is that the discussion in the Legislature of 
Mass., in which I was opposed to Mr. S. [Sullivan] and other distinguished men, 
was relative to the recommendation of Congress to the several States to grant                                                         
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them the power to levy for the use of the general Government an impost of 5 
pc. on the value of all goods imported into the United States.”113  Sullivan’s 
arguments in support of Congress and the impost were elaborated more fully in 
a lengthy letter written a year later, under the name Consideration.  He stated that 
while he was grateful that the United States had achieved independence, he 
reminded readers that they had only just begun to build their new government 
and that they were still quite vulnerable.  He warned, “we may yet lose all that 
our blood and treasure have won and sink into ruin.”  His chief concern was the 
menacing presence of Great Britain:  
We see and feel our situation, and old tyrant mother Britain is goading us and 
shall we not act with energy!  If we mean to be a nation, this is the 
moment to determine, and to execute.  What avails our labored speeches 
in the legislative assembly, while the national honor is expiring for want 
of power and energy in continental government.  Britain means to 
depreciate us in the ages of the world, and is active to make us a 
dependent contemptible people and she will effect her purpose, unless 
we immediately form and execute plans to support public credit.114   
Because the United States government was weak, trade was down, and the debt 
was growing, Sullivan insisted that certain steps had to be taken.  First, he 
argued, “all the states must give to Congress ample powers to regulate trade; 
and to impose duties on all foreign goods imported into the states; likewise all 
other powers that may be found necessary for an active and firm continental 
government.”  Then, returning to a familiar theme, he insisted that “each state 
must appoint one able man to conduct its finances; by which means the 
finances of the respective States would not only be conducted with less 
expense, and a vast advantage,” and that “a correspondence might be carried 
on between the Financiers of the States to the benefit of each, and to the great 
national advantage.”  With a metaphorical flourish, Sullivan concluded that 
“our political situation is like that of a ship at sea, the wind fair, her bottom 
sound, and nothing wanting but a pilot and some good men to hand the sails; - 
and shall we play the game of folly until our political ship drives on the rocks of 
tyranny, or founders in the quick-sands of anarchy.”  In order for this nation to 
flourish, they needed to look out for “rational measures.”115  Sullivan’s belief 
that Britain would continue to undermine and insult the United States in the 
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eyes of the world caused him to stress the importance of supporting public 
credit.   
In the face of British aggression and a precarious federal treasury, Sullivan 
abandoned his earlier defense of state sovereignty and became a strong 
advocate of a strong national government.  In the opening days of the last 
session of the 1784-1785 legislative season, he again volunteered to serve on a 
new three- person committee assigned to investigate the question of the 
impost.  The committee’s charge revealed the deep hostility with which the 
national government was perceived.   
Whereas it must at all times be necessary for the immediate 
representatives of a free people, to be particularly acquainted with the 
expenditures of such monies, as are from time raised upon them by 
taxes, and this House being not fully acquainted with the manner in 
which the monies granted to Congress, from time to time are expended, 
therefore ordered that Mr. Sullivan, Mr. Rowe and Mr. Bourn, be a 
committee to enquire and state to the House, all the salaries, grants and 
other expenditures of Congress, exclusive of payments of the national 
debt.116  
Massachusetts’ passage of the federal impost represented an important political 
step, but it did not solve the state’s financial woes.  Because the General Court 
had been unwilling to levy sufficient taxes to cover wartime expenses, 
Massachusetts borrowed heavily and issued paper currency.  After the war, 
“fearful of pressing citizens too hard,” the legislature postponed new fiscal 
policies, suspended taxes pledged to the debt in 1782 and 1784, and delayed 
payment of the principal until after 1785. The result was a huge public debt.117  
Public indebtedness was exacerbated by the post-war collapse of trade. 
Massachusetts’ traders were subject to a mercantile system that barred their 
ships from the West Indies and placed heavier duties on exports to Britain.118 
As a result, “heavy imports in 1783 put American merchants deeply in debt to 
their British suppliers; domestic manufacturers, trying to establish small 
industries, complained of unfair competition; and the distressed in all parts of 
the state laid blame upon agents of foreign creditors.”119   
Perhaps the most successful of these agents was Christopher Gore.  He spoke 
for many who believed that the elimination of weaker competition would                                                         
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ultimately benefit the economy, when he observed that “many who retail tape 
& pins, must, as they ought to have done years ago, retire to labor.”120  The 
crisis deepened in 1785, touching all segments of the economy and resulting in 
many business failures.  Many urban groups demanded that lawmakers enact 
restrictive legislation that would shelter them from English imports and force 
the reopening of English markets.121  Importers, some of whom were 
represented by Gore, opposed those merchants who sought such protection.  
Sullivan advocated hard work and temperance as the way forward.  If people 
looked closely, he wrote, they would see that “luxury and extravagance” had 
“long since been tamely suffered to banish industry and frugality from their 
peaceful seats, and reign with an unbounded sway.”  Once Americans were 
content to wear modest clothes made with their own hands and feed 
themselves “with the fruit of their own soil and the labor of their own hands,” 
but recently they had “ignobly sunk into venality and idleness.”  People were 
purchasing “extravagant British goods,” not only at the expense of their 
country, but also of themselves.  “There is as wide [a] difference between 
liberty and licentiousness, as there is betwixt liberty and the most abject 
slavery,” he preached.122  While such a formulation was reminiscent of classical 
republicanism, Sullivan equated adherence to such traditional values with the 
attainment of nationalist goals, and national survival.  He understood that if the 
United States were to survive and prosper, the individual states would have to 
promote and develop local manufacturing and not rely on costly British goods.   
Sullivan realized his emphasis on traditional values was but one step toward 
building a new economy.  The United States also had to improve its credit 
rating and repay its debt.  One of the factors contributing to the nation’s poor 
credit in 1785 was the severe lack of currency.  Writing under the name 
Americanus in November 1785, Sullivan responded to the widespread discontent 
surrounding the scarcity of cash, imploring the people of Massachusetts to 
create their own wealth and not rely on Britain.  In addition to stressing the 
importance of local manufacturing, he assured the people of Massachusetts that 
things would get better, and that they should not accept the argument that even 
if they had cash, they would have to export it to get the goods they needed.  
The fact was, he insisted, “we never yet have discovered our real wealth.”  He 
observed that Britain had always “discouraged us from all productions,” and 
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“even the few manufactures in which we were then allowed, have not as yet 
been fully renewed.”123  
According to Sullivan, “industry and manufacture are as sure a source of wealth 
as mountains of gold,” so “let us not be discouraged, my countrymen, nature 
has dealt with us a liberal hand; and our natural industry and spirit of 
enterprise, enable us to improve her bounties.”  After setting forth the several 
natural benefits enjoyed by Americans, and pointing out that the country had 
every reason “to expect that we shall become a rich and flourishing commercial 
people,” he nonetheless warned that “it behooves every worthy citizen to 
contribute his utmost to hasten the desirable period – by encouraging 
manufactures – discouraging the importation of superfluities – but especially by 
instructing our constituted guardians to unite our commercial interests, by 
committing it to the care of the grand council of these states [Congress].”  The 
transformation in Sullivan’s view of Congress was now complete.  He declared 
that “under the direction of that august body our trade will soon be wisely 
regulated, and our manufactures will increase.”  Then, he added, “may we view 
with the oldest and most flourishing commercial states on the globe,” as 
“merchants will throng from every coast to our ports – and every nation hail 
with joy the approach of American ships.”124 
Sullivan asked the people not to blame the legislators for the existing economic 
problems, arguing that such conditions were the “necessary effects of a long 
war;” and that they were “part of the price of our independence, and we ought 
therefore to endure them with patience.”  Sullivan argued that the legislatures 
of the individual states had it in their power to help solve the problems, “by 
vesting Congress with power sufficient for the regulation of trade; and this they 
will undoubtedly do.” He believed they would all realize “that we all have a 
common interest.”  Only then, he added, would we recognize that “our 
circumstances are not so desperate as we imagine.”125  As these arguments 
make clear, Sullivan’s view of Congress and the national government had been 
completely transformed.  
While Sullivan offered suggestions as to how best to deal with the nation’s 
finances, Rufus King was just beginning his career in Congress.  Praised for his 
intelligence and oratory skills, the two term state legislator was only twenty-nine 
years old when he was selected by the Massachusetts legislature in November 
1784 to serve as one of the delegates to the Continental Congress.  Three                                                         
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months after King assumed his new post, John Hancock resigned the 
governorship of Massachusetts citing poor health.  Christopher Gore wrote to 
King in March 1785 about Hancock’s action, noting “the late Governor’s 
resignation was a source of great joy to his opponents & much grief to his 
friends.” Gore added that when Hancock took the floor in House of 
Representatives to take his leave, “his enemies discovered marks of indecent 
joy, while his admirers chose to display their sorrow by unmanly blubbering 
and sycophantic speeches.”  Gore asked “Who is next to take the chair remains 
quite problematical,” [but] many expect and wish to see Mr. Bowdoin the chief 
magistrate, while the lovers of Mr. Hancock are warm for the present lieutenant 
Governor, [Thomas Cushing] supposing that the latter will at any time give way 
to his quondam Excellency, if, as is expected, he should again desire an 
election.” 126  Cushing completed Hancock’s term. 
King did not join in the criticism of Hancock.  Although they disagreed 
politically, King remained friends with Hancock, as Sullivan’s letter to King 
makes clear.  Although ‘their’ friend had been ill, Sullivan wrote to King that 
Hancock’s health had improved to the point that Sullivan urged him to go to 
Congress, expressing his belief that Hancock could be elected president of the 
Confederation Congress if he served. Hancock responded he would be glad to 
see his ‘old compatriots’ and serve his country in any way he could.  To ease 
Hancock’s concern over his health, Sullivan suggested to him that the 
“president’s chair [is]the Easiest in the Union for an invalid.”127  Hancock, it 
would seem, listened to Sullivan, for he was elected to Congress and he did 
accept the presidency of Congress in the fall of 1785.  When Congress 
convened in November 1785, however, they encountered the same problem in 
obtaining funds from the states to cover federal expenses.  Only seven states, 
including Massachusetts, had approved the impost requested by Congress the 
year before.  Consequently, it did not go into effect.128  
The year 1785 was as difficult for the national government as it was for the 
Massachusetts state government.  King’s fellow congressman, Elbridge Gerry 
wrote to King in May urging him to travel to New York and warning him of 
the sorry state of commerce and noting “eight states only have complied with 
the recommendation of last year for granting to Congress power to prohibit 
certain importations & exportations.”  Expressing his obvious frustration, 
Gerry added, “the situation of the impost laws you know – the unprosperous 
condition of commerce, you must have entire information concerning – the                                                         
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disposition of Congress you cannot be a stranger to – What can be done?  
Repeated recommendations on the same subject will produce consequences 
unfavorable to the measures of the Union; and the delays in compliance will be 
ruinous…”129  Gerry was imploring King to embrace national needs, just as 
Sullivan had done the year before. If he hadn’t known the full extent of the 
financial crisis previously, King, as a member of Congress, was quickly made 
aware of the almost dire situation. 
By 1786, King needed no further persuasion.  In April of that year, King wrote 
Gerry “we are without money or the prospect of it in the Federal Treasury; and 
the States, many of them, care so little about the Union, that they take no 
measures to keep a representation in Congress.”  He added that “the money 
borrowed in Europe is exhausted and this very day our Foreign Ministers have 
it not in their power to receive their salaries for their support.”  Furthermore, 
he suggested, “the people of the States do not know their dangerous situation.”  
Noting that government troops ‘over the Ohio’ were deserting because they 
were not being paid,” he asked “can there be no means devised whereby 
Massachusetts can yield something to the common Treasury?  Since the 
organization of the Board of Treasury, the State has paid nothing.”  Clearly 
frustrated, King added, “indeed the State neither pays anything to the federal 
Treasury, nor supports her delegates,” adding that he had to use his own funds 
to pay expenses.130  He concluded: “I can support myself – and freely would do 
it, if I can serve our country, ...  but if a dissolution must come – and dissolve 
our Government will unless the several States immediately exert themselves in 
it favor – it behooves every one to withdraw in season to effect, if possible, 
some sort of personal security.”  He gravely concluded, “the greatest danger is 
near.”131   
You must know the deranged condition of the confederacy.  New York 
has granted the impost to be paid in paper money & to be collected by 
officers amenable to & removable by themselves and under regulations 
formed by their Legislature  - This grant you see is a mere name – the 
consequence is, that Congress not having it in their power to put the 
impost in operation, no money will come into the federal Treasury. 132 
By June 1786, the situation had worsened.  King spoke of the “humiliating 
condition of the Union,” concluding that “the Treasury now is literally without a                                                         
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penny.”  In fact, the Treasury was unable to give the Secretary of War $1,000.00 
to transport ammunition.133  With little or no financial support from the states, 
King looked to alternative means of funding the federal government.  Like 
many of his colleagues, King saw the ‘western territory’ not only as a source of 
security for the United States, but as a source for much needed federal funds.  
Talk of subdividing these lands as a means of funding the government had 
begun in 1784, but little progress had been made.  When discussions turned to 
how these lands would be divided and the conditions under which they would 
later be admitted as states, the issue of slavery was inevitably raised.  In 1784, 
Congress had rejected language that would have excluded slavery in this 
territory.  When the matter was again discussed in 1785, King made a motion 
“that there shall be neither slavery nor involuntary servitude in any of the 
[proposed] states.” The proposal was not adopted.134  A year later, on May 12, 
1786, King, after seconding a motion to expedite the survey of the western 
lands, also seconded the motion to keep the navigable waters and portages 
between the lands, “forever free.”   
That the navigable waters leading into the Mississippi and the St. 
Lawrence, and the carrying places between the same, be and are hereby 
declared to be common highways, and to be forever free, as well to the 
inhabitants of the said territory, as to the citizens of the United States, 
and those of any other States that may be admitted into the 
Confederation without any tax, duty or impost therefore. 135 
This resolution was the precursor to the Northwest Ordinance, passed in 1787, 
which included the prohibition of slavery in the Northwest Territory. Like 
many other northern leaders, King looked with scorn at southern support of 
slavery at the same time they preached the virtues of a free society.   
C. Sullivan the Progressive 
Writing in 1785, under the name Consideration, Sullivan addressed the issue of 
slavery in an article entitled ‘Out of sight, Out of mind.’  Never hesitant to 
express his opinion on the most controversial of subjects, he stated “we are 
often led away by the glittering prospects of accumulating wealth, without 
enough considering whether a prosecution of our plans will not terminate in 
the misery of others.”  He suggested to his readers “a voyage to Africa for 
slaves has always appeared to be a plan of this kind.”  In a detailed discussion                                                         
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of the horrors of the slave trade and of slavery, Sullivan observed that slaves 
were being “pursued by men of humane disposition and the most refined 
sensibility.”  He also drew a picture for his readers of how children were 
separated from their parents and dragged “headlong into despair,” adding that 
while those who benefited from slavery “may not be present at this melancholy 
scene, yet they must be considered the sole cause of it.”  He concluded by 
demanding that those who benefited from slavery should be forced to “face 
these awful scenes as they pass from this world.”136  In response to news that a 
slaving voyage to Africa was preparing to leave from Boston, Sullivan wrote in 
the Massachusetts Centinel that “I am unwilling to believe that any citizen of this 
state, can be so lost to honor and justice, and so dead to every sentiment which 
animates the free mind, as to be concerned in the vilest injustice and tyranny.”  
He refused to believe that “so black a deed,” would stain “the soul of a son of 
liberty.”137  
In addition to denouncing slavery in the name of liberty, Sullivan also 
championed the rights of women.  As Attorney General he represented 
Massachusetts in Martin v. Commonwealth (1801), a property confiscation case 
that raised questions about a married woman’s citizenship and her obligations 
to the state.  In April 1775, during the Revolution, Massachusetts had seized 
the property of William Martin under the state’s confiscation statute, after he 
and his wife Anna had fled to England.  At issue was whether the appellant, 
James Martin, the son of William and Anna, could reclaim his mother’s 
statutory share of the property under the presumption that she did not violate 
the law by abandoning her property.  It was Martin’s contention that his 
mother did not have an obligation to make clear her loyalty to the revolutionary 
state because she did not have the legal standing to do so.  Martin, who was 
represented by Theophilus Parsons, the leader of the conservative wing of the 
Federalist Party in Massachusetts, and George Blake, a conservative 
Republican, argued that the legislature intended to exclude women and children 
from the confiscation act.  They cited English common law, which held “a 
women is supposed to have acted under the coercion of the husband,” and 
therefore were regularly excused for acts, otherwise illegal, done with him.  In 
other words, Martin was arguing that his mother could not have acted on her 
own when she left Massachusetts, since she was obliged to obey her husband.  
Therefore, they reasoned, she should not be punished with the forfeiture of her 
share of the property.  The two attorneys further argued that while men were 
considered active members of the commonwealth, women were merely                                                         
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residents, and that Anna Martin had “no political relation to the state any more 
than an alien.” 138  
Sullivan and his co-counsel, Daniel Davis, the solicitor general for the 
Commonwealth, argued that Anna Martin did meet the clear terms of the 
confiscation law in that she had consciously withdrawn from the state, like her 
husband. Sullivan was furious when counsel for Martin suggested that women 
were not included in the law because only masculine pronouns were used in the 
legislation.  Sullivan responded that “the same reasoning would go to prove 
that the constitution of the commonwealth does not extend to women – 
secures them no rights, no privileges; [because] it has no words in the feminine 
gender.”  According to historian Linda Kerber, Sullivan and Davis, “articulated 
a case for the politicized married woman,” and shook “loose from traditional 
assumptions about women’s vulnerability, their incompetence, their distance 
from the issues of concern to the commonwealth.”  She also argued Sullivan 
raised the level of intensity at the trial, accusing his opponents “of being 
unfaithful to the intent of revolutionary legislation.”  According to Kerber, “for 
Sullivan and Davis the Revolution had claimed the loyalty of all persons – not 
only physical service but emotional and mental allegiance as well.”  As far as 
Sullivan was concerned, “women could share in this sort of citizenship, and, 
they concluded, women could also share in its obligations.”139   
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, comprised of four conservative 
Federalists, agreed with Parsons, and by a vote of 4-0 decided against Sullivan, 
who was then the Republican candidate for governor.  While the court’s 
decision may not have been motivated by political considerations, the ruling in 
the case reflected old, English common law interpretation of women’s rights, 
or more specifically their lack of rights.  Sullivan, on the other hand, argued 
that women had rights and obligations as citizens of the state.  While one could 
argue that Sullivan took the position he did because he was representing a 
client, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Kerber contends that Sullivan’s 
argument was in accord “with the unusually consistent liberalism which he 
displayed throughout his career.  Believing that society was composed of equal 
individuals, he spun out the implications of that belief in a wide range of issues 
as they presented themselves.”140   
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To further support her claim that Sullivan “continued to align himself with 
those who supported various challenges to women’s subordination,” Kerber 
referred to a 1792 case, in which the town of Northampton refused to allocate 
funds for the education of girls.  Sullivan, she noted, persuaded a jury “that 
girls had equal rights under the constitution and could not be expelled from 
school.”  Kerber concluded that Sullivan “was a man of the center, but [that] 
he consistently took some positions that were more progressive than any 
articulated by John Adams, Thomas Jefferson, and many other contemporaries 
more famous than he.”  She added that he was “willing to follow the principle 
of government by the consent of the governed where it led; certainly as far as 
the elimination of property requirements for voting, and, … up to the 
boundaries of gender.”141  In short, Sullivan’s stance on women’s rights was 
consistent with his long held position on republican government. 
D. Quincy Adams Comes of Age 
While Rufus King and James Sullivan were debating issues of public policy, and 
Christopher Gore continued to build his law practice, John Quincy Adams was 
coming of age in Europe.  He had been away from the United States since 
1777, and was, in 1785, living with his sister and parents in Paris.  The family 
lived together in France for almost a year, and during that time Quincy Adams’ 
diary is filled with numerous references to dinners with, among others, 
Benjamin Franklin and Thomas Jefferson.  The first sentence of his diary entry 
on January 21, 1785 gives the reader some idea as to the type of people Quincy 
Adams was seeing on a regular basis: “Paris, Dined at Mr. Jeffersons. Captn. 
Paul Jones told us the Marquis de la Fayette was arrived.”142  Young Quincy 
Adams’ diary also reveals he spent considerable time dining and socializing with 
the Marquis and Madam de la Fayette over the next several months. 
In April 1785, John Adams received word that he had been appointed minister 
to the Court of St. James.  Rather than remain in London as his father’s 
secretary, it was decided that Quincy Adams would return to the United States 
to finish his education at Harvard.143  In anticipation of his trip, Quincy Adams 
met with La Fayette, who was willing to lend his help to Boston and New 
England merchants who were interested in exporting their goods to France.  
Quincy Adams noted in his diary on May 9, 1785 that he had “Walk’d into 
Paris in the morning, to the Marquis de la Fayette’s; to go with him to Mr. 
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Jefferson’s upon the subject, of the Importation of our whale oil.”144  That he 
would not soon enjoy the company of such luminaries must have been on his 
mind as he prepared for his trip back to the United States.  As it was, Quincy 
Adams was not looking forward to leaving Paris to begin the life of a student in 
Massachusetts.  He would be leaving a world of activity, excitement and 
opportunity, and replacing it with a world of relative inactivity.  On the 
morning of May 12th, after collecting correspondence from his father, 
Jefferson, La Fayette, and others, Quincy Adams left his family in Paris and 
began his long trip home.145 
Quincy Adams arrived in New York City, which was then the American capital, 
on July 18, 1785, just after his eighteenth birthday.  On the very day of his 
arrival, with his numerous packets of letters in hand, he was introduced to 
several government leaders, including Elbridge Gerry and Rufus King, who 
were then Massachusetts delegates to the Congress.146  According to Quincy 
Adams, King was very attentive to his needs and helped him out a great deal.  
In particular, when Quincy Adams inquired of the Massachusetts delegates if 
any of them could assist a friend of his from the boat who had his trunk seized 
by a Customs official, it was King who came to his aid.  Quincy Adams 
recorded that King went with him and the young man to speak with officials 
from the Customs office.147  These simple gestures from King to the young 
Quincy Adams provide a few examples of why it was that so many different 
people viewed King as a friend.  In fact, Quincy Adams spent a considerable 
amount of time with King over the next several days as he carried out his 
business and became acclimated to his new surroundings.  Quincy Adams left 
New York in mid August 1785 for his return to trip to Boston. 
In all, Quincy Adams had spent seven years in Europe and experienced things 
that few Americans could have imagined.  He had traveled throughout the 
continent and had seen every major capital in the Old World.  He had 
frequented the worlds most celebrated museums, galleries and theaters, and 
been educated at some of the finest schools in the world.  He mastered the 
French language and studied several others.  He had interacted with all classes 
of society, including kings and queens, and counted among his friends Thomas 
Jefferson, Benjamin Franklin, and Marquis de La Fayette.  He had even traveled 
over the Pyrenees Mountains on horseback.  John Quincy Adams had also 
observed firsthand the living conditions in the Old World, providing him with                                                         
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insight that no other American could have possessed.  In particular, he was 
shocked at the condition of the people in Russia and the absence of schools. 
He wrote to his father that the reason for the lack of schools in the Russian 
capital, because, “there is nobody here but slaves and princes.”148   
Incredibly mature for his age, Quincy Adams entered adulthood with a list of 
experiences few Americans would know in a lifetime, and when he returned 
‘home,’ he was in many respects, entering a foreign country.  Not surprisingly, 
by December 21st, 1785, after only four months at home, Quincy Adams was 
becoming increasingly restless, and made the following diary entry: “All day at 
home. I am often at a great loss, what to say at the end of the day, in this 
journal, of mine: I would place my thoughts upon persons and things: but 
persons I do not often see….” and “this scene of perpetual sameness, which 
does not agree perfectly with my disposition, will not last very long.”  Referring 
to his relatives in Boston with whom he was staying, he added “the family I am 
in, presents as perfect a scene of happiness, as I ever saw: but it is entirely 
owing to the disposition of the persons.  A life of tranquility is to them a life of 
bliss.  It could not be so to me.  Variety is my Theme, and Life to me is like a 
journey, in which an unbounded plain, looks dull and insipid.”149  He no doubt 
missed the exciting life he had enjoyed in Paris.  Indeed, depression would 
haunt Quincy Adams for the rest of his life and his despair was no more 
evident than when writing in his journal during the final minutes of 1785: 
“Time steals gradually, and imperceptibly away; so that we are not sensible how 
important it is to employ it well, until it is gone to far to be retrieved. Moment 
after moment passes off, and seems as nothing; but when millions of those 
nothings, have collected into a year, and we see it gone, cruel reflections rushes 
upon us, and undeceives us of our error.”150  
After spending several months of independent study in order to satisfy 
Harvard’s required curriculum, Quincy Adams entered Harvard University as a 
junior in the spring of 1786.  For the next fifteen months, he spent his time 
reading and studying.  It was his intent that upon graduation from Harvard, he 
would pursue a career in the law.  In the same month that the delegates to the 
Constitutional Convention were completing their work in Philadelphia, John 
Quincy Adams traveled to Newburyport to begin studying law in the office of 
Theophilus Parsons, who would later serve as Chief Justice of the 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court.151  It had been exactly ten years since                                                         
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Harvard graduate, Rufus King, studied law under Parsons in the same 
Newburyport office.   
As part of his legal studies, Quincy Adams attended court to observe lawyers 
and judges in action.  One of the attorneys he observed was former superior 
court judge, James Sullivan.  Judging from the record, it appears Quincy Adams 
didn’t think much of Sullivan in 1787.  He recorded that he had witnessed 
Sullivan in court, arguing on behalf of a client and insisting to the judge that it 
was customary in this country to take ‘parol,’ or word of mouth, evidence in 
preference to matters of record.  Quincy Adams suggested in his diary “this 
bare-faced falsehood was noticed by all the Court,” adding that Judge Cushing 
shook his head and said “You are totally mistaken Mr. Sullivan.”  After Sullivan 
replied, “they [other courts] have done so,” Cushing said, “then I hope they will 
never do so again.”  Quincy Adams concluded “This is not an uncommon 
practice of Sullivan’s; and when the whole Court are thus loudly against him he 
does not appear in the least abashed, but appears to display a countenance 
which never knew a blush.”152    
After completing his studies with Parson, Quincy Adams, like Gore, decided to 
open his law practice in Boston.  Unlike Gore, however, who quickly 
established a thriving practice in the Massachusetts capital, Quincy Adams was 
not particularly successful, nor happy.  He had few clients, little money, and, 
further adding to his misery, recently terminated a relationship with a young 
woman from Newburyport.  Furthermore, the fact that his office was in a 
building owned by his father was a constant reminder that he was still relying 
on his parents for support.  These were difficult days for Quincy Adams, who 
didn’t seem to have much interest in the law.153  He quickly discovered, 
however, that he enjoyed politics, and soon began to spend much of his time 
writing articles for newspapers in Massachusetts.  In 1791, for example, he 
published a series of essays entitled “Letters of Publicola” in the Columbian 
Centinel, in which he challenged Thomas Paine who was then calling on the 
British to follow the French and overthrow their monarchy.  Quincy Adams 
took a staunchly conservative position, arguing against the dangers of 
demagoguery, and a “rampaging democracy intent on leveling existing 
distinctions in society by supposing it had the power and therefore the right to 
do whatever it wished.”154  His conservative views drew praise from Boston 
Federalists, who, in turn, encouraged him to write more.                                                           
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The essays that followed were not limited to the important political questions 
of the day.  In December 1792, for example, Quincy Adams jumped into the 
debate over the existence of theaters in Boston.  His adversary was Sullivan, 
whose courtroom tactics so offended Adams a few years earlier.  Sullivan, in his 
capacity as attorney general, had recently written an article explaining why the 
state government had closed a theater and arrested an actor in the middle of a 
performance.  Sullivan’s article, written under the name Friend of Peace had 
recently appeared in the Independent Chronicle.  According to Sullivan, an effort 
had been made the previous year to repeal a state law that forbad the 
construction of theaters.  Though the measure failed, a theater, capable of 
seating 500 people was built and opened in August 1792.  State authorities were 
unable to find a grand jury to issue an indictment, and so decided to arrest one 
of the actors, setting off a huge controversy.  After reading Sullivan’s defense 
of the government’s action, Quincy Adams appears to have been eager to enter 
the fray, despite his father’s earlier warning to his son “not to cross the 
traitorous Sullivan lest he try to harm his embryo law office.”  Quincy Adams, 
writing under the name Menander, challenged Sullivan, arguing “In a free 
government the minority never can be under an obligation to sacrifice their 
rights to the will of the majority, however expressed.”  He added, “no 
obedience is due to an unconstitutional act of the legislature.”155  In his second 
article on the subject, Quincy Adams made the mistake of charging Governor 
Hancock with having encouraged people to “unlawfully collect in front of the 
theater for the purpose of “pulling it down.”  The charge wasn’t true, and the 
young Adams, prompted by Sullivan and others, was forced to withdraw his 
accusation.156  
Despite this initial conflict, Quincy Adams developed over the next few years a 
begrudging respect for Sullivan.  Just as his father had observed almost twenty 
years earlier in a letter to Abigail, Quincy Adams was impressed with Sullivan’s 
work ethic.  In a letter to his father, he observed “Mr. Sullivan does more 
business I suppose than any four others put together, adding “I shall carefully 
remember the cautions in one of your letters respecting him; whatever other 
qualities he may possess, he may safely be taken as a model for industry and 
activity.”  He quoted fellow attorney, Parson Clarke, who, on the subject of 
Sullivan, told Quincy Adams “I believe that man has not a particle of indolence 
in his nature.”157  He also mentioned to his father that he had learned 
something from observing Sullivan in court and from his conversations with                                                         
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him.  He related that once “I was sitting next to him within the bar at 
Concord,” when “he took from his finger a ring, and pointed to me the motto 
engraved within the rim.  It was ‘Weigh the Consequences.’” He added, 
“Perhaps the benefit of the admonition may not be lost in its influence upon 
my conduct towards the man himself.  I have no desire to render my self 
personally obnoxious to him, and I trust I shall always disdain to court his 
favor.”158  In the coming years, Quincy Adams would develop a genuine 
fondness for the man.   
Sullivan, Gore, King and Quincy Adams were all revolutionaries and united in 
their commitment to the law and to constitutional government in which the 
people were sovereign.  They would stand together in defense of the legal 
profession when it came under attack, largely because they perceived the law as 
vital to republican stability.  But as the struggle over the impost revealed they 
differed as to how political power could best be distributed among sovereign 
states and a fledgling national government.  Ironically, Sullivan, the future 
Republican, overcame his opposition to the federalist impost a full year before 
the Federalist King.  
Between the end of the war and the adoption of the new federal constitution, 
economic challenges would threaten the fragile confederation and highlight the  
growing differences between the two emerging parties, and these four men. 
King and Gore were desirous of a more conservative foundation for the new 
government, and would look to the past for guidance in securing peace, 
stability and the preservation of the old social order.  Sullivan on the other 
hand, saw an opportunity to effect more fundamental change.  He embraced a 
more sweeping and inclusive brand of republicanism.  Quincy Adams, who 
began his public career as a defender of the old order, would soon begin his 
slow transition from the party of Gore and King to the party of Sullivan. The 
four men would be forced to come to terms with disagreements over 
fundamental national policy questions.  These challenges and obstacles set the 
stage for the emergence of a national consensus, with two of the men firmly on 
one side and the remaining two on the other.  
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Chapter III 
Ideological Conflicts in Massachusetts 
The years after the American Revolution were difficult ones for the people of 
Massachusetts.  In addition to a growing list of economic problems, state 
leaders confronted social and political upheaval as taxpayers struggled with 
unforeseen post-war adjustments and disruptions.  Repayment of the state’s 
large wartime debt hampered efforts at achieving economic stability and a 
weakened economy coupled with a scarcity of cash resulted in a large number 
of judgments and foreclosures.  Frustrated and overburdened taxpayers turned 
their anger against the legal system that administered the collection and 
enforcement of debt, and in western Massachusetts, an uprising by disaffected 
farmers provided stark evidence of the states vulnerability to civil unrest. 
The inability of the Articles of Confederation to meet the needs of the state 
and national governments had become increasingly evident and contributed to 
a growing sense of anxiety and unease in Massachusetts.  The political and 
economic ties that bound the state to the central government were weak and 
largely incapable of sustaining, let alone encourage, economic growth and the 
promotion of regional and national goals.  While there was widespread 
recognition that substantive changes needed to be made to the existing 
Confederation government, there was also considerable disagreement as to the 
exact nature and extent of those changes and how they would be implemented.  
Against the backdrop of these challenges was the fact that state and national 
leaders were still struggling to define the principles that would serve to guide 
the new republic. 
For political leaders in post-war Massachusetts, defining republicanism would 
prove to be a source of bitter debate and contribute significantly to the 
formation of political parties.  While Sullivan, Gore, King and Quincy Adams 
each embraced the concept of republican government, they had very different 
ideas as to how it should work.  All four men were united in their defense of 
the legal system and in their opposition to armed revolt, though they would 
differ in their level of sympathy for the aggrieved taxpayers and in the measures 
necessary to restore order.  When the time came to enhance the power of the 
national government, however, the breadth of their ideological divide became 
apparent.  The differences between those who called themselves Federalists 
and those who would later call themselves Republicans were deeply rooted and 
reflected a cultural and economic divide that predated the Revolution.  The 
challenge of building and manning a new and expanded national government 
only magnified their differences. 
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The words and actions of all four men were reflective of their individual 
background and revolutionary experiences, and represented legitimate points of 
common view in Massachusetts.  Sullivan would call for greater legal safeguards 
for the benefit of the more vulnerable and for the end of the practice of 
multiple office-holding which had long been a tool of the ruling elite to 
maintain power and influence.  His vision for a more participatory and 
democratized political process was shared by a growing number of anti-
Federalists.  King and Gore would argue against such dramatic change, 
defending instead the time tested social hierarchy overseen by men like 
themselves.  They and other Federalists defended the ruling elite and the long 
established commercial interests as the best means to maintain stability and 
prosperity.  Quincy Adams, who was just beginning his legal practice, would 
soon emerge as an independent thinker with a foot in both camps.   
Ideological conflict in Massachusetts grew steadily in the years after the war, as 
debate over the meaning of republicanism split the state into two camps.  
Initially, the disputes were procedural, focused primarily on the manner in 
which federal offices should be filled, but soon became intensely personal and 
spilled over into state affairs.  By the end of the decade, party politics had 
become an integral part of the Massachusetts political landscape, and the 
process of democratization was well underway.  
A. Legal Profession Under Fire 
While John Quincy Adams was still completing his studies at Harvard, 
anticipating a career in the law, members of the Massachusetts bar were circling 
the wagons, united in defense of their profession.  If there was one thing on 
which Sullivan, Gore and King agreed it was the concern they shared over the 
growing enmity towards lawyers and the law.  In the years following the 
Revolution, Massachusetts’s lawyers came under serious attack.  If ordinary 
citizens did not particularly esteem them in the years leading up to the 
Revolution, it paled in comparison to the animosity encountered by attorneys 
in the decade after the war.  This is not to say that fewer men were choosing 
the law as a profession.  As Van Beck Hall observed in his study of post-
Revolutionary Massachusetts, the fraternity of lawyers had grown considerably 
since the end of the war, and “these rising lawyers defended their newly won 
positions of power and prestige by organizing professional associations which 
set standards for admission to the bar and in a few instances even established 
fees.”159  It was precisely because the legal profession was becoming more                                                         
159 Van Beck Hall, Politics Without Parties: Massachusetts, 1780-1791 (Pittsburgh, 1972), 45-46. 
 58 
professional and more complex that there was a growing disaffection among 
the people towards the law.  In addition, according to legal historian Lawrence 
Friedman, in the years after the war the common law was looked upon with 
disfavor as being too English and not suited to a “new and independent 
country.”  Friedman argued that to many Americans, “new democratic states 
needed new democratic institutions, from top to bottom, including fresh, non-
monarchical law.”160  To make matters worse, for the growing number of 
debtors in Massachusetts who were forced into court by creditors, their only 
exposure to the law and lawyers were as frustrated adversaries.  It was also well 
remembered in Massachusetts that many members of the legal profession had 
been Tories, forced to flee the Commonwealth with the British in 1776. 
Not all historians agree, however, that creditors controlled the legal system in 
Massachusetts and that a large number of debtors faced jail time for failure to 
pay their debts.  Jonathan Chu, for example, has challenged the notion that the 
legal system in Massachusetts during this period was class biased.  In his study 
of debt litigation in Massachusetts in the spring of 1785, Chu makes the case 
that far from falling victim to an unfair legal system many debtors actually used 
legal procedure to their advantage. According to Chu, imprisonment for debt 
was “relatively infrequent and mild,” in post-Revolutionary Massachusetts.161  
Opportunity for delay was built into Massachusetts’s legal procedure and 
debtors were not afraid to take advantage of the appeals process in order to 
delay the payment of their debts.  Many debtors would intentionally fail to 
appear at the lower court trial, and after a default judgment was entered against 
them they would simply post the nominal fee and appeal the matter to the 
Supreme Judicial Court.  Such a practice, as outlined by Chu, was inexpensive, 
carried little risk, and, most importantly, gained the debtor several months of 
additional time.  Chu insists “the assumption that debtors necessarily disliked 
courts and that creditors liked them misreads the dynamics of the tension 
between the two and overlooks the specific role courts played in solving their 
respective problems.”162  
While Chu effectively argues against the assumption that the legal system in 
Massachusetts was unfairly tilted in favor of creditors, and though he offers 
evidence that many debtors were able to effectively manipulate the system to 
their advantage, there remains ample evidence to suggest that a large number of 
debtors in Massachusetts were becoming increasingly frustrated with the legal                                                         
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system.  Anti-lawyer and anti-law sentiment increasingly dominated the news in 
a state where taxes were high and getting higher, where money was scarce and 
getting scarcer, and where debts were substantial and coming due.   
By the spring of 1786, Sullivan, Gore, King, and other members of the 
Massachusetts legal community believed that the level of hostility against 
lawyers and the law had reached a new high.  Writing to Elbridge Gerry in May 
1786, King was deeply concerned about the attack on lawyers.   
I am mortified as a citizen of an enlightened State, by the publications in 
Boston, of a defamatory petition calling for the abolition of an order or 
class of men (lawyers) to which I myself belong. The proceedings of 
several towns in correspondence with these publications, forbode a 
confusion which virtuous men must deprecate, [and] to what length the 
authors of the measures intend to extend them I am unable to say.163   
King was referring to a series of articles initiated on March 9, 1786, in the 
Independent Chronicle.  The primary antagonist, who identified himself only as 
Honestus, was widely known to be Benjamin Austin, a Boston merchant and 
future Republican.  In his weekly assault on the legal profession, which lasted 
well in to the summer, Honestus declared “the order of lawyers is not only 
unnecessary, but dangerous in our Republic; and that unless this body [is] 
totally abolished, will finally establish an absolute aristocratical jurisdiction.”  
Insisting that the legal process was far too complex, far too expensive and far 
too English, he called for a total overhaul of the legal system, beginning with 
the elimination of attorneys.  After all, he asked: “Can the monarchical and 
aristocratical institutions of England, be consistent with … republican 
principles?” 164 
At first, members of the legal profession chose to ignore Honestus, perhaps 
hoping he would tire and go away.  He didn’t.  In the April 13th edition of the 
Chronicle, Honestus was given the full front page to assail the law and the legal 
profession.  A week later his rhetoric intensified, referring to a particular 
defender of the legal profession as “a contemptible, lying, wretch,” and 
suggesting that any such apologist for the ‘order’ was nothing but a “miserable 
comforter.”165   
Sullivan publicly challenged Honestus [Austin] and defended the legal profession 
as well as the critically important role played by the law in a republican society.                                                          
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Writing under the name Zenas, Sullivan provided his readers with a civics lesson 
and asked for understanding, emphasizing the importance of the legal system 
and offering an explanation as to why lawyers were necessary.  “Knowledge of 
the law are necessary to every free government,” he declared, and one of the 
reasons “for the complications of laws in a free state is, the variety of views in 
which property is considered, for the payment of debts, raising a revenue and 
the numberless rules necessary to the regulation and transferring immoveable 
estate in all countries.”  Perhaps thinking of his experience in 1765, when he 
and his brother had been asked to leave Durham, New Hampshire, simply 
because they were attorneys, Sullivan insisted that laws and lawyers were 
necessary.  Otherwise, he warned, the “tall, brawny bullies would take what 
they wanted by force.”  Without the law, “how would the poor man, the weak 
man, the widow, and the orphan, be upon an equality in their demand of right, 
with the opulent, the cunning, and the strong?”166  
Sullivan was particularly critical of those who he thought were irresponsibly 
seeking to inflame public opinion against lawyers for public attention or 
political gain, regardless of party affiliation.  Writing under the name Tully, 
Sullivan pointed out “the peoples right to counsel is established by the 
[Massachusetts] Constitution,” and that the only options are to either repeal the 
state constitution or annul the laws regulating the privilege.  He added: “You 
[Honestus] say you only advised the people to petition, … but where is the 
difference between inviting the people to petition for that which the 
government cannot grant, and advising them to discontent, commotion, and 
rebellion?” “An author must be very ignorant of the history of the world,” 
Sullivan charged, “not to know that petitions to redress real or pretended 
grievances, have been the foundation, or commencement, of the civil wars, 
commotions, and revolutions, which have happened in the world.”  Petitions 
were a natural right, acknowledged Sullivan, but he would “utterly condemn 
and detest the man, who, for the sake of a little applause, will excite the 
multitude to petition for that which cannot be granted, and of course bring on 
riots and confusion.”  Therefore, in this new republican government, there 
were limits to what a person could say or do in protest.  Finally, Sullivan 
reminded readers of the legislature’s ability to establish penalties in cases of 
corruption by lawyers as “a sufficient check upon the abuse of the 
profession.”167  
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Sullivan challenged Honestus to look “at the Supreme Bench of Justice of this 
State, as the bulwark of the people’s freedom, at that august tribunal which 
gives us rank and character in the world, and gives stability and energy to our 
government – you will see that they were taken from this order [attorneys], 
which you like a rash inexperienced boy, have unjustifiably attacked, without 
either strength or cunning.”  The courts were the ultimate guarantor of 
freedom, he insisted, and “barristers and attorneys in this state have checks 
upon them, and are so peculiarly liable to punishment for fraud and 
dishonesty,” that the “weakest citizen had the ability to seek redress against 
them.”   
Sullivan’s passionate defense of the law and the legal profession in 1786 was 
consistent with his commitment to the promises of the Revolution. As far as he 
was concerned, Honestus’s call for doing away with lawyers was demagoguery. 
He had effectively turned the tables on Honestus by arguing that not only were 
attorneys and the law not the enemies of the common man, but were instead 
critical allies and guarantors that every citizen would be treated “upon an 
equality in their demand of right.” 168  While Sullivan appreciated the 
importance of the law in protecting property rights, he also emphasized that 
the legal system in a republican society must provide the necessary means to 
protect the rights of the weak, the poor, and other minority interests, against a 
rapacious and aggressive wealthy citizenry.  This expanded view of the law 
represented a significant point of departure between men like Sullivan, who 
would later identify themselves as Republicans, and Federalists like King and 
Gore.   
Although Gore also was worried about the growing anti-lawyer sentiment, he 
did not publicly challenge Honestus or embrace Sullivan’s expansive view of law 
in a republican society.  Gore was content to defend the law and the profession 
in his private correspondence.  As Gore perceived it, the primary purpose of 
the law was to guarantee the rights and safety of property owners and creditors.  
He was particularly concerned about how the General Court would react to the 
appeal of Honestus and expressed little hope that the lower house would do the 
right thing.  He told King in June 1786 that “tender bills, acts against lawyers, 
or more truly against law, now occupy the time of the H. of Reps.”169  Gore 
was afraid that the House of Representatives would ride the anti-law tide to 
attack private property.  Where men like Sullivan emphasized the law’s public 
and political role as a means to protect the interests of the poor, as well as the                                                         
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rich, men like Gore focused on the law solely as the means to settle private 
disputes.   
While his path to riches was similar to that taken by other attorneys, Gore had 
the good fortune to come of age at just the right time and with the connections 
to firmly establish himself as a member of the elite.  Though he would soon 
enter government service himself, Gore first made a small fortune in the years 
immediately after the Revolution by buying and selling government securities.  
During the war, soldiers often had been paid with ‘state certificates.’  Because 
of the scarcity of cash in the mid 1780’s, many ex-soldiers were compelled to 
sell their certificates for as little as fifteen cents on the dollar. Speculators, like 
Gore, purchased these securities with the expectation they would later be paid 
the face value.  For the cost of only $3,743.00 Gore purchased securities that 
carried a face value of $25,000 and paid $449.22 in interest.170  
Gore and a handful of speculators prospered in the 1780s, but for many 
people, these were particularly lean and frustrating years.  Economic instability 
at the state and national level left government leaders searching for solutions.  
Congress in particular had to contend with a depressed national economy, an 
empty federal treasury and a dizzying array of restrictions imposed upon them 
by the Articles of Confederation.  One of the most significant deficiencies of 
the Confederation government was that it gave Congress no authority to 
regulate foreign trade.  Consequently, each state was left to its own devices, 
often creating policies that conflicted with those of other states.  Congressmen, 
like King, grew increasingly frustrated at their inability to fashion 
comprehensive solutions to obvious problems, even as the national and state 
economies continued to worsen.   
B. Growing Frustration in Massachusetts 
In Massachusetts, a state that relied heavily on foreign trade, the economic 
outlook was particularly bleak.  Benjamin Lincoln’s letter to King in February 
1786 made a case for centralized policy making and reflected the time honored 
Federalist strategy of using governmental power to bolster trade and increase 
the property of the well-to-do.   
We are drained of our cash, [and] that our trade is embarrassed and our 
finances deranged are truths which will not be denied.  The moment, my 
dear Sir, these questions are asked, what is to be done under these 
circumstances?  How shall our trade be placed upon a respectable                                                         
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footing?  How shall the interest of each State be advanced, that of the 
United States be promoted and their dignity be preserved abroad?171  
Lincoln suggested the answer to the economic trouble was to give Congress 
more power.  He added, “the United States, as they are called, seem to be little 
more than a name.  They are not really embarked in the same bottom.”  The 
central question, according to Lincoln was “whether Congress shall be vested 
with full and competent powers to regulate the trade of the United States.”  
Boston merchants agreed with Lincoln, having petitioned the legislature to 
direct the state’s delegates in Congress to press for the regulation of foreign 
trade. Governor Bowdoin agreed with them, but confessed that many other 
states were still unwilling to cede their authority to Congress.172  
It was well understood by the ruling elite in Massachusetts that in order to 
address the many challenges confronting the states, a convention of delegates 
from each state would have to be called to address the deficiencies of the 
Articles of Confederation.  The Massachusetts General Court had already 
passed a series of resolutions in July 1785, calling for a federal convention to 
revise the Confederacy and to reassess the powers of the Congress.173  The 
state’s three delegates to Congress, however, which included King, decided to 
hold off presenting the resolutions, arguing that they understood the 
sentiments of their colleagues in the Congress and were certain that such a 
move was premature.  The Massachusetts legislature seems to have approved 
of King’s judgment in the matter, for they re-elected him to Congress in 1786.  
Gore sent King the news of his re-appointment: “The choice of delegates is 
concluded,” he said.  “The members are Mr. Gorham, Dr. Holten, Mr. Dane 
and my friend King.”  He added that “Sedgwick was not chosen, the clamor 
against lawyers was so great that they preferred Holten to him.”  Perhaps more 
fatal to Sedgwick’s candidacy was the fact that among a growing number of 
debtors in the western part of the state, he was a high profile creditor.174 
Maintaining a strong relationship with Congress was important, but the 
political situation in Massachusetts continued to deteriorate.    
Although the General Court postponed funding of the public debt, the scarcity 
of cash and the lack of local manufacturing were of even greater concern to the 
people of Massachusetts.  Adding to their troubles, the legislature, hoping to 
discharge the debt over time, decided to levy high real estate and poll taxes,                                                         
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payable only in specie, and also sought new revenue from taxation on farm 
buildings and animals.  This strategy would, over the next several months, 
prompt many western farmers to consider taking unprecedented actions against 
their government. 
In mid-January 1786, Sullivan suffered a personal crisis. His wife Hetty died 
very suddenly.  The speed of her death shocked Sullivan, who, in the weeks and 
months that followed, withdrew from public life and public debate.  As 
evidence of his close relationship with King, the only extant letter written by 
Sullivan in the immediate aftermath of his wife’s death was to his friend in 
congress.175  Meanwhile, King had recently married Mary Alsop, the only child 
of one of New York’s most merchants, John Alsop.  Just as they had before the 
war, political connections and wealth still counted in the new republic.  No 
doubt desirous of seeing his daughter remain in New York, Alsop convinced 
the young couple to remain in New York.  
It was spring before Sullivan emerged from his self-imposed political silence.  A 
clear sign of restored life and confidence was the fact that he began writing 
essays again.  Writing under the name Consideration, Sullivan addressed the 
deepening financial crisis and the scarcity of cash, by drawing upon classical 
republican advice.  He urged the people of Massachusetts to cut back on 
expenses, to “save money for a rainy day,” and warned them to “never listen to 
the tales of complainers, who talk of nothing but hard times,” but do nothing 
to remedy them.  He suggested that every man could live within his income, 
“and thereby preserve his independence.”176  Sullivan linked the familiar call for 
industry and economy as a means to “forever triumph over hard times, and 
disappoint poverty,” with patriotism.  “The general cry ‘that we cannot pay the 
taxes, and live,’” was absolutely false, he declared, and people who complained 
about paying taxes were not worthy of freedom, “when so many patriots and 
heroes laid down their lives to purchase it for their country.”  In the final 
analysis, he insisted, “it is impossible to be happy without industry, economy 
and virtue, and as experience evinces that these are produced by what we call 
hard times, or the scarcity of money, we certainly ought to be thankful when 
we see the causes of public happiness operating.”177   
Sullivan’s words had little effect on the growing number of frustrated debtors, 
particularly farmers in the western communities who were suffering 
unprecedented economic hardship.  While Sullivan relied on tired old bromides                                                         
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to sooth tempers, western farmers were insisting on government intervention, 
demanding that the General Court, among other things, cut taxes, issue new 
currency and enact legislation that would suspend suits for debts.  As these 
farmers would soon discover, however, their political influence was minimal at 
best, victims perhaps of their own reluctance to become active participants in 
government in the years leading up to their current financial troubles.  Indeed, 
while several factors contributed to the politically volatile environment of the 
1780s, perhaps the most significant was the underlying disparity in the exercise 
of political power.   
According to Van Beck Hall, the economic-political dominance of 
“commercial-cosmopolitan” towns and interests contributed to the violence of 
1786-1787.  Commercial towns, such as Newburyport, Gloucester, Beverly, 
Salem, Boston, Newton, Milton, Dedham, New Bedford and Barnstable, 
among others, containing the wealthiest and well-connected political and 
commercial leaders dominated political offices in the state.  Between 1780-
1791, the governor and lieutenant-governor came from one of these 
communities 100% of the time; that the justices of the Supreme Judicial Court 
and the president of the senate all came from these towns; that the speaker of 
the House came from these towns 91% of the time; and that members of the 
Confederation Congress came from these towns 84% of time, as did 69% of 
the new national congress and 62% of the Governor’s Council. Men from this 
same group controlled the state senate and enjoyed considerable influence in 
the House of Representatives.178  These political realities, however, also may 
have reflected the fact that westerners chose not to be active in government 
until after their economic situation had become untenable in the mid-1780s.  In 
addition, western communities had to contend with the demographic fact that 
they were still fewer in number than those in eastern urban population centers.   
After the decision by the Massachusetts legislature in the summer of 1786 to 
raise property taxes and to levy taxes on farm buildings and animals, it was 
simply a matter of time before events came to a head.  For the growing number 
of cash strapped farmers who faced financial ruin, possible imprisonment and 
loss of their property to public and private creditors looking to enforce their 
claims, time had run out.  In late August, under the leadership of former 
Continental army officer, Captain Daniel Shays, western farmers forcibly 
prevented courts in Middlesex and Berkshire Counties from conducting 
business.  They demanded that the General Court, among other things, lower 
taxes, reduce the cost of state government, simplify the judicial system, curb                                                         
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lawyers’ fees, and increase the money supply through the issue of state bills of 
credit.179   
Most government leaders and members of the legal community were quick to 
condemn Shays and his followers.  King, Gore and Sullivan, for example, 
condemned the uprising, though they differed as to what the rebellion meant 
and what could be done to prevent similar violence in the future.  While 
Sullivan was critical of the insurgents, he also expressed sympathy and caution.  
In a letter to the Centinel, he sought to convince the insurgents they were taking 
the wrong path: “There seems at present to be a general dissatisfaction 
throughout the state.  Whether it is with or without cause, let us not rashly 
apply a remedy that may prove more fatal than the disease.”180  Sullivan, again 
relying on familiar republican virtues, suggested that many Americans were too 
concerned with “luxury and extravagance,” and that “if we have honestly 
involved ourselves either in public or private debts, let us as honestly discharge 
the obligations we have voluntarily contracted.”  He complained that many 
people “seem to think that to enjoy liberty is to live independently of all laws, 
both divine and human; that each one should have a code of laws written in his 
own breast, and adapted to his own convenience.”  He implored them to 
“Correct your error before the tyrant’s herald shall proclaim it too late.  Be 
assured that by your turbulence and sedition you are preparing a yoke for your 
own necks, and heaping millions of burdens upon those which you now think 
too grievous to be borne.”181  Sullivan added that “whilst we now have it in our 
power to show ourselves worthy of the name and privileges of Americans, let 
us not become a prey to lawless ambition, or the sport of contending powers.  
Whilst we maintain inviolate our rights and privileges, let us not give our liberty 
wings to fly away.”182  
Sullivan was certainly not alone among those who later identified themselves as 
Republicans in his opposition to Shays.  The editor of the Independent Chronicle 
declared:  
Those who wickedly mean to stir up confusion and destroy our 
government, will not listen to reason themselves, nor will they, if they 
can help it, suffer their followers to attend to its voice.  But of the 
rational and dispassionate, who have been led to favor measures which, 
upon cooler deliberation, they will detest and condemn, I beg leave to                                                         
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ask, whether they conceive that it is possible to support government 
without taxes? And whether they can devise a constitution more free, 
and which pays a greater attention to the sacred rights of mankind, than 
that under which we live.183  
Pacificus’ “Friendly Address to the Insurgents,” acknowledged “that we are 
under pressing burdens, none will deny,” but armed revolt is not the answer.  
“There is only one case that will justify forceable opposition to our 
Government,” Pacificus insisted, “and that is when our constitutional rights are 
invaded, and other means of redress are ineffectual.”184  
Writing to John Adams in London about the uprising, King acknowledged that 
perhaps the decision by the legislature to press for direct taxes went “beyond 
what prudence would authorize,” and that all taxes, taken together, were far 
more than Massachusetts’s citizens could afford.  He remained optimistic, 
however, and assured Adams that the legislature would take the necessary 
measures to restore order. “You will see this business greatly magnified and 
Tories may rejoice, but all will be well.”185  One month later, King expressed 
“compassion for those ignorant and misguided men, who have thoughtlessly 
joined in measures unauthorized by their sober reflection,” but he warned that 
state officials should not assume that the insurgents were not receiving aid or 
council from external or foreign sources.186  
Gore expressed no sympathy for the insurgents, wishing only to see them 
defeated.  He vented his anxiety and frustration in regular letters to King in 
New York, updating him on reports and rumors of Shays and his “mighty 
armies” and their continued threats against the courts.  Fearful that state 
legislators would buckle under the pressure, Gore, whose law practice was still 
focused primarily on ‘collections,’ was very concerned at what he perceived as 
the government’s inability to protect creditors or quell the growing disorder.  
He complained of “wise-acre” lawmakers, who were “weak enough to think 
[that] by sacrificing private contracts,” they were somehow supporting public 
debts.  He expressed outrage that lawmakers, particularly in the House, were 
simply acting out of “disgraceful fear” of western farmers, though he remained 
confident that the state senate would “for this session at least, stand firm” 
against “all invasions of our constitutional rights.”187  A few weeks later, Gore 
wrote to King: “I wish it was generally believed that an attack on property and                                                         
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a subversion of the Government was intended, for so great a languor, so little 
spirit I never knew.”  He insisted that deflation would take care of itself and 
that the legislature should do nothing in response to the demands of the 
farmers.188  
By January 1787, the rebels, who never numbered more than 1200 at any given 
time, grew more violent.  Lacking the institutional mechanism to crush the 
rebellion, Governor Bowdoin and several Boston businessmen raised money to 
create a private army to defeat Shays.  Though the ‘army’ was later legitimized 
by the legislature as a state militia, the episode highlighted the inability of state 
government to quickly and effectively respond to armed threats.  The 
legislature then urged the newly assembled militia under the command of 
General Benjamin Lincoln to take the necessary measures “for the good name 
of the commonwealth to prevent effusion of blood and the spread of 
insurrection to other commonwealths and even danger to the whole 
confederation.”189  Within a few weeks, General Lincoln and his army of 4,400 
men caught up with Shays and his rebel army in Petersham and quickly 
defeated the much smaller and largely disorganized force.  While most of the 
rebels scattered, many of its leaders, including Shays, were eventually taken 
prisoner.   
Seventeen year-old James Sullivan, Jr., who had recently graduated from 
Harvard, was one of the government soldiers who participated in the harsh 
winter campaign against the rebels.  He volunteered for a cavalry company 
raised by Colonel Hitchbourn to track down Job Shattuck, one of the leading 
insurgents.  During their January march to Petersham, the cavalrymen were 
caught in a severe snowstorm and exposed to bitterly cold conditions.  After 
capturing Shattuck, they then rode non-stop forty-three miles to Boston with 
their prisoner.190  It is believed young Sullivan suffered from the effects of 
prolonged exposure to the bitter cold, for in the early spring he “was attacked 
with pleurisy,” and died on June 19, 1787.  Shaken by his loss, the elder Sullivan 
held Shattuck responsible for the death of his young son.191  
Once it became apparent that the rebellion had failed, the government acted 
with renewed confidence and remarkable speed.  When the General Court 
convened in early February 1787, it acted quickly on Governor Bowdoin’s 
request for additional troops and additional money to repay the businessmen                                                         
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who helped fund the expedition against Shays, without even determining from 
where the money would come.  The legislature also acted on the governor’s 
request for a Disqualifying Act, limiting the rights of an indeterminate number 
of Massachusetts citizens who may have participated in or contributed to the 
uprising.  Sullivan expressed concern over the lack of debate: “The General 
Court goes on with remarkable and astonishing unanimity, as there is no 
opposition it would be a wonder if the Constitution was strictly adhered to, and 
yet the critical situation of the Commonwealth requires circumspection in order 
that good men may not be made enemies to Government.”  Sullivan worried 
that “the powers of the Government are so united in the metropolis that it is 
dangerous even to be silent; a man is accused of rebellion if he does not loudly 
approve every measure as prudent, necessary, wise and Constitutional.”  And, 
“Every countryman who comes in and offers to apologize for his son or 
brother deluded, is railed at and called a Rebel, … God knows where all will 
lead.”192  
King had no such misgivings. Writing to Gerry, he declared “I hope the most 
extensive and minute attention will now be paid to the eradicating of every seed 
of insurgency.” 193  Writing again a week later, however, he observed that for 
“punishment to be efficacious [it] should not be extensive,” and that “a few 
and those of the most consequence should be the victims of law.” “I am 
extremely pleased with the proceedings of the General Court,” King told 
Gerry, “they will procure them Honor wherever they are known.  Be assured 
the late exertions of the Commonwealth are viewed in a very respectable light.”  
King expressed “some doubt about the policy of your Bill disqualifying” certain 
citizens, but he concluded “I am not so competent a Judge as they are who 
have decided in favor of the measure.”  Like many Massachusetts leaders, King 
was just glad that the rebellion had ended.194  
Despite the fact he had strongly opposed the rebellion, and while his eldest son 
was still suffering the effects of a disease that would soon take his life, Sullivan 
took an active part in the defense of several prisoners, both as trial counsel and 
as a member of the Governor’s Council.  His two most notable cases were 
those involving Henry Gale of Worcester, who was accused of taking a leading 
role in the rebellion, and Jason Parmenter of Bernardston, who had been 
charged with murder in the death of Jacob Walker.195  Though Gale was found 
guilty, Sullivan was ultimately successful in setting aside his penalty.  As a                                                         
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member of the Governor’s Council, Sullivan was asked to review petitions for 
clemency.  In was in this capacity that Sullivan recommended that mercy be 
extended to the insurgents, suggesting that like “many thousands of the people 
that these unhappy commotions should be settled without further loss of life.” 
196  After reviewing the evidence in Parmenter’s case, Sullivan argued that “As I 
do not, and see no necessity of, nor public advantage from, the execution of 
these people, after all this suffering, and now that the state has sunk into the 
arms of peace and tranquility, I am clearly of the opinion we should advise his 
Excellency to grant a full pardon to Jason Parmenter.” 197  With the exception 
of Job Shattuck, the man his son was pursuing when he contracted the illness 
that would ultimately claim his life, Sullivan’s decision to represent rebels was 
certainly consistent with the arguments he raised against Honestus in his defense 
of the legal profession, and offered further evidence of his commitment to the 
law and republicanism.   
In the weeks and months after the uprising had been suppressed, most 
Massachusetts political leaders, including Governor Hancock, who had been 
elected after the treason trials had been conducted but before the sentences 
were carried out, increasingly shared Sullivan’s feeling that enough blood had 
been shed.  Though most of the prisoners were found guilty of participating in 
the uprising, the legislature granted pardons to everyone who took an oath of 
allegiance.  In June 1788, the governor pardoned Shays and the other leaders of 
the rebellion who had been found guilty of treason and sentenced to death.  
After peace had been restored, Sullivan suggested that what had happened was 
not so unusual.  He argued: “the late unhappy commotions do not fix the 
character of the people as ungovernable.  They arose from an unfortunate 
concurrence of circumstances, with which all countries in their turns have been 
afflicted, but which, under free institutions, are attended by consequences 
peculiarly dangerous and disagreeable.”  He added that “it must be 
remembered that we had lately been in resistance to a government long 
established,” and that “taxes of previous years, not heavy when they were 
granted, upon the sudden contraction of the currency became intolerable.”198   
Gore was not as understanding as Sullivan, nor was he comfortable with the 
election of several farmers to the General Court in the spring of 1787, 
including many who had participated in or sympathized with the uprising.  As 
far as Gore was concerned, the democratization of government had gone too                                                         
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far.  He feared that these farmers would continue their assault on the legal 
system and creditor rights.  He was convinced that property interests must be 
protected against radicals and to that end he embraced the idea of increasing 
the power of the federal government.  
Gore was not alone in his growing fear of democratization.  To many 
Federalists, Shays Rebellion was a reminder of what could happen when the 
time honored social order was challenged, and the ‘habit of deference’ 
discarded.  David Hackett Fischer highlights the ‘habit of subordination’ that 
existed in the old Federalist world, where the “natural rulers of society” were 
expected to assume leadership roles.  Although the elite came to believe in 
republican government, they also believed it should be governed by the favored 
class.  The Federalists were not anti-democratic, Fischer argues, but they 
believed certain individuals were better suited to lead than others.  “Every man 
of observation is convinced,” Sedgwick wrote to King in 1787, “that the end of 
government, security, cannot be attained by the exercise of principles founded 
on democratic equality.”199   
King and Gore have been characterized as “young” Federalists, men who stood 
in contrast to their ‘old school’ colleagues.  Though like-minded in their view 
of government, and though close personal friends, King and Gore had very 
different talents and very different temperaments.  King had more in common 
with the old-school Federalists, particularly in his commitment to society over 
the individual.  A highly regarded congressman and gifted orator, King felt 
comfortable working with the older Federalist leaders like Washington, Jay and 
Hamilton.  Gore, on the other hand, represented a new and different breed of 
Federalist leader with an almost singular commitment to the protection of 
property rights.  Though admittedly a regional figure at this point in his career, 
Gore would never enjoy the friendship and confidence of Federalist luminaries. 
He would instead gravitate towards the far more partisan and aggressive 
conservatives like Timothy Pickering.  Gore was, as Fischer observes, ingrained 
with the old Federalist “insistence upon an open and habitual display of 
subordination,” but he had a more harsh and aggressive manner that ran 
counter to the methods of old school Federalists.200  Whereas King was widely 
viewed as a gentleman, Gore was seen as combative, embodying the spirit of 
faction that would come to dominate American politics in the next decade.  
Where King felt more comfortable in the halls of Congress, Gore felt more at 
home in the courtroom.  Though both forums were traditional environments                                                         
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for the ruling elite, they demanded different talents for success.  Compromise 
and conciliation were the accepted means of getting things done in Congress, 
while in the adversarial world of the courtroom, legal cunning and passionate 
argument ultimately won the day.  Furthermore, as society became more 
democratized, the courts became the last bulwark in defense of property and 
creditor rights, and therefore a natural arena for men like Gore.  As the country 
moved closer to a national consensus in the coming years, men like Gore were 
marginalized in large part because their tone and their methods differed so 
dramatically from the old school Federalists and the new Republicans.  
In the spring of 1787, both old school and new school Federalists were 
contemplating steps to restore order.  In the wake of Shays, there was a 
growing consensus that the powers of the national government had to be 
strengthened.  When Congress reconvened in February 1787, the central 
question facing the body was what could be done to address the inherent 
weakness of the Confederation.  Writing to Elbridge Gerry, King declared that 
“It is most certain that things will not long continue in their present condition, 
if foreseeing the dangers which hang over us, we do not unite in measures 
calculated to establish public happiness; I am confident that no man will be 
able to bear up against calamitous events, which will otherwise force 
themselves into existence.”  He then spoke of the Philadelphia convention.  He 
implored Gerry: “for God’s sake be careful who are the men; the times are 
becoming critical: a movement of this nature ought to be carefully observed by 
every member of the Community.”201  Several months later King spelled out 
the kind of men he hoped Massachusetts would send to Philadelphia. Delegates 
should have “good knowledge of the constitutions and various interests of the 
several states, and of the good and bad qualities of the confederation.”  King 
realized that the time for definitive action had come, “that events [were] 
hurrying to a crisis,” and that “prudent and sagacious men should be ready to 
seize the most favorable circumstances to establish a more permanent and 
vigorous government.”202  
The prospect of a strong central government was particularly appealing to Gore 
because he was confident that the government would be built and run by 
people who thought and acted as he did, and because the Shaysites were 
becoming more politically active and assuming a larger share of political power 
in the Massachusetts General Court.  Only a strong and vigorous federal 
government, Gore reasoned, could protect business interests and prevent                                                         
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legislation that would ruin the economy, and only the strong exercise of power 
at the national level, enforcing uniform trade regulations over all states, would 
salvage the Republic.  As an attorney who represented clients engaged in 
interstate and foreign commerce, Gore understood the importance of creating 
a system of laws that encouraged commerce among the states and between 
states and other countries.  In addition to the commercial implications of a 
strengthened union, the actions of Daniel Shays and the subsequent electoral 
success of his followers completed the transformation of Gore into an avowed 
nationalist.  
Sullivan agreed with the need to call a convention for the purpose of revising 
the Confederation government.  He embraced the idea of creating a 
constitution to meet the needs of the people.  In a lengthy article submitted to 
the Centinel, he declared “it is a matter of the utmost surprise to all people of 
understanding … that Americans … should institute a Congress to superintend 
their political interests, - by whom alone those interests can at present be 
promoted, and in whom only they have any pretensions to an union, - and yet 
deny or neglect to give them the powers necessary to answer the purpose of 
their institution.”  Sullivan didn’t fear giving too much power to Congress, 
arguing that since “we have adopted the plan of conducting our political affairs 
by a Congress annually elected by the several states, it is but right, it is but what 
sound policy would dictate, to grant to that body full and ample powers, 
constitutionally settled, to conduct the public concerns of the nation without 
impediment.”  As always, Sullivan stated his case clearly and unequivocally, 
concluding that “if the states are determined to proceed as they have begun, 
reserve to themselves their absolute sovereignty, and grant Congress only 
occasional, temporary and interfering powers, we have nothing to expect but 
that train of ruinous consequences which naturally and unavoidably proceeds 
from imbecility and disorder.”203  
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Chapter IV 
A New Federal Government 
George Washington wrote to his old friend, Henry Knox, on February 25, 
1787, to congratulate his former colleague and the government of 
Massachusetts on the “happy termination of [Shays] this insurrection.”204  The 
former commanding general knew that strong measures would need to be 
taken at the national level to strengthen the government and restore order and 
improve the economy.  Writing to Knox again on March 8th, Washington 
observed that “I am glad to hear that Congress are about to remove some of 
the stumbling blocks which lay in the way of the proposed convention.”  He 
added that “a Convention is an expedient I wish to see tried: after which, if the 
present government is not efficient, conviction of the propriety of a change of 
it, will disseminate through every rank and class of people and may be brought 
about in place;” and “which however necessary it may appear in the eyes of the 
more discerning, my opinion is, that it cannot be effected without great 
contention, and much confusion.”205   
A. Massachusetts and the United States Constitution 
The Constitutional Convention convened on May 25, 1787 in the Pennsylvania 
State House and Washington was unanimously elected to preside over the 
gathering.  King, who was named as one of the Massachusetts delegates, 
arrived on the 25th, but couldn’t take part in the proceedings until the 28th when 
the rest of his Massachusetts colleagues arrived.  Over the next several weeks, 
he played an active role in the deliberations and was viewed by many as “the 
most eloquent orator” at the Convention.206  
Sullivan wrote often to King in Philadelphia, encouraging him in his work and 
keeping him abreast of Massachusetts news.  In the months since Shays and his 
men had been defeated and captured, peace had been restored and the 
economy had picked up, Sullivan reported.  But, he noted, “all appears to me in 
vain unless you make the United States a nation.”207  King also received 
numerous letters from his good friend and Federalist colleague, Gore.  
Favoring a medical metaphor, Gore urged action to strengthen the central 
government: “You, of the federal Convention, must invent some plan to                                                         
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increase the circulation at the heart, and thereby dispense heat and vigor to the 
extremities – if you do not, we shall descend to anarchy and disgrace.”208  
Clinton Rossiter labeled King “the champion committeeman of the summer,” 
who had “turned suddenly, perhaps under the influence of Hamilton, into an 
enthusiastic, sharp witted, persuasive nationalist.”209  Though King’s conversion 
to the nationalist cause may not have been as sudden as Rossiter suggested, the 
tone of his arguments had taken a dramatic and enthusiastic turn.  When 
discussions turned to the proper role of state governments in relation to 
foreign powers, King declared that states as political beings “are dumb, for they 
could not speak to any foreign Sovereign whatever.  They were deaf, for they 
could not hear any propositions from such Sovereign.  They had not even the 
organs or faculties of defense or offence, for they could not of themselves raise 
troops, or equip vessels, for war.”210  According to James Madison’s notes, 
King said he couldn’t understand the attachment to states, and professed 
amazement “that when a just Government founded on a fair representation of 
the people of America was within our reach, we should renounce the blessing, 
from an attachment to the ideal freedom & importance of States.”211  King had 
never been so emphatic in his promotion of the national government or so 
dismissive of the importance of state governments.  On June 19, 1787, he 
declared that “a Union of the states is a union of the men composing them, 
from whence a national character adheres to the whole,” and argued that 
“much of their power ought to be taken from” the states.212  During the 
extended debate over the interests of large states versus the small states, King 
observed that he “was fully convinced that the question concerning a 
difference of interests did not lie where it had hitherto been discussed, between 
the great & small States; but between the Southern & Eastern.”213  
Not all the delegates embraced King’s nationalism.  The greatest innovation of 
the convention was the creation of a federal system of government that divided 
sovereignty between the state and national authorities.  Where the national 
government had jurisdiction, “it could act conclusively and effectively,” while 
the states retained jurisdiction over large areas of governance.214  In late July, a 
committee was assigned to draft a document setting forth all issues on which 
agreement had been reached over the previous two months.  On August 6th,                                                         
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the convention accepted the first draft of the Constitution, and then debated 
the document article by article for the next five weeks until a consensus had 
been reached.  Only three delegates voted against the final product.  Despite 
pleas from Washington and Benjamin Franklin, the three men, Edmund 
Randolph, George Mason and Elbridge Gerry, apologized but still refused to 
sign.215  Every other delegate signed his name to the document on September 
17, 1787.  Copies of the document were then sent to Congress and to the 
several states.   
Outside Federalist circles, there was a great deal of suspicion and opposition to 
the proposed constitution in Massachusetts, as the fear of change was 
widespread.  While there was strong support in the predominantly Federalist 
coastal communities, there was widespread opposition in the central and 
western counties.  Not surprisingly, those who supported the Constitution were 
those “who were convinced that centralization was essential to promote their 
welfare.”216  For conservative members of the legislature, including Sedgwick 
and Gore, there was evidence of the need for a profound change in 
government.  They hoped the new Constitution would save them from the 
“wreck” of the current government and prevent a descent into “anarchy and 
disgrace.”217  
After reading the Report of the Convention, Sullivan wrote to King on 
September 23rd, congratulating him on his work and incorrectly predicting that 
the constitution would meet with little opposition in Massachusetts: “Our 
people expect so much happiness from the doings of the Convention that they 
stand ready to adopt anything which may be offered; but this is as I think so 
very unexceptionable that I flatter myself it will meet with no opposition in this 
State.218  “I consider it to be of the highest importance,” Sullivan wrote on the 
28th, “to have a federal government and should this not be adopted, I should 
despair of having one excepting it arises from the chance of war.”  Sullivan 
expressed doubt about certain provisions.219  He believed, for example, that too 
many concessions had been given the south on the question of slave 
representation, and he also was concerned that trial by jury was not adequately 
secured.  In addition, he soon joined the chorus calling for the inclusion of a 
Bill of Rights to the document.  Although he was later accused by many of                                                         
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being an Anti-Federalist because he continued to challenge specific language in 
the finished product, Sullivan enthusiastically supported ratification of the 
Constitution, even if many of his political allies, including Hancock, had their 
misgivings.  Indeed, Sullivan had long been a strong advocate of sufficiently 
funding the national treasury and understood before many of his Republican 
colleagues the importance of strengthening the central government. 
Like Sullivan, Gore expressed optimism to King that the document would be 
ratified without difficulty.  “The federal plan is well esteemed, and as far as can 
be deduced from present appearances, the adoption will be easy.”220  Even as 
he penned these words, however, opponents were lining up to oppose the 
proposed constitution.  Gore would soon report to King there was 
considerable opposition to the plan in the western counties, particularly in areas 
that had supported Shays and his rebels.  While some farmers did support the 
new plan, a large percentage were against the proposed Constitution, and they 
were joined by many small property holders and those of lesser social and 
economic status, “either because it would not benefit them or because they 
believed it held dangers for the country.”221  
Perhaps recognizing the importance and historical significance of what was 
about to happen, Gore chose this occasion to enter the world of politics.  
Although he had always had an interest in politics, he had devoted most of his 
energy to the private practice of law since graduating from Harvard.  At the age 
of twenty-nine, he sought election as a delegate from Boston at the state 
convention that would debate and vote on the document produced in 
Philadelphia.  He had some damaging political baggage: his father had been a 
Tory, forced to leave Boston during the evacuation of 1776; he had a 
reputation for preferring government run by men of the traditional ruling elite; 
and his strong post-war ties to British merchants did not endear him to many 
Bostonians.  Unlike many old school Federalists who enjoyed widespread 
support, Gore’s critics, including Sullivan, saw him as an abrasive elitist. 
What Gore had in his favor, however, was that Boston was overwhelmingly 
Federalist.  Indeed, Boston was such a strong Federalist district that Elbridge 
Gerry, who refused to sign the constitution, was unable to secure a seat at the 
ratifying convention.  Boston electors cast votes for twelve delegates on 
December 10th at Faneuil Hall.  James Bowdoin was the top vote getter, with 
760, and Hancock was a close second with 751.  The other delegates were 
Thomas Dawes (749), William Phillips (740), Rev. Samuel Stillman (739), Dr.                                                         
220 Gore to King, October 7, 1787, King, I, 261. 
221 Pinkney, Christopher Gore, 22. 
 78 
Charles Jarvis (714), John Winthrop (661), John Coffin Jones (635), Sam 
Adams (628), Thomas Russell (610), Caleb Davis (603), and Christopher Gore 
(517).  It was a decidedly Federalist group, with Hancock, Jarvis and Adams the 
notable exceptions.222  
Despite being selected as a delegate Gore was not pleased with the voting, 
complaining to King that he had been singled out and that “falsehoods of every 
kind,” had been disseminated, and the “lowest and meanest acts of deception 
made use of to effect their purposes.”  Nonetheless, he added, despite being 
the only delegate [Republicans in attendance] opposed, “I feel as honorably 
elected as any one of the delegates.”223  Newspaper accounts of the gathering 
made no reference to any discord, focusing instead on the seeming unanimity 
of the group.  “It is not in our power to refer to a period when such general 
unanimity pervaded all ranks of citizens,” the Federalist leaning Centinel wrote, 
noting “no clashing party interests appeared.”224  “The general unanimity which 
pervaded all ranks of people in the choice of Delegates for the State 
Convention,” the Centinel carefully observed, “presages, in some degree, a 
happy result to the deliberations of [the Convention]”225  The Chronicle also 
cheered the election’s non-partisanship, but was more cautious about 
predicting the outcome.  
Between late September when the proposed Constitution was received in 
Massachusetts, and early January when the convention was called to order, the 
people of Massachusetts listened to arguments for and against ratification.  The 
Boston newspapers were the primary outlets for debating the merits of the 
proposed Constitution.  The Centinel, which strongly supported the 
Constitution, printed a mock dialogue between “Mr. Grumble” who offered 
vague and confused objections to the document, and Mr. Union, who carefully 
explained the benefits of the Constitution: “Mr. Union” confidently declared 
that: “It is no wonder, when we consider the horrors of present situation – the 
decay of our trade and manufacturers – the scarcity of money – the failure of 
public credit – the distraction of our public affairs – and the distress of 
individuals, which have all arisen from a want of this very Federal Government 
– it is no wonder,” the people support it.226  
In January 1788, just as the ratifying convention was about to begin, James 
Madison wrote to Governor Edmund Randolph in Virginia about the                                                         
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resistance to the Constitution in Massachusetts.  Without revealing the source 
of his assessment, Madison believed “The opposition proceeds from that part 
of the people who have a repugnancy in general to good government, to any 
substantial abridgment of State powers, and a part of whom in Massachusetts 
are known to aim at confusion, and are suspected of wishing a reversal of the 
Revolution.”227  
The opening session of the Massachusetts Ratifying Convention convened on 
Wednesday, January 9, 1788, at the Old State House in Boston.  The following 
day, because of space limitations, the 364 delegates moved to the Brattle Street 
Church, but dissatisfied with the acoustics they returned briefly to the Old State 
House before moving again on January 17 to the Rev. Jeremy Belknap’s Long 
Lane Meetinghouse.  The delegates who attended the Massachusetts ratifying 
convention represented a cross section of occupational groups including 
tradesmen, tavern and innkeepers, manufacturers, artisans, doctors, and 
clergymen.  The most heavily represented groups were merchants engaged in 
interstate and foreign commerce, numbering twenty-three; large landowners 
identified as ‘gentleman capitalists,’ numbering twenty-eight; lawyers, also 
numbering twenty-eight; and fifty-two farmers.228 
It soon became apparent to observers that consensus would be difficult to 
achieve. King perceived a division along class lines.  He told Madison that 
Gerry’s supporters were men “who are certainly not the most enlightened part 
of the convention.”229  Among these men, according to King, there existed “an 
apprehension that the liberties of the people are in danger,” a fear based on  “a 
distrust of men of property or education.  This belief has “a more powerful 
effect upon the minds of our opponents than any specific objections against 
the Constitution.”230  Indeed, despite Gore and Sullivan’s initial projections of 
an easy victory, at the outset more than two hundred of the delegates likely 
opposed ratification.  Twenty-nine had actually fought alongside Daniel Shays a 
year earlier.231  “Had a vote been taken on the adoption of the Constitution as 
soon as the convention assembled,” Samuel Harding observed, “there can be 
no question but that it would have been overwhelmingly against the proposed 
plan.”232  The American Herald, which frequently expressed Hancock’s views,                                                         
227 Debates and Proceedings in the Convention of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts Held in the Year 
1788 (Boston, 1856), 744-745. 
228 Forrest McDonald, We the People: The Economic Origins of the Constitution (Chicago, 1958),      . 
229 King to Madison, January 6, 1788, King, I, 313-314. 
230 King to Madison, January 20, 1788, King, I, 314. 
231 McDonald, We the People, 183. 
232 Samuel Bannister Harding, The Contest over the Ratification of the Federal Constitution in the State of 
Massachusetts (New York, 1896), 67. 
 80 
reflected the concerns of this large block of delegates when it urged caution as 
deliberations began.  It warned that if the proposed plan was accepted, “you 
will subject yourselves to a government where you will be totally unprotected 
by a Bill of Rights, … without which no system of government ought to be 
instituted.”  After outlining its specific objections, the Herald responded to the 
argument that the proposed constitution had been drafted by the best minds in 
the country: “I allow them to be perhaps second to none in the world,” … but 
“the greatest men are liable to be mistaken.”233  Still, the Centinel confidently 
quoted Oliver Ellsworth, the Connecticut Federalist who opened that state’s 
convention a few days earlier: “The Constitution before us is a complete 
system of legislative, judicial and executive power.  It was designed to supply 
the defects of the former system; and I believe, upon a full discussion, it will be 
found calculated to answer the purpose for which it was designed.”234 
Recognizing that they did not have the votes to ratify when the convention 
opened, the Constitutionalists were publicly patient and deferential to their 
opponents.  With the more experienced, confident and better-educated 
delegates in their corner, the Constitutionalists managed the convention with 
skill and efficiency, confident that if they educated the Constitution’s 
opponents they could win the day.  A review of the proceedings on January 15th 
provides an example as to how the Constitutionalists managed to control the 
debate.  King opened the proceedings with a review of the subject of elections, 
arguing that debate should focus on the general principles contained in the 
Constitution.  Judge Francis Dana followed King and several leading Federalist 
merchants, including George Cabot, John C. Jones, William Pearson and 
Nathaniel Gorham, spoke in favor of the proposed Constitution. Federalist 
clergyman, John Carnes and attorney Theophilus Parsons rounded out the 
Constitutionalist speakers.235  
Although the Constitutionalists controlled the debate, King grew increasingly 
frustrated.  On January 27th, he reported to Madison that while “a very large 
proportion of the good sense and property of this State” were well represented 
by the “friends of the Constitution,” they had the difficult “task not only of 
answering, but also of stating and bringing forward the objections of their 
opponents.”  He added that “the opposition complains that the Lawyers, 
Judges, Clergymen, Merchants and men of education are all in favor of the 
Constitution – and that for that reason they appear to be able to make worse 
appear the better cause.  But they say, ‘if we had men of this description on our                                                         
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side, we should alarm the people with the imperfections of the Constitution.’” 
“These objections are not directed against any part of the Constitution,” King 
told Madison, “but their opposition seems to arise from an opinion that is 
immovable, that some injury is plotted against them – that the system is the 
production of the rich and ambitious, that they discover its operations and that 
the consequence will be the establishment of two orders in the Society, one 
comprehending the opulent and the great, the other the poor and illiterate.”236  
King may have had Amos Singletary in mind when he penned these words.  
Singletary, a grist and sawmill operator from Sutton, Massachusetts, had been 
particularly vocal the previous week, insisting that “shifty” lawyers were 
attempting to force the Constitution down the throats of the poor.  Singletary 
declared he “did not understand what [the] gentlemen meant by Congress 
guaranteeing a republican form of government.”  He “wished they would not 
play round the subject with their fine stories, like a fox round a trap, but 
[instead] come to it.  Why don’t they say that Congress will guarantee our State 
Constitution.”  King responded in frustration that even if the state Constitution 
were guaranteed by the United States, the gentleman from Sutton would find it 
a greater defect because it would have precluded the State from making 
amendments. 237  
The anti-Constitutionalist Singletary spoke again on the morning of the 25th 
about the power of Congress to raise money, declaring that Americans had 
fought the British in 1775 “because they clamed a right to tax us and bind us in 
all cases whatever.”  He added:  
And does not this Constitution do the same?  Does it not take away all 
we have, all our property?  Does it not lay all taxes, duties, imposts and 
excises?  And what more have we to give? ... These lawyers, and men of 
learning, and moneyed men, that talk so finely, and gloss over matters so 
smoothly, to make us, poor illiterate people, swallow down the pill, 
expect to get into Congress themselves; they expect to be the managers 
of this Constitution, and get all the power and all the money into their 
own hands, and then they will swallow up all us little folks, like the great 
leviathan, Mr. President; yes, just as the whale swallowed up Jonah.238    
Theophilus Parsons responded to Singletary by declaring simply that “no 
compositions which men can pen, could be formed, but what would be liable 
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to the same charge.”239  King added that the new government would be more 
responsive to the people than the old.  “The introduction to this Constitution is 
in these words: ‘We, the People.’ The language of the Confederation is ‘We, the 
States.’ The latter is a mere Federal government of states.  Those, therefore, 
that assemble under it have no power to make laws to apply to the individuals 
of the States confederated; and the attempts to make laws for collective 
societies, necessarily leave a discretion to comply with them or not.”  And, 
insisted King, “In no instance have there been so frequent deviations from first 
principles, as in neglect or refusal to comply with the requisitions of general 
governments for the collection of moneys.”240    
Gore, who also spoke on the subject, reminded the delegates “the Congress of 
the United States is to be chosen, either mediately or immediately, by the 
people.  They can impose no burdens but what they participate in, in common 
with their fellow citizens.”  In response to the opposition’s charge that 
Congressmen would act improperly because Roman magistrates in ancient 
republics often usurped power, Gore replied: “Some gentlemen suppose it is 
unsafe and unnecessary to vest the proposed government with authority to ‘lay 
and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises.’  Let us strip the subject of every 
thing that is foreign, and refrain from likening it with governments which in 
their nature and administration have no affinity; and we shall soon see that it is 
not only safe, but indispensably necessary to our peace and dignity, to vest the 
Congress with the[se] powers.”  He insisted the new government must be given 
the resources to fund the necessary functions and exigencies of government.241  
“If gentlemen would be candid,” he later said, “and not consider that wherever 
Congress may possibly abuse power, that they certainly will, there would be no 
difficulty in the minds of any in adopting the proposed Constitution.”242  
The Constitutionalists knew that argument alone would not carry the day and 
they worked hard to bring popular Governor Hancock into their fold.  With 
the delegates split, Hancock had been reluctant to choose sides or antagonize 
either group.  When Hancock finally took the president’s chair at the 
convention, King became optimistic that the convention would finish its work 
successfully within a week.  “If Mr. Hancock does not disappoint our present 
expectations,” he wrote, “our wishes will be gratified; but his character is not 
entirely free from a portion of caprice.  This however is confidential.”243                                                            
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Hancock made a grand entrance.  He was carried up the aisle in a chair with his 
feet wrapped in bandages.244  He apologized to the assembly for not being able 
to participate earlier, and declared it was “his earnest desire that the convention 
adopt the proposed Constitution,” with a few amendments to satisfy the great 
diversity of opinion.245  After Hancock spoke, Samuel Adams rose to support 
him, acknowledging that “I have had my doubts of this Constitution – I could 
not digest every part of it, as readily as some gentlemen.”  But, he said, the 
governor’s proposal “will have a tendency to remove such doubts.  A proposal, 
of this sort, coming from Massachusetts, from her importance, will have its 
weight.”246  
On February 6, 1788, the convention ratified the Constitution by a vote of 187-
168, making Massachusetts the sixth state to ratify the document.  Even with 
the support of Hancock and Adams, however, the vote was close, passing by a 
slim nineteen votes.  The convention’s official endorsement included the 
following language: “As it is the opinion of this convention that certain 
amendments and alterations … would remove the fears and quiet the 
apprehensions of many of the good people of this commonwealth, the 
convention do therefore recommend that the following [nine amendments] 
alterations and provisions be introduced into the said constitution.”247  On the 
day after the final vote, King cheerfully wrote “the ratification is unconditional 
and absolute, but we have recommended certain amendments to the delegates 
first appointed under the Government.”248  He then explained to Madison that 
the majority, “although small, is extremely respectable, and the minority are in 
good temper,” and “they have the magnanimity to declare that they will devote 
their lives and property to support the Government.”249  
The key role played by Hancock was not a surprise to recent Harvard graduate 
John Quincy Adams, who had written to his father in June 1787, that the 
governor “has a peculiar talent of pleasing the multitude.”250  In the fall of 
1787, the old school Federalists, who always felt uncomfortable with Hancock’s 
willingness to yield to political opinions merely because they were popular, 
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were perhaps a bit more forgiving after Massachusetts ratified the 
Constitution.251    
 B. Massachusetts and the Federal Government 
Massachusetts’ ratification of the new federal Constitution marked the 
beginning of what would be one of the most important years in the state’s 
political history.  The Commonwealth had to create the political structure 
necessary to carry out the provisions of the new Constitution, including the 
election of its first congressmen and senators as well as state electors to the first 
Electoral College.  As the annual state election approached, Hancock basked in 
his renewed popularity. Former governor Bowdoin and his Federalist ‘faction’ 
offered their support to Hancock in his bid for re-election in 1788, just as King 
had predicted a few months earlier.  It is unlikely, however, that even without 
Bowdoin’s support Hancock could have been beaten.  The Federalists were 
determined to regain a majority in the state legislature, knowing that the 
upcoming session was going to be critically important and precedent setting.  
They also worked hard to elect Federalist Benjamin Lincoln, the general who 
had led the state militia against Daniel Shays, as lieutenant governor.  Thomas 
Cushing, who had served as lieutenant governor since the state government 
was established in 1780 had recently passed away, and Samuel Adams was 
completing the last few months of his term.  
Gore worked particularly hard to elect Lincoln, and asked King to write to their 
mutual acquaintance, Nathaniel Gorham, to encourage him not to run, for fear 
of splitting the Federalist vote. “I earnestly request that you ... write 
immediately & forcibly on this business to Mr. G[orham]” because   
he can disturb the tranquility of the Commonwealth, [and could] aid the 
election of Gerry & Warren or Adams; he may possibly destroy the good 
he has done in promoting the adoption of the fed. Govt. & will certainly 
damp[en] the ardor of his friends & increase the opposition of his 
enemies to the attainment of any great purpose of his own future 
emolument, by proposing himself a candidate for the office of Lt. 
Governor…You & Gen’l Knox can save this man from playing the fool 
with himself & injuring a good cause.252   
Whether King took Gore’s advice and wrote to Gorham is uncertain, but 
Gorham ran for lieutenant governor.                                                         
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Gore, who was tracking the various state races very carefully in the spring of 
1788, wrote again to King on April 9th, updating him on the status of the 
different contests.  Referring to their political allies not as Federalists or 
Constitutionalists but as ‘supporters of government,’ Gore declared “we shall 
have six good Senators from Essex & the like number from Suffolk.  Middlesex 
probably four good.  On a fair calculation our Senate will be better than the last 
year,” though “we can say nothing certain as to Lt. Govr., tho’ it is clear that 
Warren will not be elected by the people.”253  The optimism expressed in 
Gore’s letter was well founded.  On Election Day the opposition only won six 
of the thirty-one senate seats.  In the race for lieutenant governor, Lincoln 
received almost half of the votes, while Warren, the opposition candidate, 
received only one-fifth of the vote.  Samuel Adams and Nathaniel Gorham 
split the rest.254  Nonetheless, because none of the candidates had been able to 
secure a majority of the vote, the matter had to be decided by the state 
legislature.  Lincoln’s subsequent victory in the General Assembly confirmed to 
everyone that the legislature was firmly in the hands of those who supported a 
strong national government.255   
As these numbers suggest, the election of 1788 was a triumph for the 
Federalists and those who had fought hard for the ratification of the 
Constitution.  Shortly after the election, King wrote to Madison, inquiring as to 
how the debate over ratification was going in Virginia, and to proudly inform 
him that “there remains no doubt that a very large majority of the people of 
Massachusetts are in favor of the Federal Constitution.”  Together with the fact 
that Gerry “is elected to no office, the late elections for Governor, Lt. 
Governor, Senators & Representatives incontrovertibly prove it.”256 Gore was 
one of the new Federalists elected to the state legislature.  His active 
participation at the ratifying convention and subsequent hard work on behalf of 
Federalist candidates apparently brought him positive attention. Anxious to 
play an important role in the precedent setting work of implementing the new 
federal government, Gore won appointment to the committee that would 
recommend the mechanism for the selection of electors for president and vice 
president as well as the selection of United States senators.  
Over the opposition of Hancock’s close friend Dr. Charles Jarvis, who argued 
that state electors should be determined by a vote of the people, Gore and his 
committee recommended that the electors be chosen by joint ballot of both                                                         
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legislative houses.257  To support his claim, Gore pointed to Article II in the 
Constitution as providing that “the electors should be appointed in such a 
manner as the state legislature should direct.”  The esteemed attorney and legal 
mentor to King and Quincy Adams, Theophilus Parsons, suggested that as a 
practical matter, there simply wasn’t enough time to hold an election before the 
Electoral College was convened.  After Jarvis and others objected, a 
subcommittee was formed to hammer out a compromise.  Thereafter, it was 
agreed that the people of each district could vote for two candidates and that 
the legislature would then select one of the two from each district.  In addition, 
the legislature would appoint two at-large electors from the list of candidates 
submitted by the voters.  Though Representative Gore and his committee tried 
to insert yet another layer in the selection process, they were unsuccessful in 
convincing their opponents.  A compromise, giving the General Court the final 
judgment on the people’s choice of the state’s electors, was eventually 
reached.258  
Gore and his Federalist colleagues realized that in order to prevent a repeat of 
populist legislation of a year earlier, they would have to limit the influence of 
the “debtor” counties of Western Massachusetts.  They proposed dividing the 
state’s eight congressional districts by county, thus giving the heavily populated 
coastal districts a larger proportion of the congressional seats.  Though Article 
I, section 2 of the Constitution stated, “the number of representatives shall not 
exceed one for every thirty thousand,” it did not specify a figure for the 
maximum number of people within one district.  Consequently, the Federalist 
dominate General Court created eight congressional districts in Massachusetts, 
based on the counties, creating a natural inequity since the population of each 
county varied from 96,500 for the District of Maine to 38,600 in Bristol.  As 
Hall observed, the four smallest counties, “Bristol-Islands, Plymouth-
Barnstable, Middlesex, and Suffolk, elected 50 percent of the representatives 
but contained only 35 percent of the population.”259 
While the Massachusetts General Court debated the election of federal officers, 
Rufus King, one of the state’s former members of the Confederation Congress, 
was debating whether he and his family would permanently reside in 
Massachusetts or New York.  With the adoption of the new federal 
Constitution, the Confederation Congress ceased to exist, and with it, King’s 
congressional seat.  King’s friends in Massachusetts, including Gore, were 
urging him to purchase a home in Cambridge in order to re-establish his ties                                                         
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and residency in Massachusetts, in hopes of having him elected as one of the 
state’s first two senators. “Your friends in this quarter are very anxious to have 
you among them,” Gore wrote, adding “if possible, to gratify them, especially 
myself, pray conclude the bargain and become again a son of Massachusetts.”260  
In addition to Gore, General Knox and Nathaniel Gorham also encouraged 
King to remain in Massachusetts.  Having lived in New York as a member of 
the Confederation Congress since 1784, however, King had established strong 
personal and professional ties in that state.  Alexander Hamilton, for example, 
was one of the sponsors at the baptism of King’s first son, John, in April, 
1788.261  Moreover, since his marriage to Mary Alsop, the couple spent most of 
their time in New York to be with Mary’s aging and ailing father.  Conversely, 
his political and business ties in Massachusetts had weakened in his absence.262  
King spent the summer of 1788 in New York, corresponding with friends,  
promoting the ratification of the Constitution throughout the several states, 
and pondering his own future.  In the end, he chose to settle permanently in 
New York.   
On August 10th, Gore wrote to King about efforts to draft Hancock for the 
presidency.  He cited Hancock’s clique of Dr. Jarvis, Benjamin Hichborn and 
James Sullivan as seeking support to have the governor elected as the country’s 
first president.263  Three weeks later, Gore informed King that “parties begin to 
run high; it is said the Governor aims at the Presidency & disdains a second 
seat.”264  Gore’s reporting had little basis in fact, however, nor did he name 
individuals who were pushing Hancock’s nomination.  Indeed, Massachusetts 
electors gave no votes to Hancock for either the presidency or for the ‘second 
seat,’ in large part because John Adams was seen as the frontrunner for the vice 
presidency, and it would have been constitutionally impossible to have both 
executives hailing from the same state. 
As difficult as it was to reach agreement on the selection of state electors and 
congressional apportionment, the most contentious issue facing the General 
Court was the manner in which senators to the national government were to be 
selected.  Again, Gore took a leadership role.  Although the U.S. Constitution 
provided that the legislature of each state should choose two senators, it did 
not specify how that selection should take place.  Gore and his committee, 
again committed to reducing the general public’s influence in the selection                                                         
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process, suggested that each branch of the legislature be given a veto power 
over the other.  His opponents in the more democratic House favored a joint 
ballot.  It was finally agreed that the House would initiate the choice of two 
senators, with the senate having the power to approve or deny their choice.  If 
the senate did not concur, the House would continue making 
recommendations until the senate agreed.265  
The first two United States senators from Massachusetts were Federalists, 
Caleb Strong of Northampton and Tristram Dalton of Newbury.  A member 
of Hancock’s inner circle, Dr. Jarvis, who had championed the rights of the 
people to have a more direct role in the selection of their national leaders, was 
selected by the lower house, only to be rejected by the state senate.266  The 
Federalists successfully ensured that those who supported the Constitution 
would serve in the first session of the United States Senate. 
In the absence of disciplined political parties, the election of United States 
congressmen to represent Massachusetts proved to be quite disorganized and 
contentious.  Numerous candidates enthusiastically stepped forward to 
participate in the new government. Consequently, there was little chance for 
any candidate to receive a majority of votes cast, which resulted in runoff 
elections.267  The Federalists, who had long enjoyed electoral success in 
Massachusetts, seized the upper hand.  Of the eight seats allotted to 
Massachusetts in the House of Representatives, the Federalists captured six.268  
Hall observed that because the General Court “created eight election districts, 
based on counties that varied in population from 96,500 for the District of 
Maine to 38,600 in Bristol and the Island counties,” that there was a built-in 
inequity.  Therefore, long before the concept of one man, one vote, “the four 
smallest (Federal), Bristol-Islands, Plymouth-Barnstable, Middlesex, and 
Suffolk, elected 50 percent of the representatives but contained only 35 percent 
of the total population.”  Therefore, according to Hall, “the house elections 
confirmed the fears of anti-Constitutionalists about the large election 
districts.”269  
 C. Growing Partisanship in Massachusetts   
The new Congressional elections stirred a good deal of interest, but state 
politics also changed dramatically following the adoption of the U.S.                                                         
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Constitution.  From 1780 to 1794 state elections tended to be dominated by 
two groups, one led by Hancock and the other by Bowdoin.  Although the two 
groups would not form into organized parties until the mid-1790s, the process 
began with the death of Lieutenant Governor Thomas Cushing in 1788.  
Because the lieutenant governor’s position was primarily ceremonial and 
unsalaried, two years before his death Cushing was appointed captain of Castle 
William in Boston Harbor.  As captain of the fortification, a job that required 
no duties, Cushing received an annual salary of L450. 
A few days after Cushing’s death, and before his successor was chosen by the 
legislature, Governor Hancock declared that he would not be making any 
future appointments to the Castle William post.  Samuel Adams, who 
completed Cushing’s term, was comfortable with the decision and assured the 
people of Massachusetts that he would accept no compensation for a job for 
which there were no constitutional duties.270  With the election of Benjamin 
Lincoln as lieutenant governor, however, the future of the Castle William post 
became a bitter political battle, with accusations and personal attacks being 
made by both sides.  Federalists argued that the benefits from the Castle 
William post were customary and necessary to compensate the lieutenant 
governor.  Hancock and his defenders, however, insisted that it was a wasteful 
use of government funds. Federalists, like Gore, saw this as just another 
example of Hancock playing to the crowd for political gain. 
A House committee began an investigation to determine whether Hancock 
should appoint someone to fill the vacancy, or if not, whether the legislature 
should find some other way to compensate the lieutenant governor.  The 
governor’s allies, including Dr. Jarvis and William Widgery, argued that the 
legislature had no right to question the chief executive over such an 
appointment, while Representative Gore insisted the legislature had every right 
to inquire into the matters that affected the state’s defenses.271  Nonetheless, 
the House’s action failed to force Hancock into appointing Lincoln to the 
Castle William post.  In fact, the governor argued that as commander in chief 
of the army, he was in command of Castle William and that in his opinion it 
would be a waste of taxpayer money to appoint someone else to the position.272   
Massachusetts Federalists responded with regular assaults on the governor in 
the press.  Their principal argument was that the governor was violating the law 
since the General Court had, many years earlier, enacted legislation requiring                                                         
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the appointment of a commander of Castle William.  In addition, they argued, 
the lieutenant governor had come to rely on that source of income in lieu of a 
salary.273 Sullivan wrote to the Independent Chronicle on January 15, 1789 under 
the name Junius. He blasted the governor’s opponents for engaging in party 
politics, because, he suggested “there has been an implacable hatred for the 
name Hancock, since 1775.”  The governor has been subjected to unfair 
personal abuse, because he refused to appoint the lieutenant governor to the 
Castle William post because it was an unnecessary burden on the people.  
Sullivan assured readers that the governor had expressed his intention early so 
as “to prevent as far as he could, any appearance of disrespect to the man 
appointed by the people.”  The fact that the governor and lieutenant governor 
dined together frequently, Sullivan argued, and that they rode together to take 
their oaths, was proof there was no evidence of disrespect on the governor’s 
part.  If the lieutenant governor were granted a salary, it should be done by the 
legislature. As far as Sullivan was concerned, the position warranted no salary at 
all because the lieutenant governor had no official duties.  But if money was to 
be appropriated, he insisted, “let it be done in an open manly manner.”274  
As a member of the joint committee to determine a salary for the lieutenant 
governor, Gore -- perhaps in answer to Sullivan’s challenge -- took a leading 
role.  The committee’s report was issued in January 1789, and called for a 
lieutenant governor’s salary of L300. The pettiness continued, however, as 
several friends of Hancock took exception to the report’s preamble that 
implied the governor had acted improperly in refusing to provide support to 
the lieutenant governor.   
The Castle William dispute was the single biggest source of contention in the 
Massachusetts General Assembly from October 1788 until January 1789.  The 
Centinel reported that the “debates were animated and heated,” and that the 
House “remained full,” during the extended discussions, as did the public 
gallery.275  Gore, in particular, stood out as one of the more outspoken critics of 
the governor and played a leading role in the debate. 276  Finally, after months 
of debate, both sides could claim a partial victory.  Gore and his Federalist 
colleagues could celebrate the fact that a salary was established, while Jarvis, 
Widgerly, Sullivan, and other members of the Hancock faction could take 
comfort in the fact that L160 was deemed adequate compensation, instead of 
the 300 requested by Gore.                                                          
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The Castle William dispute was in part a dispute about patronage.  The 
Federalists had long enjoyed the benefits of such arrangements, relying on such 
traditional practices to build personal loyalties.  The Republicans, on the other 
hand, opposed such appointments on the grounds they were not merit based.  
The dispute left a great deal of political bitterness in its wake.  Lieutenant 
governor Lincoln disappointed Sullivan because he had countenanced the 
attacks against Hancock.  Lincoln should have disapproved publicly of the 
slanderous statements, “If the people should re-elect Mr. Hancock to be 
Governor,” Sullivan warned, “it may be a question whether it will be for the 
public good to place by him a man who has thus abused him.”277  The 
protracted dispute, petty and trivial as it was, did represent a significant shift in 
how appointments were to be made.  A meritocracy was slowly replacing the 
old patronage system.  The dispute also represented the first highly visible 
skirmish between these two emerging parties in Massachusetts and set the stage 
for later and far more significant political battles. 
The growing tension between the political factions in Massachusetts continued 
into 1789.  Long tired of what they perceived as Hancock’s inattention to the 
economic troubles that burdened the state and no doubt still angry over his 
handling of the Castle William post, the Federalists worked to oust the 
governor in favor of Bowdoin. Gore, in particular, did not like Hancock and 
scorned the “Governor’s repeated ruse of ill health, his great vanity,” and “his 
questionable means of holding his popularity.”278  Sullivan again defended his 
old friend in the Herald of Freedom, warning readers of efforts underway by the 
governor’s enemies to remove him from office: “His downfall is their first 
object, supposing that when the shepherd is taken away, the flock will become 
an easy prey to their ambitious purposes, therefore no effort is to be left to 
sacrifice him their idol, the god of ambition.”279  In another open letter, 
Sullivan suggested the choice was between freedom and slavery, referring to the 
“wanton, wicked, overbearing, anti-democratic junto, the sole design of whom, 
is to raise themselves to the rank of nobility, and to aggrandize themselves on 
the ruins of their unfortunate fellow citizens.”280  Despite a bitter campaign, 
Hancock won re-election easily, 81% to 16%.  By comparison, Hancock had 
defeated Bowdoin 75% to 22% two years earlier.281  
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Hancock’s landslide victory also meant fewer Federalists were elected to the 
legislature in the spring of 1789.  According to Gore “the Boston votes for 
Senators has deeply mortified the friends of Government,” and that “if this 
town should be equally wild in her choice of representatives, the antifeds will 
be warm, & I fear, successful in their exertions to embarrass the General 
Government.”282  Three weeks later, on May 9th, Gore, who was up for re-
election learned the results of voting for the Massachusetts House.  Because of 
its size, Boston could send seven representatives to the General Court.  The 
names of eight individuals were placed in nomination and 659 votes were cast.  
The top six vote getters received 659, 656, 654, 648, 625 and 621 votes 
respectively.  The two candidates who received the least amount of votes were 
John Winthrop (337), and Christopher Gore, with only 319.  Gore was the only 
candidate to lose.  However, three of the top vote getters declined 
appointment, suggesting that their names were entered without their 
encouragement.283  Gore enjoyed greater success the second time around, 
when, on May 14th, a second election was held.  When former Governor 
Bowdoin declined the appointment despite his election, the remaining three 
candidates secured the last three seats in the Boston delegation.284  Despite the 
active role he played in the most recent session, or perhaps because of it, Gore 
received less than half the votes of other candidates, suggesting that he was not 
particularly well liked by those who were politically active in Boston.      
Following the state election of 1789, there began to appear in Gore’s letters, a 
tone of resignation.  For a man who seems never to have had a kind word to 
say about Hancock, Gore even extended to the governor a halfhearted 
compliment, capturing perhaps the underlying appeal of the longtime governor 
of Massachusetts, when, in a letter to King, he said “that Mr. Hancock is chief 
Magistrate will at least tend to the peace of Massachusetts.”  Continuing in this 
rare generous strain, Gore, speaking of the aging patriot, Samuel Adams, noted: 
“That he should receive honor and rewards, at the latter day of a life, spent in 
the service of his country, ought not to displease anyone.”285   
The bitter personal attacks of the 1789 political season were gone by 1790.  
Hancock had consolidated his power and competition for his job virtually 
disappeared.  Twenty-two year old John Quincy Adams, who was completing 
his law studies with Theophilus Parsons in March of that year, told his father 
that “the internal politics of the State are in a state of tranquility, very unusual                                                         
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at this season,” adding that “the opposers of the Governor, discouraged I 
presume by the ill success which they have always experienced, seem 
determined to leave him in quiet possession.”286  Hancock remained governor 
of the Commonwealth until his death in 1793. 
The calm that characterized the election of 1790 did not last long.  The practice 
of one person simultaneously holding multiple government offices had long 
been a bone of contention in Massachusetts, dating back to the colonial period.  
The people of Massachusetts were so sensitive to the practice of plural office 
holding, which they had seen abused by crown authority’s years earlier, that 
they insisted that a provision be included in the state constitution explicitly 
banning the practice.  After the adoption of a new federal constitution, which 
called for the election and/or appointment of numerous officials to man the 
new federal bureaucracy, the debate over plural office holding took on added 
significance.  Among other questions being asked was whether the state ban on 
multiple offices prevented a state legislator or state judge from holding a federal 
position.  It was also unclear whether a state official could also serve as a 
member of Congress or on the federal bench.  It was generally accepted, 
particularly among anti-Federalists, that the spirit and principle of the state 
constitution did extend to federal appointees as well, and therefore, individuals 
holding federal offices “should be barred from holding plural offices in a 
manner similar to that set forth in the Massachusetts constitution.”  Underlying 
the widespread opposition to pluralism was the fear that “favored individuals 
might accumulate dangerous influence.”287 
The first test case to challenge plural office holding in Massachusetts involved  
Representative Christopher Gore.  In September 1789, President Washington 
appointed Gore United States District Attorney for Massachusetts.  Although 
several other members of the state legislature had also accepted federal 
positions, they had resigned their seats in the legislature.  Gore chose not to 
resign his seat, insisting there was no conflict in serving as both a member of 
the state legislature and as United States Attorney.  Gore’s opponents 
responded quickly, arguing that such a practice would upset the balance of 
power between the state and national governments.  Dr. Jarvis, the longtime 
friend and confidant of Governor Hancock and Sullivan, moved that the 
House conduct an investigation into the matter.  Gore’s defenders argued that 
nowhere in the federal constitution did it prohibit such a practice, and further 
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suggested that it would encourage cooperation between the two levels of 
government to permit such an arrangement.288    
On the afternoon of January 21st, 1790, after “very lengthy and ingenious 
debate,” the Massachusetts General Court, with a bi-partisan vote of 137 to 24, 
overwhelmingly determined that “a person could not retain his place in the 
legislature if he held an office under the United States government that was 
similar to the offices declared by the Constitution of Massachusetts to be 
incompatible with holding a seat in the General Court.”289  A review of the roll 
call reveals that Gore received support only from the conservative wing of his 
party.  Among those who voted with the anti-Federalists to deny Gore’s effort 
to retain his seat in the legislature were a large number of moderate Federalists 
who had voted to ratify the Constitution two years earlier, including John Davis 
of Plymouth, William Almy of Westport, and Abraham Fuller of Newton.290  
Stubborn to the end, Gore refused to concede that the language of the ruling 
meant that he was being asked to leave his seat.  Nonetheless, perhaps on the 
advice of his friends, Gore reluctantly resigned his seat, though he attached a 
letter defending his right to hold both positions.  
James Sullivan, Christopher Gore and Rufus King each played significant roles 
in the establishment of constitutional government in Massachusetts and in the 
United States.  Though he was considered a member of the so-called Hancock 
faction, a group viewed as primarily anti-Constitutionalist, Sullivan was an 
independent thinker.  A vocal proponent of the national government before 
King, Gore and Hancock, Sullivan had long recognized the importance of 
strengthening the central government.  His embrace of participatory 
government and of law aimed at protecting all classes of people naturally 
appealed to a wider audience would continue to contribute to the 
democratization of Massachusetts politics. 
It wasn’t until he became a member of the Confederation Congress that Rufus 
King became an advocate of the national government.  Once committed to the 
cause, however, King worked tirelessly for a stronger and more efficient 
national government.  The important role he played in Philadelphia during the 
summer of 1787 and at the ratifying convention in Boston made him a key 
national figure.  He continued to believe, however, in government by the 
favored class and adhered to the traditional view of the law as the guarantor of 
property rights.                                                         
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Unlike King, who gained notoriety in national politics, Christopher Gore 
emerged as an influential political leader at the state level.  He became an 
ardent nationalist only after the Federalists lost their grip on the control of the 
General Court in 1787.  As a strong and vocal supporter of the Bowdoin 
faction in Massachusetts, he took a leadership role in the critically important 
and precedent setting months following the ratification of the Constitution.  
Utilizing his legal skills, Gore helped usher through the legislation necessary to 
implement the new federal Constitution, and, with the help of his Federalist 
colleagues, did everything he could to guarantee the selection of like-minded 
men to fill the various federal posts.  Gore’s role in the Castle William dispute 
and his refusal to relinquish his seat in the legislature reflected the changing 
tone of political debate in Massachusetts.  With a new national government in 
place and a new political era begun, Sullivan, King, Gore, and soon Quincy 
Adams, were uniquely positioned to play significant, if competing, roles in the 
coming struggle.  Party politics would soon dominate both national and state 
elections.     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 96 
Chapter V 
Emergence of Political Parties 
James Sullivan, Rufus King, Christopher Gore and John Quincy Adams were 
no strangers to opposition and resistance, but they did not foresee the creation 
of political parties as an inevitable outgrowth of the new republican society they 
had helped establish.  Like the founding framers they ‘feared the growth of 
partisanship and the destructive party ‘spirit,’ believing it would undermine all 
they had accomplished.  By 1800, however, differences of opinion over 
domestic policies, including Alexander Hamilton’s financial program, the 
French Revolution, and the war between France and Britain, intensified the 
division between Federalists and Jeffersonians. Finally, the Jay Treaty ushered 
in a period of intense partisan conflict that resulted in the cementing of party 
divisions.   
As the decade of the 1780s was winding down, King had already established 
himself as a national figure and a leading voice in support of President 
Washington and the Federalists in the United States Senate.  Gore recently had 
emerged as a passionate and effective member of the Federalists in the 
Massachusetts General Court, and, because of his close ties to King, would 
soon emerge as a national figure.  Both King and Gore spent the 1790s 
vigorously defending the policies of the Federalists and encouraging economic 
ties with Britain.  Quincy Adams too, despite his youth, was already making a 
name for himself in Federalist circles.  Having written several articles in 
support of the Washington administration, he was viewed as a natural 
successor to the causes and politics of his father.  He would spend the next 
decade, however, charting his own independent course and increasingly 
confounding his Federalist friends.  Sullivan was the most dedicated and 
influential Jeffersonian in Massachusetts.   A strong adherent to the ideals of 
Jefferson, Madison, and the French Revolution, he viewed the Federalists as 
the party of privilege, and fought hard to diminish their influence in 
Massachusetts.   All four men would, in the coming decade, contribute 
significantly to the development of political parties in Massachusetts and in the 
country.   
John Hancock’s re-election in 1789 ushered in a period of relative political calm 
in Massachusetts and a comparable period of peace also descended upon the 
national political landscape.  Party politics had not yet taken root, and the 
bitterness that characterized the mid-1790s had not yet begun to emerge. 
Although several controversial and precedent setting issues were addressed, 
national political figures were more inclined to work together to build a new 
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government apparatus and to create an economic plan they hoped would solve 
the numerous problems that beset the Confederation period. 
A. Assumption of Debt in Massachusetts 
The first significant policy test facing the nation was Secretary of the Treasury 
Alexander Hamilton’s financial program.  Opposition was directed primarily at 
the specifics of the program and not necessarily its underlying goal.  One of the 
more controversial elements of Hamilton’s financial plan involved the funding 
of state debts by the federal government, as well as the manner of payment of 
other categories of public securities.  In late January 1790, Hamilton’s detailed 
plan, the merits of which had been discussed for months, was formally issued.   
Among other things, the treasury secretary recommended that the national 
government assume, at full value, the domestic debt and the debts of the 
individual states.  Speculative creditors, like Gore, had been expecting this for 
some time.  Indeed, once it became apparent that the Federal Constitution 
would be ratified, the value of public securities went up considerably.  For 
those who had been wealthy enough to keep their certificates over the previous 
decade and/or had been able to purchase additional certificates for a fraction 
of their face value, Hamilton’s proposal was welcome news.291  
Hamilton’s innovative and costly initiative was particularly important to the 
Commonwealth of Massachusetts, which, as a result of wartime borrowing, had 
amassed a public debt in excess of $14.5 million.292  Significantly, in the years 
after the Revolution, the size of the Massachusetts debt had changed little, as 
state leaders were unwilling to enact a revenue plan that addressed the massive 
financial burden.  There had been widespread opposition to the commonly 
accepted means of raising revenue, as merchants opposed high imposts and 
excises, and farmers opposed direct levies on lands and polls.  Consequently, 
the revenue that was generated covered only government operations and 
interest payments.293  Therefore, Governor Hancock and the General Court 
consistently took the path of least resistance and postponed the repayment of 
principal on the public debt.  After the adoption of the new constitution, many 
of the state’s farmers and merchants began looking for a national solution to 
the problem.294  
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Members of Congress who represented the states with the largest debts 
supported assumption: Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, South Carolina, 
and Massachusetts.  The congressional delegation from Massachusetts gave 
their full support to the plan.  Many southern states, led by Virginia, opposed 
the plan for several reasons.  First, they were philosophically opposed to what 
they saw as an expanding federal influence.295  Second, as a practical matter, 
they argued that they should not be penalized for faithfully funding their debt 
over the past decade, whether through taxes or land sales, while the states 
which had neglected to pay down their debt were essentially being rewarded by 
the national government.  Unless they were otherwise compensated, 
representatives from these states insisted that they should not be taxed for the 
benefit of northern speculators.  There was also opposition in Congress, 
particularly among representatives from the South, of adding tens of millions to 
the new government’s debt.296   
In late 1789, as Congress debated the issue of federal debt assumption, recently 
appointed United States Attorney Christopher Gore wrote to Senator Rufus 
King, now of New York: “Reports are that the United States will assume the 
debts of the several States.”  He assured King that federal assumption had 
widespread support among their Federalist friends, but that others would be 
opposed simply because “the federalists wish the adoption” of the measure.  
He added, however, that even those members of the General Court who 
favored having the state fund it’s own debt, “will not promote it [in the next 
session], if they can feel any confidence in the assumption by the U. States.”297  
The growing consensus in Massachusetts seems to have been: ‘why should the 
state make the difficult and costly decision of paying down the debt when there 
was a chance the entire debt may be assumed by the federal government?’ 
John Quincy Adams wrote to his father about his plans to open a law office in 
Boston and to inform him of the ongoing debate over assumption.  Quincy 
Adams believed that the general feeling was that unless Congress asked for the 
consent of the different state legislatures for assumption, that the measure 
would be unpopular.  Nonetheless, he added, in their most recent session the 
legislators in the Massachusetts General Court took no steps to pay down or 
otherwise deal with the massive debt owed by the Commonwealth.298  Indeed, 
it would seem that as much as the state legislators were reluctant to bestow 
additional power on the federal government, they were equally unwilling to                                                         
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address the massive and economy crippling debt.  The legislature’s lack of 
response illustrated as perhaps nothing else could the need for federal 
intervention.  
James Sullivan opposed federal assumption because he believed the public debt 
was an obligation of the state government that should be addressed through 
state action.  Support for federal assumption, according to Sullivan, was based 
on fear and expedience: “The people, sometimes, when their difficulties 
become accumulated, and their public distresses are multiplied, are apt to be 
discouraged, and to despond.”  Similarly, he added: “When a nation happens to 
be involved in debt, as we are now, and a popular government grows careless 
of the public faith and honor, the people are too ready, instead of associating to 
change the public measures [and pay down their debt], to despond, … and cry 
out for a master,” to help them.  “They seem to be petitioning, like the 
Hebrews, for a King, to scourge them of their duty.”299   
Some Massachusetts creditors opposed assumption because of the low rate of 
interest being proposed for the payment of public securities, including “loan 
certificates,” “final settlement certificates,” and “certificates of accrued 
interest.”  Expressing his concern to Senator King, Gore wrote in January 1790 
that “the creditors are numerous and important & are so attached to property 
that we have reason to fear they would change sides [and not support 
assumption] rather than lose any share of their blessing – a less rate of interest 
than 4 per cent you may rest assured will never be acceded to by nine tenths of 
the creditors in Massachusetts.”300 
The main source of opposition to the funding plan, however, came from those 
who thought it wrong to reward those who speculated in public securities.  
James Madison, like many Americans, did not like the idea of paying 
speculators who had often purchased these public securities for pennies on the 
dollar, the same rate as they paid the original holders of the paper.  In 
particular, many Americans took a dim view of speculators who took advantage 
of former soldiers by purchasing their final settlement certificates that they 
received in payment for their military service, for less than face value.  Indeed, 
according to several contributors to Boston newspapers, many Massachusetts 
war veterans in need of cash sold their certificates to speculators at the rate of 
ten to fifteen cents on the dollar.  In response to the “dramatic emergence of 
speculators and speculation as a gross and visible fact,” Madison proposed a 
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funding plan that discriminated between current and original holders of public 
securities, but his proposal received little congressional support.301 
A number of letters to the Chronicle during these months reveal that economic 
resentment towards those who had invested in these public securities was the 
central source of the objection to the funding plan in Massachusetts.  An 
Advocate for the Public Credit addressed his letter “to you gentlemen, who by your 
superior wealth, have by degrees monopolized the public securities from the 
poor soldiers and others whose necessities drove them to that extremity.”  He 
declared that he would “be exceedingly sorry if you Clan of Sharpers and idle 
speculators, who are a dead weight to the public, and discouragement to honest 
industry; and who first played foot-ball with the public credit, with your two 
shilling games on the pound, should at last be suffered to make your fortunes 
by it, out of our public treasury.”302  A writer identified as ‘An Old Soldier’ also 
made an appeal for the original security holders: “It is but an insult to the 
unfortunate, to represent that transfers have been generally made voluntarily, 
and for adequate and valuable considerations, when the reverse is the fact, as 
will abundantly appear, if properly investigated.”303   
Despite full support from the Massachusetts delegation, the United States 
Congress rejected Hamilton’s assumption plan in early April 1790.  The main 
source of opposition at the federal level was not resentment towards security 
holders, but the unwillingness of the southern states with smaller debts to 
assume the large debts of their eastern neighbors.  Gore wrote to King that 
“the news of non-assumption had arrived in town before my return,” and that 
“the event of this proposition has been very unfavorable to the wishes of many 
– and the people are now generally alarmed lest Congress should refuse to fund 
their own debt.”304  In May, Gore again wrote to King, expressing the 
disappointment and dejection felt my many when news of non-assumption 
reached Massachusetts, adding: “I write these things to you, because I fear that 
some of our friends feel the object of assumption so important to 
Massachusetts as to be in danger of hazarding too much for the prospect of 
attaining it.”305   
In May, the issue of funding was again debated in Congress, and again it failed 
to pass.  On June 20th, a frustrated Gore wrote to King to thank him for his 
efforts but also to urge him to press on.  “I do most sincerely hope that your                                                         
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exertions for the assumption ... may meet with success.”306  Since the 
Commonwealth of Massachusetts remained unwilling to fund its debt, owners 
of public securities began to fear that if assumption failed, the state would 
always be competing with Congress for revenues.  In addition, local merchants, 
anxious to abolish local duties, believed that “unless the Union assumed both 
local and national obligations, Massachusetts would continue to need extensive 
revenues and would probably burden trade.”  Consequently, as the months 
passed, the hand of the federal government became stronger, “because citizens 
were reluctant to pay federal levies and still support a large local debt, the anti-
assumptionists were doomed.”307   
Secretary Hamilton also found support for his funding plan in unlikely places.  
Elbridge Gerry, for example, who had opposed the Constitution, insisted the 
government couldn’t discriminate against speculative creditors or otherwise 
distinguish between original and subsequent holders of securities.  He favored 
compensating soldiers who sold their certificates at discounted rates, but not at 
the expense of creditors.  While it was true, Gerry argued, that speculators 
bought securities at reduced prices, they gave “currency to property that would 
lie dormant,” and discrimination, he concluded, was plainly fraudulent and 
violated a sacred contract.  “Even if some creditors were the very “dregs of 
creation and the scum of iniquity,” he insisted, “discrimination was both 
impractical and unjust.”308  As far as Gerry was concerned, it was not a matter 
of politics, but of property rights.  The government must protect the 
contractual rights of the security owners, he argued, and not discriminate 
between one group and another.  Gerry was not persuaded by the argument of 
anti-assumptionists that such a measure would mean further centralization in 
the federal government.  He argued that should the states fund the debt 
separately, taxes “will be so heavy as to make the State Government unpopular, 
and the destruction of their constitutions may thereby be produced.”309  For 
these reasons in June 1790 Gerry made the motion for federal assumption.  
Congressman Fisher Ames spoke in support of Gerry’s motion arguing, “the 
expenses of the war ought to be made a common charge upon the United 
States.”  The war “was between this country and Britain, and not a war of 
particular states.” “Justice plainly requires,” Gerry argued, “that these persons 
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should be repaid, their interest at least in all events, and without delay.” The 
motion failed.310  
In Massachusetts, the push for assumption slowly gathered political steam.  
Even Governor Hancock, who had initially taken his customary wait and see 
attitude, eventually supported the federal funding plan.  On May 31, 1790, he 
addressed the General Court and acknowledged that it wasn’t “within the 
power of the people” at that time to make a punctual payment of the debt with 
interest.  Arguing that their contractual obligations had to be met, he agreed 
that the central government was in the best position to do so.  While he agreed 
that the general government should not assume the state debt unless the state 
consented or requested them to do so, he recommended that they give their 
consent, “as it will be more congenial to any system of finance which the 
Congress may adopt.”311  Despite Hancock’s recommendation, however, there 
was still a large contingent of representatives in the General Court who 
opposed the measure.  The ardent anti-Federalist John Bacon of Stockbridge 
presented the case against assumption on the day of the final vote.  According 
to the Herald of Freedom, Bacon perceived assumption of the state’s debt by the 
federal government as a step toward “aristocratic” control.  It is “only in the 
state legislatures that a real representation of the people is to be hoped for,” 
Bacon argued.  Only in the states is there “a representation composed of men 
whose interests, views, feelings, are the same with those of the body of the 
people.”  Assumption, he predicted, would speed the day when “the 
administration of the general government will naturally fall into the hands of 
the natural aristocracy of the country.”  While Bacon hoped that the general 
and state governments might both be maintained, he feared that assumption 
would “directly tend to detach the wealth, influence and power from the state 
governments, and to unite them with the general government – to increase 
those inequalities which are destructive to republican governments, to lessen if 
not annihilate, the state governments, and to consolidate the whole in one 
permanent aristocracy.”312  Bacon was correct.  Hamilton’s plan was intended 
to strengthen the national government and attract men of property.  Bacon’s 
use of the term “aristocracy,” reflected how quickly and completely 
republicanism had swept aside the old order.  
On June 4, 1790, the Massachusetts General Court voted 83–41 in favor of 
assumption, with Hancock stalwarts Eustis and Jarvis joining the majority.  But 
by mid-July Congress had not yet acted. Gore, who was becoming increasingly                                                         
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anxious, vented his frustration to King, suggesting that “the appearances are 
against our national prosperity, and all real friends to our country have grown 
weary with disappointment: but nothing seems to have happened more 
contrary to their expectations than the bare 4 per cent as proposed by the 
Senate.  That a proposal so undisguised & unjust should come from that 
branch of the Legislature was not within our expectation.”313   
A compromise on assumption was eventually reached, due in large part to the 
intervention of Thomas Jefferson.  In a memorandum written by Jefferson two 
years later, he described how, in July 1790, he and Hamilton had a long 
conversation in which Hamilton reminded him that the success of the 
administration was their common concern, and that they should make a 
common cause in supporting each other.  Jefferson, having just returned from 
France, admitted that he wasn’t sufficiently familiar with the issue.  He did 
agree, however, to invite both Hamilton and Madison to dinner in the hopes of 
finding common ground.  Madison eventually agreed that the matter should go 
before the House by way of amendment from the Senate.  Though Madison 
would not support the measure, neither would he strenuously object to it, 
agreeing to leave it to its fate.  Since any concession would be a bitter pill to 
swallow for the southern states, it was agreed that something must be done to 
soothe them, and since a permanent home for the federal government had 
been an ongoing source of contention, it was agreed that it would it be located 
in the south, on the Potomac River.  According to Jefferson, “this is the real 
history of the assumption, about which many erroneous conjectures have been 
published.”  He added “it was unjust, in itself oppressive to the states, and was 
acquiesced in merely from a fear of disunion, while our government was still in 
its most infant state.” Final passage of the funding plan, on August 4, 1790, was 
a tremendous victory for Hamilton and for the Washington administration.  It 
also resulted in a huge windfall for those who had invested in public securities, 
including Gore, who had been particularly active in promoting the federal 
initiative.314  
As successful as Gore had been with his legal practice, he benefited immensely 
from his involvement in the business of speculation.  As Forrest McDonald 
noted in his study of the economic origins of the Constitution, of the fifty-eight 
delegates who voted to ratify the Constitution at the Massachusetts convention, 
and who owned public securities, Gore was among those who owned the most.  
Where the majority of security holders owned securities valued at between $5                                                         
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and $2,000, Gore owned public securities valued at $32,882.00 at the time of 
the Convention.  Only three delegates owned more.315  In the world of 
eighteenth century finance, however, there was certainly nothing unusual or 
illegal in Gore’s actions.  As McDonald details, speculation in public securities 
by government leaders was commonplace, as the concept of conflict of interest 
did not yet exist.   Even in this world, however, Gore stood out as a particularly 
active and successful investor.  Although Gore’s legal practice provided him 
with a comfortable income, he “laid the foundation of his fortune by 
speculating in government securities with Andrew Craigie,” a Boston 
businessman who had been the ‘Apothecary General’ for the Continental Army 
during the Revolution.316  By 1788, Gore and Craigie purchased government 
securities with a total face value in excess of $100,000.  Gore alone owned 
certificates with a face value in excess of $90,000, for which he paid $20,641.317  
As expected, the value of his securities rose considerably with the appointment 
of Hamilton as Secretary of the Treasury.  Furthermore, Gore benefitted from 
the fact that the second highest-ranking official in the treasury department was 
his friend and business partner, William Duer.318  According to the registers and 
journals of the Funded and Assumed Debt for Massachusetts, Gore’s securities were, 
on September 1, 1791, listed at $104,986 in 3 percents and at $30,631.86 in 6 
percents in the funded debt.  Gore had “supported a public program that 
spectacularly enhanced his private advantage,” and his belief in “the political 
benefits of allying the rich to the central government,” paid off handsomely.319  
Gore also was interested in international speculation.  Pinkney argued that he 
understood “that the really big speculations in the United States could be 
financed only in Europe,” noting that in 1788, he “had joined enthusiastically 
with Craigie, Duer, [Daniel] Parker, and their group to promote the sale of 
American land and securities to European bankers and, since they believed the 
war debt owed by the United States to France would be repaid with interest, to 
arrange a transfer of that debt to themselves.”320  Although the debt was not 
transferred to Gore and his group, the idea of profiting from the debt owed by 
the United States to France remained with him.  In 1792, he came up with a 
plan whereby the United States, through a third party, would take advantage of 
France’s political and economic troubles, by paying off their $6 million debt to 
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that nation at a substantial discount.  To assist him with this plan, Gore wrote 
to King:   
I have supposed this debt might be purchased of France for the like sum 
of their assignments, which are at a discount of forty per cent.  The 
government of this country would not, probably, think proper to make 
the attempt for its own emolument.  The deranged situation of the 
affairs of that kingdom, & their want of money to support the credit of 
their paper currency, render it not improbable that they would be willing 
to part with their demands against America for the amount in their own 
paper.  Unless the government of the U.S. chose to avail itself of this 
state of things, a transfer of the debt to other hands could not injure 
America.  Under this impression I have thought that a company might 
be formed in this country, who should authorize some person to repair 
to Europe, & there connect himself with some able, solid, & prudent 
people, who might provide funds for the payment to France & make 
engagements with that kingdom to transfer the demand to the 
purchasers on making payments.  If there is no political objection to the 
plan, I think the measures may be so adopted that no other risk need be 
feared, than the loss of a sum necessary to defray the expenses of that 
person who may undertake the operation in Europe in case his endeavor 
should be unsuccessful.  Now, my friend, if you think a thing of his kind 
feasible, safe, and without objections, should you like to be concerned in 
it – at present the only persons that have conversed on this subject are J. 
Coffin Jones & myself – the company may be formed of such men & 
under such regulations as will ensure against all loss, but a very limited 
one, and all hazards of improper conduct – I will with pleasure meet you 
in New York or elsewhere to make arrangements on this subject – if the 
thing should meet your ideas of propriety & advantage.321  
Nothing came of Gore’s plan, as King responded simply that two attempts had 
already been made and he doubted the expediency of a third.322  Generally 
speaking, however, Gore restricted himself to investments that he could 
carefully follow, such as the case of federal assumption of public debt.  With 
his ongoing correspondence with King, he was able to keep abreast of all 
actions that impacted the legislation.  
In a letter to his father during the debate over assumption, Quincy Adams 
related his impressions of Gore.  “Mr. Gore is one of those whom Cardinal                                                         
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Richelieu would have enjoyed in public affairs,” he began.  “His is a very 
fortunate man,” and “in his profession he has been remarkably successful; from 
a combination of circumstances, which a man of inferior abilities to those he 
possesses might perhaps have improved as well.”  He suggested that Gore’s 
“family connections have likewise been extremely serviceable to him; and it is 
said that he has made an independent fortune by speculation in the public 
funds.  I have heard it asserted that he is the richest lawyer in the 
Commonwealth.”323  
According to Quincy Adams, Gore wasn’t the only member of the legal 
profession to make a great deal of money in the speculation of public securities.  
He also mentioned Thomas Amory, Harrison Gray Otis and William Wetmore, 
as having benefited from this practice.  “This employment does not appear to 
be very intimately connected with the [legal] profession,” young Adams wrote, 
but he added with obvious disgust that “these gentlemen I am told have played 
at that hazardous game with monies deposited in their hands; and have been 
enabled by the temporary possession of property belonging to foreigners, to 
become masters of sums to an equal amount before they have been called upon 
for payment.”324   
Though the debate over assumption had ended, a lingering resentment 
underscored the growing animosity between Republicans and Federalists.  With 
wealthy speculators like Gore having benefited tremendously, often at the 
expense of former Revolutionary War soldiers, the passage of perhaps the most 
controversial component of Hamilton’s financial plan was the first of many 
issues that would divide the American people and lead to the formation of 
parties.  To many wary observers, the presumed dominance of the national 
government over the state governments raised old fears. During the debate 
over assumption, Quincy Adams referred to growing tension between “our 
general and particular [state] governments,” suggesting that “the seeds of two 
contending factions appear to be plentifully sown.”  Referencing for the first 
time the growth of political parties, Quincy Adams observed that “the names 
of Federalist and Anti-federalist are no longer expressive of the sentiments 
which they were so lately supposed to contain, and I expect soon to hear a 
couple of new names, which will designate the respective friends of the 
national and particular systems.  The people are very evidently dividing into 
these two parties.”  As far as Quincy Adams was concerned, however, “the 
government of the United States has undoubtedly greatly the advantage,” and                                                         
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that they were “strengthening their hands by assuming the debts, and by 
making provision for the support of the public credit.”325   
 B. French Revolution/Genet Affair 
The French Revolution accelerated the development of political parties. 
Beginning with the events in Paris in the summer of 1789, political debate in 
the United States became more acrimonious as two distinct political groups 
emerged.  If the seeds of partisan politics in the United States were not planted 
in France in 1789, they were certainly nourished by it.  Massachusetts political 
leaders like Hancock, Sullivan and Samuel Adams, who would later be 
identified as Republicans, embraced the revolutionary movement in France as 
an extension of the ideals of American Revolution.  Federalists like King, Gore, 
and Quincy Adams, however, were less effusive in their praise.   
Many Americans embraced the French when news first arrived of the meeting 
of the Estates General in May and the formation of the National Assembly in 
June.  Soon thereafter, most Americans considered news of the ‘Declaration of 
Rights of Man and Citizen’ as a tribute to their own system of government.  
For this reason during the early phase of the French Revolution, Americans of 
every political stripe seemed to wish the French well, as a government with 
republican ideals was being established in an Old World country.  As Paul 
Goodman has suggested: “In some ways Americans became more deeply 
involved in events abroad than ever before as their own revolutionary example 
became a model and inspiration for those alienated from Europe’s old 
regimes,” and Massachusetts, “no less than the Union, was caught up in this 
web of dependency, as events in the 1790s made indelibly clear.”326  
Consequently, relations between the United States and France remained close 
during the first phase of the Revolution.  In September 1791, King Louis XVI 
even sent a royal letter to George Washington announcing his “acceptance of 
the recently completed constitution and praying God to have France’s ‘very 
dear, great friends and allies, in his just and holy keeping.’”  In August 1792, the 
French Assembly conferred honorary citizenship on Washington, Madison, and 
Hamilton.327   
Support for the French Revolution in Boston reached its peak in late January 
1793, when news of France having declared itself a republic reached 
Massachusetts.  Under the heading ‘Liberty and Equality,’ the Independent                                                         
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Chronicle announced on the 24th that “this day will be celebrated a Civic Festival, 
the first of the kind ever exhibited in America, in honor of the French 
Revolution.”328  A huge celebration and civic feast took place later that day, as a 
large procession moved from the State House to Faneuil Hall where three 
hundred people had gathered.  There were fireworks, a huge bonfire, 
entertainment and a banquet.  Because Governor Hancock was ill, the 
festivities were presided over by Lieutenant Governor Samuel Adams.   Toasts 
were made to, among others, “The People,”  “The Rights of Man,” the 
“American Revolution,” the “French Revolution,” the “Republic of America,” 
the “Republic of France,” “The Fraternity of Freemen,” and “The Law.”  
President Washington was saluted, as were Governor Hancock, Lafayette, and 
the “Whigs of Seventy-Five.”329   
As the people of Boston celebrated on the evening of the 24th, they had no way 
of knowing that earlier that same day, King Louis XVI had been executed by 
the revolutionary government in France.  When news of his execution reached 
the United States in March 1793, most Americans were shocked and support 
for the revolution waned.  In Massachusetts, the Centinel expressed Federalist 
anxiety over the growing level of violence in Paris, and questioned the moral 
justification for embracing the new government in the face of such violence.  
Referring to contributors to other papers, the Centinel suggested: “After 
exerting their powers to expose the vices of existing governments, some other 
writers have ended their research where they might have begun them.”  The 
paper charged that these supporters of France failed to “explore the art of 
virtuous government, … the most important of all ethical inquiries.”  
Furthermore, it declared, “it is notorious that doctrines favorable to arbitrary 
power have been invented, and, for ages, patronized and inculcated by those 
who rioted on the spoils of nations.”  On surveying the policies of Europe, the 
paper added, “the attention is arrested by establishments which outrage the 
most evident deductions of reason: amidst the knowledge of the eighteenth 
century, nations are ordered to observe the institutions of an ignorant, 
plundering and murderous age.”330  The idea that the nature of man did not 
change, regardless of the form of government, would be a consistent theme in 
the conservative Centinel.  
Many American Republicans, however, were “convinced that for all their 
mistakes and excesses, the French carried the torch of liberty against                                                         
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monarchical despotism.”331  Sullivan voiced his continued support for the 
Revolution.  Writing under the name Plain Truth in the Boston Gazette, he cited 
history to support the cause, describing how various kings, princes, and 
empresses had in the past obtained their power, and concluded that “it was a 
bloody history, complete with war, and yes, beheadings.” Queen Elizabeth, for 
example, ordered the execution of her sister, Mary Queen of Scots.  “This 
illustrious and truly protestant princess stained her hands in the blood of her 
rival, whom she would not trust even in a jail; and the son of this miserable 
potentate was afterwards crowned in the very place which had been moistened 
with his mother’s blood, having notwithstanding continued several years during 
the lifetime of Elizabeth, upon terms of civility and friendship with this most 
excellent protestant and humane princess,” despite the fact she had executed 
his mother.  “The humanity of Kings,” Sullivan concluded, “is a satire on the 
plain and literal meaning of the word; and as there are but two classes who 
believe and pretend to believe in it, the ignorant and unprincipled, we ought to 
pity the former and despise the latter.” 332   
Gore spoke for many Federalists when he argued that active support for the 
French would damage economic relations with Britain.  He pointed to 
allegations that some Boston merchants were working with the French to arm 
and man privateers to capture English vessels.  “There can be no more doubt,” 
he wrote, that such an “act of hostility against any subject of the King of Great 
Britain would be a direct violation of the 7th article of the treaty of peace.”  
And, he added, “it is indeed of material importance to the commercial interest 
of this country, that our merchants should show a peculiar degree of 
circumspection in their conduct.” 333 
The treaty to which Gore referred soon became the focal point of national 
attention.  President Washington and his cabinet anxiously debated the political 
implications of the Treaty of 1778 with France and discussed how it should be 
interpreted.  While Washington had not forgotten that independence would not 
have been possible without the French, he did not want to involve the United 
States in the conflict between France with Britain.  Attorney general, Edmund 
Randolph recommended to the President on May 6th that the treaty must be 
considered “in a kind of middle, or dormant state, until some important change 
shall be effected,” … and that the United States “cannot be embraced in the 
war by confessing the obligations of the treaties.”334  Randolph concluded that                                                         
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the treaty did not “oblige us to become a party to the war, and abandon our 
neutrality.”335   
President Washington also asked Senator King to give his legal opinion on 
commerce with France.  King wrote a detailed brief for the president and 
attorney general, counseling caution.  Indeed, as the president was preparing to 
meet with the new French minister, King expressed the view of many, when 
writing to Alexander Hamilton on April 24th he observed “prudence would 
seem to require us to move with caution, and by delay to insure a safe 
decision.”336  After further consultation with his cabinet, Washington issued his 
Neutrality Proclamation on April 22, 1793, declaring that the United States 
government would “adopt and pursue a conduct friendly and impartial toward 
the belligerent powers.”337    
King applauded the policy of neutrality, noting, “if we maintain our neutrality, 
our farmers will reap a golden harvest, and our Flag, while floating on every 
sea, will enrich our merchants and extend and assist in the establishment of our 
national fame and wisdom.”338  Gore was similarly pleased, and wrote to Tobias 
Lear, Washington’s secretary, to applaud the action: “Nothing could have been 
more fully adapted to gratify the friends of America, than the proclamation of 
our revered president.”  He informed Lear of the widespread support for the 
policy in Boston, adding that when the town’s ‘democrats’ and French 
sympathizers “most furiously inveighed against the impositions of Britain and 
the pusillanimity of the government in bearing them, their outbursts was 
attended by no other consequence than a general hiss.”339     
The simmering differences between the Federalists, who abhorred French 
privateers, and those whom Gore referred to as the ‘town’s democrats’ and 
French sympathizers, would soon come to a head.  The arrival of a new French 
minister ushered in a period of intense political conflict and prompted a dispute 
that would actively involve Gore, Sullivan and Quincy Adams in Massachusetts, 
as well as King in New York.  Within a few weeks after Americans received 
news of the public execution of Louis XVI, the First Minister of the French 
Republic, Edmond Charles Genet, arrived in the United States.  The new 
French Minister had been directed by his government to secure certain 
concessions from the United States government as well as gain support from 
the American people for the French cause.  He also was instructed to                                                         
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encourage French and American privateering against British shipping, because 
the French reading of the existing treaty permitted French privateers to bring 
their prizes into American ports while denying similar rights to Britain, and also 
permitted the arming and manning of these vessels in American territory.  This, 
of course, would place the United States, which had taken a position of 
neutrality, in an untenable position.340  In addition, Genet was directed to 
strengthen economic ties with America, and was to insist at the very least on 
the observance of the treaties that already existed between the two countries.341  
President Washington, through Secretary of State Jefferson, advised Genet that 
the United States could not give him the assurances he sought, and specifically 
refused to permit the arming and manning of French prizes. 
Dissatisfied with Washington’s response, Genet announced his intention to 
bypass the president and press the matter of American assistance for France 
directly to Congress.  He mistakenly believed that Congress was the final 
arbiter and could grant his requests regardless of what the president wanted.  
Among the outraged Federalists who supported the president’s insistence on 
the removal of Genet was John Quincy Adams.  He harshly criticized Genet 
for threatening to circumvent President Washington and reach out directly to 
the American people to demand that Congress be called into session to discuss 
measures to assist the French government.   
If he [Genet] publicly damns with one dash of his pen, all the known 
rules and customs established in the intercourse of nations, if he openly 
disclaims all submission to the authority and respect for the opinions of 
writers who have been by the consent of all civilized nations, 
acknowledged to contain the true principles of national justice and 
equity; if he professes loudly a determination to appeal from a 
constitutional to an unconstitutional tribunal, in the country where he 
resides; if he threatens to negotiate with the people, without any 
authority or commission from his own sovereign for that purpose, if he 
is constantly pouring forth in the public prints, a stream of abuse, … 
against the very government to which he was accredited, he thereby 
renounces all the privileges which surround his public character.   
Quincy Adams concluded: “In my opinion his actions bespeak him the most 
implacable and dangerous enemy to the peace and happiness of my country.”342   
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Sullivan and Massachusetts Republicans were quick to defend the French 
Minister.  Sullivan viewed the criticisms of Genet as an attack against the 
French and, more importantly, the French Revolution.  He argued that the 
liberties of Europe were involved in the Revolution and that it was important 
for the United States to promote its success.  It wasn’t because of a 
disagreement Sullivan had with President Washington that prompted him to 
take an active role in the defense of Genet. Rather, he insisted, he was 
motivated by a belief in the importance of open and candid discussion of 
public policy.  In a free country, he argued, it was the duty of all the people to 
question and challenge their leaders.343  For this reason Sullivan came to the 
defense of the French diplomat, suggesting that “America must be in a very 
hazardous situation, if a Minister must stand exposed during the recess in 
Congress, to the most malignant attacks, secret whispers and open charges.”  
He argued that efforts were being made to “disaffect ‘the People’ of America 
against the Minister of their ONLY ALLY; and to expose him to public 
resentment.”  He also complained that ‘paltry scribblers’ were now assuring 
readers that “Genet ought not and will not have the indulgence of laying his 
conduct before the legislative body of the Union.”344  Writing under the name 
Americanus, Sullivan reminded his readers “the American government had 
changed since 1776 and now the people were supreme so that even the Chief 
Executive must bow to their sovereignty.”  Finally, Sullivan took aim at the 
Adamses, suggesting both men apparently had not accepted the American 
Revolution, preferring instead the rule of an aristocracy.345   
On December 4th, Quincy Adams published a lengthy reply to Americanus.  His 
strategy was simple: to praise the president, to ridicule Genet, and to tie the 
French Minister as closely as he could to the Republicans.  He referred to 
Genet as a ‘petulant stripling,’ who, by challenging Washington, had committed 
an “insolent outrage,” against the people’s common friend and benefactor.”346  
Quincy Adams further argued that Genet “endeavors to support his failing 
influence by connecting himself and his interests with a particular party of 
American citizens, separate from the whole body of the people: a party 
professing republican sanctity beyond the rest of their fellow-citizens, and 
scarcely endeavoring to disguise sentiments, hostile to the national government 
of the country.”  He added “every public measure of the French Minister, since 
the profession of his resolution to appeal [to the people], may be traced to the 
policy of arming one part of America against the other.”  After lamenting the                                                         
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destructive nature of parties, Quincy Adams insisted that differences must be 
handled internally, and not be subject to the intrigues of other nations: “The 
interference of foreigners upon any pretence whatever, in the dissensions of 
fellow-citizens, must be as inevitably fatal to the liberties of the State, as the 
admission of strangers to arbitrate upon the domestic differences of a man and 
wife is destructive to the happiness of a private family.”347  
Americanus struck back. The key distinction among republicans, he wrote, is 
between those who place the people at the center of government and those 
who did not.  Columbus [Quincy Adams] believed that sovereignty resided in the 
government and that the people were merely subjects who were bound to obey.  
“Does the sovereignty reside in the people forming each nation or 
Commonwealth,” he asked, “or does it attach itself wholly to the person 
administering the Government?”  “All legitimate authority is derived from the 
people,” Sullivan insisted, and, therefore, “true and real sovereignty resides in 
them, and the government is a creature of their making.”  The dismissal of 
ambassadors was tantamount to declaring war, and the power to declare war 
was with the Congress, not the president.348  He insisted he was not defending 
the actions of Genet, but merely reminding readers of the source of all power 
and authority in the United States.349  
Gore privately entered the fray in a letter to King. “The vile faction that 
disgraces Massachusetts still supports Genet,” wrote King.  “Their number is 
small, but their clamor loud and incessant – their impudence & falsehood 
unparalleled.”350  Several months later, writing under the name Manlius, Gore 
denounced the Republican’s criticisms of President Washington, and suggested 
that future generations “will read the Gazettes of these times, and in many they 
will find the most illustrious character now on earth vilified and traduced – they 
will find that a common address to this great and good man is deemed a 
surrender of liberties and a degradation of our character as freemen – that to 
inquire into the conduct of a foreigner, however decently and delicately, is 
considered as the highest indignity and worthy of severe punishment.”  
According to Gore, the Independent Chronicle—publisher of Americanus -- was 
“devoted to destroy the government; to sow seeds of discord and jealousy 
among the people,” and between “the President and the legislature.”351  
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Quincy Adams also renewed his attack on Sullivan and the Republicans.  
“Whether the manifest misrepresentation of Americanus originated in ignorance 
or in willful falsehood is immaterial,” declared Barneveld.  “By confounding 
together original and delegated sovereignty,” he wrote,” Sullivan had confused 
“things almost as widely different from each other as his assertions are from 
truth.”  In fact, the American people committed to their governments a limited 
sovereignty, and, therefore, “the governments are sovereigns as far as their 
constituted power extends.”  Barneveld readily acknowledging that only 
Congress could declare war, but he added “nothing can be more clear than that 
the power of removing a foreign agent for misconduct, is not delegated to any 
legislative power in America.”352  Exasperated, Quincy Adams asked if there 
was “no end to the falsehoods of Americanus.”353   
John Adams wrote to his son to let him know he had the support of 
Washington and other government leaders: “The President … with the 
unanimous concurrence of the four officers of state, has formed the same 
judgment with Columbus, and I hear no members of Congress who profess to 
differ from them.”354  Abigail Adams also wrote to her son shortly after the 
exchange:  “I have read all the numbers with attention, and consider them a 
valuable present to the public, tending to place in a true and just point of view 
the conduct of a man [Genet] who has disgraced his office, and made himself 
so obnoxious as scarcely to be entitled to common decency.”355  She told her 
son to remember that he was a gentleman even if his opponent had forgotten 
it, but that Sullivan’s age nonetheless merited him some respect.356    
In a letter to his father, Quincy Adams expressed pleasure at the attention and 
commendations he received as a result of his Columbus letters, but refused to 
repeat “private conversations, …  lest you should suspect the author of vanity 
beyond the limits of common extravagance.”  He even seemed flattered by the 
comments of his critics, joking to his father that he had been referred to as a 
“juvenile author,” who would “not be rescued from contempt even by the high 
station of his sire.”  Despite the harsh nature of the exchange, Sullivan and 
Quincy Adams appear to have harbored no ill will towards one another.  In the 
same letter to his father, Quincy Adams wrote of his return to the practice of 
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law, and noted that the attorney general [Sullivan] “looks at me with less 
complacency than ever, and is said to be the writer of Americanus.”357   
Gore and other Federalists supported the president and his handling of the 
Genet Affair.  Of perhaps more importance to Gore, however, was the 
underlying danger of the French Revolution.  Like other Federalists, he came to 
view the events in France as a potential threat to Federalist control in the 
United States and feared that the revolt in France would encourage efforts to 
secure additional liberties in the United States.358  In addition, Gore was 
concerned that with the resumption of war between Britain and France, that 
Massachusetts commercial prosperity would be damaged.  His concerns were 
justified in the summer of 1793 with the presence of a French privateer in 
Boston Harbor.  As the United States Attorney for Massachusetts, Gore 
displayed his determination to enforce American neutrality and took an active 
role in monitoring the actions of the French vessel.  He acted on the belief that 
the presence of French privateers in and around the port of Boston posed an 
immediate threat to Washington’s Neutrality Proclamation and to the 
merchants of Massachusetts.   
In a letter to King on August 1st, Gore outlined how the French vessel, the 
Roland, with two Americans on board, had been cruising Boston Harbor and 
chasing several vessels over many days.  Gore complained to the new French 
consul in Boston, Antoine Duplaine and the consul ‘affected’ his disapproval of 
such conduct, and promised to investigate the matter.  Gore sought the arrest 
of the two Americans aboard the Roland “for violating the Neutrality 
Proclamation, which specifically forbade American citizens from taking a part 
in hostilities on behalf of either belligerent power.”  Gore also notified 
President Washington of the incident and gave a detailed report to the United 
States Attorney General, Edmund Randolph, inquiring as to how best to deal 
with vessels that threatened American neutrality.  In fact, Gore had made up 
his mind.  “The French have no right to fit out privateers in our harbors,” he 
told King.  The Washington administration agreed and on August 3rd, 
instructed Gore to ask the governor of Massachusetts to “suppress” the vessel. 
359 
A few days later -- before Gore received his instructions from Washington --, 
he discovered that the Roland was about to sail, and notified the governor of 
the situation, requesting that he prevent it from going to sea.  Attorney General                                                         
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Sullivan informed Gore that, at his recommendation, Governor Hancock 
would take the vessel into custody pending further instructions from the 
president. Gore wrote to King that if evidence proved the French consul was, 
as he expected, involved in outfitting the privateer, he would take steps to 
prosecute him, knowing it would “cause a great clamor.”360  
On August 8th, however, Gore reported to King the French privateer had been 
permitted to sail despite affidavits signed by he and Sullivan alleging the 
Roland’s “fitting here was contrary to the law of nations, and a breach of 
neutrality.”  The vessel had sailed “armed and equipped & commissioned as a 
privateer to cruise against the enemies of France.”  Gore went on to suggest 
that while Hancock may have been inclined to hold the vessel, “the Lt. 
Governor [Samuel Adams] as I learn was bitterly opposed to my interfering.”361  
The Roland’s aggressive activities led President Washington to revoke 
Duplaine’s credentials, which set in motion a debate over the president’s 
authority.  Quincy Adams took a leading role in defending the president.  He 
argued, for example, that just as Genet attempted to circumvent the President 
and divide the county by reaching out to Congress, Genet also urged Governor 
Hancock to intervene on Duplaines behalf and demand that the General Court 
suspend their legislative functions “to sit as a court of judication upon the 
official conduct of Duplaine.”  Genet, Quincy Adams speculated, was 
attempting to drive a wedge between state and national governments.  Quincy 
Adams was equally adamant in his criticism of his political opponents in 
Massachusetts, insisting that even “the most strenuous advocates of our 
dependence upon France” must reject the minister’s “excesses” and that 
Washington had the authority to reject the credentials of the French vice-
Consul.362  
Sullivan took a different view of Duplaine’s dismissal.  He questioned the 
propriety and legal justification of the president dismissing a consul, arguing 
“the constitutional duty of the president to receive the representatives of 
foreign nations did not convey with it the right to dismiss them.”  Furthermore, 
by treaty the French had the right “of sheltering her privateers and prizes in our 
ports.”  Even if Duplaine was wrong in placing the privateer Greyhound under 
the guns of the French frigate, he argued, he certainly had not committed an 
offense deserving of disgrace.363  After all, Genet was ultimately responsible to                                                         
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the Republic of France for his “official conduct,” and shouldn’t be censured by 
Americans for doing what he thought was within his authority.364   
Duplaine was given the opportunity to argue his case.  After being arrested by 
“an officer of the Federal Government,” and charged with having “committed 
sundry encroachments and infractions on the laws of the land,” he was called 
before a grand jury in Boston.  According to Sullivan, “after several attempts to 
convict him, he was acquitted by the jury, “on whose free and unbiased 
decision, the rights, liberties, lives and property of every free-man depend.”  
Despite his finding, Duplaine lost his position.  “If such control can take place 
with respect to Citizen Duplaine,” Sullivan warned, “may not each individual 
be exposed even though he is acquitted from every charge.”  In response to 
Columbus’ [Quincy Adams] effusive praise and deference to the president for his 
handling of the matter, Sullivan concluded: “The wisdom of the Executive we 
would ever wish to confide in, but as Freemen, it is hoped that we shall always 
feel confidence in expressing our sentiments on all public measures.”365  
Quincy Adams insisted that Massachusetts court decisions were “altogether 
independent” and “immaterial to the question relative to the authority of the 
President.”  Indeed, as far as he was concerned, the president was well within 
his authority to revoke Duplaine’s credentials, regardless of what some court in 
Boston decided.  Because a foreign agent committed the infraction, it was “an 
offense against the Laws of Nations as well as against municipal law,” and 
therefore properly within the purview of the nation’s chief executive.  
Furthermore, Quincy Adams argued, it was well known by the Laws of 
Nations, that there was “in every sovereign and independent state, a power 
competent to dismiss the agent of a foreign power for encroachment upon and 
infringement of the laws of the land, under color of executing the duties of his 
office.”366   
Following the two Roland incidents, Rufus King offered his legal opinion to 
President Washington that the French Minister had exceeded his authority.  
Genet’s call for the arming of French prizes in American territory despite 
Washington’s decision that no such right existed, was “unprecedented” and 
“inexcusable,” King insisted.  He added that Genet was defying the authority of 
the United States, and “with views altogether repugnant to the peace of our 
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Country, he has persisted in equipping, and has actually fitted out, 
commissioned and sent to cruise on the high seas several Privateers.”367  
Genet’s credibility was destroyed beyond repair when he wrote a series of 
letters that were highly critical of President Washington, Secretary of State 
Jefferson and the United States government.  His subsequent refusal to delay 
the departure of a seized British vessel, despite a personal request from 
Jefferson that he do so, ended all future discussions between Genet and the 
government.368  Jefferson confided to Madison that “never in my opinion, was 
so calamitous an appointment made; hot headed, all imagination, no judgment, 
passionate, disrespectful & even indecent towards the P [Washington] in his 
written as well as verbal communications, talking of appeals from him to 
Congress, from them to the people, urging the most unreasonable and 
groundless propositions.”369  The President demanded the recall of Genet, and 
with the subsequent fall of the Girondin government in France, there was no 
objection in Paris to having him replaced. 
While the Genet Affair caused a rift between the government of the United 
States and the new French republic, it also underscored the growing divide 
between the two emerging parties in Massachusetts.  The dispute over the 
controversial French diplomat revealed the depth to which Federalists and 
Republicans disagreed over fundamental aspects of republican government. 
The Federalist response to Genet grew out of their increasingly hostile attitude 
towards the French Revolution.  They perceived Genet’s brazen challenge to 
the president as not only an insult, but as a threat to executive authority and 
established order.  Republicans, on the other hand, saw the treatment of Genet 
as not only an insult to the French government, but as a challenge to the ideals 
of republican, participatory, government. 
Sullivan, like many Republicans, attended meetings of the local Democratic- 
Republican society.  These clubs which were established throughout the 
country grew out of Republican support for the French Revolution.  Because 
the clubs were pro-French and pro-Republican, Gore, writing under the name 
Manlius, condemned “the Democratic Societies and all Americans of anti-
British, anti-Federalist persuasion.”  He questioned the patriotism of the 
Democratic Societies. “While urging the United States to fight England, these 
democrats plotted to keep the country defenseless.”  They also opposed 
Washington’s declaration of neutrality, [and] “unlawfully induced citizens to                                                         
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equip privateers for the French government etc.” 370  He further suggested that 
disloyalty flourished in America because these clubs included a mixture of a few 
unworthy “sons of America” and the “scum of Europe.”  He expressed 
particular disdain for the immigrant Irish.371  While Gore may have been 
particularly artless, he was not alone in his belief that Democratic-Republicans 
were a threat to national security.  
President Washington used the occasion of his annual message to Congress in 
November 1794, to single out the Democratic Societies, referring to them as 
“self-created societies” aimed at destroying the government.372  He also argued 
they were responsible for inciting insurrection, suggesting they had instigated 
the short lived Whiskey Rebellion.  As Hofstadter has argued, “Washington 
seemed to be trying to establish an alarming pattern of tandem guilt by 
association that threatened to tar all opposition sentiment with the brush of 
rebellion: insurrection and sedition were fostered by the Democratic Societies, 
and these societies in turn by the Republicans.”  Jefferson called the president’s 
speech “an attack on the freedom of discussion.” 373  
C. Massachusetts and the Jay Treaty 
Debate over the impact of the French Revolution and disagreement over 
Hamilton’s financial program heightened tensions between Republicans and 
Federalists.  The 1795 Jay Treaty, however, cemented party lines and elevated 
partisan conflict to a level never before seen.  It was as if the fears of both 
parties had been realized.  To Republicans, the unfavorable terms of the treaty 
confirmed their belief that the Federalists were pro-British and inclined to ally 
themselves with a monarchy against Republican France.  To Federalists, the 
reaction of Republicans confirmed their belief that the pro-French party led by 
Jefferson would only be satisfied with war against Britain, a war Federalists 
believed America was unprepared for and couldn’t possibly win. 
Since party lines had been clearly drawn, it was not surprising that King, Gore 
and Quincy Adams supported the Jay Treaty while Sullivan did not.  King, in 
particular, would play a pivotal role on behalf of the treaty in the United States 
Senate, and thereafter worked with Hamilton and Jay to write a series of articles 
designed to convince Americans of the benefits of the agreement.  Gore, who 
had long warned against the dangers of overreacting to British aggression was 
one of the treaty’s most vocal supporters.  Quincy Adams, who was the first                                                         
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American not involved in the negotiations to see the treaty, was convinced that 
despite its defects, the document represented the best chance to keep the 
United States out of war.  Sullivan strongly opposed the treaty. 
The sequence of events leading up to the treaty dated back to the 
Revolutionary War.  Seemingly unwilling to honor the fact that their former 
colonies were now an independent nation, British ‘insults’ to American 
autonomy on land and sea had continued for over a decade.  By the end of 
1793, the frequency and severity of these incidents left the United States 
government with no alternative but to act.  In December 1793, President 
Washington, at the urging of Secretary of State Jefferson, included in his 
message on foreign relations a section that was highly critical of the British 
government.  Among the list of grievances cited were Britain’s refusal to 
abandon their military posts in the northwest despite being obligated to so by 
peace treaty; Britain’s interception and seizure of American merchant vessels; 
Britain’s impressment of American sailors; Britain’s unilateral change in the 
definition of contraband in order to prevent American manufactures from 
reaching France; and Britain’s refusal to alter restrictions on America’s 
commerce in British ports.374  
Within a month after Washington’s message, James Madison offered a series of 
resolutions in the House of Representatives seeking to enact legislation that he 
hoped would force the British to alter their aggressive policies.  Madison 
proposed that the United States adopt a policy based on “reciprocity.”  
Specifically, he argued the United States should impose commercial restrictions 
on nations with whom they had no commercial treaty, comparable to the 
restrictions those nations placed on the United States.  In addition, Madison 
sought an increase in duties on a number of imported goods, most of which 
came from Britain.375  
Debate over Madison’s resolutions in Massachusetts broke along party lines.  
Writing under the name Plain Truth for the Independent Chronicle, in late January 
1794, Sullivan supported the idea of dealing aggressively with the British.  He 
was particularly offended that the British refused to evacuate the military posts 
on American soil and was outraged that the British were allegedly encouraging 
Indian atrocities on the frontier.  “Can there be a doubt of their supplying the 
Indians on the frontier with the means of their cruel and destructive warfare,” 
Sullivan asked, and “does she not hold fortifications and posts on the territory 
of the American republic?”  He stoked the fires of patriotism.                                                          
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Americans! Shall we sleep any longer on our post?  Shall we suffer a 
foreign army in hostile array to continue in our country?  God Forbid! 
Rouse then ye republican sons of Columbia; and let this overbearing 
haughty nation know that it is in your power, without the necessity of an 
appeal to arms, or without the shedding of one drop of blood, to shake 
the throne of her monarch to its center.   
Sullivan even argued that Madison’s resolutions did not go far enough, 
suggesting instead that: “Let us at one stroke stop all trade with the English, till 
justice is done, and our merchants indemnified,” and “let us declare that we will 
no longer submit to such impositions with impunity, and we shall receive no 
further insults.”376   
A contributor to the Centinel, identified as Fair Play, articulated a common 
theme among Federalists in Boston: “Has not Mr. Madison been their [French] 
most confidential and efficient agent.  Has not Mr. M. zealously and 
perseveringly advocated those measures of Genet’s, which he now openly 
avows to have been concerted purposely to involve America in the present war 
on the side of France.”377  A few months later Gore referred to Republicans as 
the “advocates for anarchy,” and warned readers they were looking to promote 
“affected gratitude to France and hatred to Britain,” by suggesting that 
Americans “might grow rich by sacrificing their trade with the latter, [and] to 
the former, in a word, by selling cheap and buying dear.”  He added: “It was 
said that none but those who were under British influence would lisp a word 
against [Madison’s resolutions] – that now was presented an opportunity to 
gratify our pride, our affections, our hatred, our avarice.”378   
Boston convened a town meeting on March 24th, to consider Madison’s 
resolutions.  When the town meeting opened, however, it was clear the 
Federalists had done an effective job of organizing opposition to the 
resolutions.  After two days the Meeting chose to take no action. “The 
arguments used by the opposition to the Report,” the Centinel reported 
“displaced an extensive knowledge of our commerce, its natural and permanent 
advantages, as well as its present embarrassments; and they were so convincing, 
as to satisfy a large majority [two-thirds], that it was inexpedient for the town to 
declare any opinion as to” Monroe’s resolutions, “but rather to leave the whole 
subject with Congress, where it ought to constitutionally reside.”379  Gore                                                         
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would later write that merchants, tradesmen and “friends of order,” saw 
through “the arts that were playing to trick them out of their commerce, their 
prosperity and their peace.”  “A larger and more respectable assembly was 
never known,” and that “the plan adopted by the anarchists to betray the 
interests of the town, and disgrace its character, failed.”  Manlius added: “the 
supporters of the resolutions were obliged to acknowledge that their primary 
motive was not the increase of our agriculture, manufactures or navigation, but 
to humble Great Britain and exalt France.”  According to Gore, it would have 
been a betrayal to the New England states to support “these destructive 
propositions.”380  
After the meeting, Gore was pleased to write to King that “I have the pleasure 
to inform you that the town meeting called by Jarvis and others to influence the 
votes of our representatives [Congressmen Cabot and Ames] on Madison’s 
resolutions, ended in a complete overthrow of those” opposed to good 
government and order.  He charged that Republicans, Dr. Charles Jarvis and 
Benjamin Austin, “descended to personal abuse; their supporters clapped and 
huzza’d applauses on their harangues; they hissed when the opponents spoke.”  
Still the opponents of Madison’s resolutions carried the day with two thirds of 
the vote.  “Our merchants now enjoy great spirits and feel that they can carry 
any point they choose,” Gore concluded.381   
Senator King was not as optimistic as Gore. Writing a week later King 
expressed his growing anxiety over the seizure of American vessels.  “The very 
general capture, and the condemnation in several cases, of vessels engaged in a 
commerce beyond all doubt lawful,” King wrote, “is an affair of great 
embarrassment; and which may assume a character of great political 
importance.”  He added ominously: “if without notice, and before the 
commencement of military operations in those seas, they should condemn our 
property already, and which may still be, captured, the inference is too obvious 
not to be alarming.”  Appropriately, King and his senate colleagues were 
preparing for the worst.  “It will be our object to preserve peace,” King told 
Gore, “but it is our duty to adopt measures to place the Country in a state of 
greater security.”382  
Because of the growing tension with Britain, Madison’s resolutions met with 
increasing opposition in Congress.  Along with South Carolina’s William Smith, 
Representative Fisher Ames of Massachusetts was the chief congressional                                                         
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spokesman for the opposition to Madison’s proposals.  He lectured Madison 
on economic theory and argued that such measures would lead either to war or 
the enactment of counter-measures by the British.  Ames also argued that the 
United States relied on British trade far more than the British relied on 
American trade and that the United States would suffer more than the English 
if such restrictions were enacted.383  After weeks of debate, sentiment began 
swinging in Ames’ favor, as he insisted that commerce should not be used as a 
weapon to combat political wrongs. “Madison & Co.,” Ames wrote to Gore, 
“now avow that the political wrongs are the wrongs to be cured by commercial 
restrictions, which, in plain English is, we set out with a tale of restrictions and 
injuries on our commerce, that has been refuted solidly; pressed for a pretext, 
we avow that we will make war, not for our commerce, but with it, not to make 
our commerce better, but to make it nothing, in order to reach the tender sides 
of our enemy, which are not to be wounded in any other way.”384  
Ames’s successful assault against Madison’s resolutions helped fuel his re-
election bid against Hancock confidant and ardent Republican, Dr. Charles 
Jarvis. Gore gleefully wrote to King, informing him of the their friend’s 
success.  “I congratulate you on our late election, ... only two towns where 
Jarvis had a majority … Ames will be elected.”  He added: “The town of 
Boston never looked more joyous than it has since Monday; and there never 
was an election, where our wealthiest merchants and respectable citizens 
exerted themselves more, or persevered so long.”  In addition, he concluded, 
“many falsehoods told of Ames have been refuted,” and “good men seem 
willing to exert themselves to support government and maintain order.”385   
Madison delayed the vote implementing his resolutions, knowing full well that 
should Britain commit new outrages on the ocean or in the western frontier, 
support for his resolutions would increase.386  In March and April 1794, reports 
of new and more severe British provocations amounting to a virtual blockade 
of the French West Indies gave Madison’s proposals a boost.  About this same 
time Washington received word that the British were looking to strengthen, not 
abandon, their forts in the northwest.  The president was convinced Britain 
wanted war.387  
Even Gore, who had been so optimistic only a few weeks earlier, expressed 
disappointment.  “We are continually receiving information of the capture,                                                         
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detention & condemnation of our vessels in the W. Indies,” he wrote King.  He 
continued to counsel caution, however, adding: “Our merchants conduct with 
great moderation & temper on the occasion.  Convinced that their losses might 
be increased, but could not be diminished by war, they are averse to it 
themselves, & unremitted in their efforts to convince others of the fatal 
consequence s of such a step.”  Gore expressed hope that when presented with 
the evidence to support their claims, the British could be persuaded to 
indemnify those who suffered losses.  He naively added: “The whole force of 
those British merchants, who trade in this country, I am well convinced, could 
easily be brought to act in concert with the American Minister in support of 
such a claim.”  If the American Minister to Britain, Thomas Pinckney, could 
present such a claim “in a manner the most flattering to British pride, most 
soothing to their wounded spirits, at the same time, most alarming to their 
apprehensions,” Great Britain “cannot hesitate to afford a satisfactory reply to 
so just a demand.”388  Gore was determined, almost at any cost, to avoid war 
with Britain. 
As talk of war spread throughout the country, Washington decided to send 
Chief Justice John Jay as a special envoy to London to negotiate a settlement 
between the two countries.  Jay was to insist, among other things, on British 
indemnification for damages to American commerce and clarification of the 
rules regarding interception and seizure of vessels for a neutral nation.  In 
addition, he was to insist that Britain comply with the terms of Treaty of 1783, 
including the surrender of the military posts in the American frontier, and to 
agree to indemnify owners of slaves taken during the war.389  As Jay would 
soon discover, however, Britain was not inclined to compromise on most 
issues. 
While Jay was beginning his negotiations with the British government, John 
Quincy Adams was rewarded for his staunch defense of the president with an 
appointment as Minister to the Netherlands.  His appointment, which was 
unanimously approved, seemed to make complete sense, given that Adams had 
lived in Holland, knew their language, and understood European courts and 
custom. 390  Quincy Adams himself, however, seems to have had mixed feelings 
about his appointment, writing to his father that “I wish I could have been 
consulted before [the decision] was irrevocably made,” adding that “I rather 
wish it had not been made.”391  He received his commission in Philadelphia on                                                         
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his twenty-seventh birthday, in July 1794.392  Before reaching Holland, Quincy 
Adams stopped in London to deliver dispatches and to meet with John Jay and 
Thomas Pinckney, the United States Minister to Britain.  He was pleased and 
flattered that Jay and Pinckney personally went over the terms of the soon to 
be released treaty with him.  While he knew the treaty would not be well 
received by many Americans, he believed that “the national interest will suffer 
infinitely less than it would by the most successful war we could wage.”  He 
mentioned to his father that while neither Jay nor Pinckney were completely 
satisfied with the treaty, they were satisfied, as he was, that it was preferable to 
war.393  Quincy Adams hoped the American people would accept the treaty, 
recognizing himself, however, that “no commerce treaty with Great Britain 
would be of much use until the Navigation Acts ceased to be the cornerstone 
of their foreign policy.”394   
One month after Jay’s meeting with Quincy Adams, he and Lord Grenville 
reached a final agreement on November 19, 1794.  On the very day that Jay 
signed his name on behalf of the United States government, to a document that 
would thereafter bear his name, he also wrote to King.  In the letter, which 
would have been included in the same packet that contained the treaty itself, 
Jay assured his friend that “the draft has undergone several Editions, with 
successive alterations, additions,” as if to underscore the fact that “time and 
trouble have not been spared.”  Jay was confident that he had achieved the best 
treaty he could.  “Should the Treaty prove, as I believe it will, beneficial to our 
country, Justice will finally be done,” he claimed, and “if not, be it so; my mind 
is at ease.”395  
The Jay Treaty was, at first blush, not beneficial to the United States.  The only 
concession gained by Jay was the British promise to abandon the military posts 
in the northwestern frontier, which they were already obligated to do under the 
Treaty of 1783.  The parties only agreed to separately arbitrate pre-revolutionary 
debts, boundary disputes, and British seizures of American vessels.  
Furthermore, Jay conceded that the British could seize American goods bound 
for France, with compensation, and French goods on American vessels, 
without compensation.  Though Britain granted the United States ‘most 
favored nation’ status, and permitted them to trade with the colonies of the 
East Indies, they restricted American access the British West Indies, which 
were considered by American merchants as the most valuable.  England also                                                         
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refused to give compensation for the slaves taken during the Revolution, thus 
angering many southerners.  Jay also failed to negotiate the end of impressment 
of American sailors into the Royal Navy, an issue that would cause 
considerable trouble a decade later.  Furthermore, the British refused to 
recognize America’s interpretation of their rights as a neutral nation.396  
Though reports of the completed treaty reached the United States in January 
1795, the text of the document did not arrive in Philadelphia until March 7th.  
President Washington, not wanting the contents of the agreement made public 
until after it was debated by the Senate in June, demanded secrecy.  Therefore, 
it wouldn’t be until late June, almost six months after initial reports of the 
treaty were received, that the document was revealed to the world.  Republicans 
quickly denounced the decision to keep secret the terms of the Treaty and 
indeed the debate over the treaty.  They asked: “How does the secrecy of the 
Senate, in relation to the treaty, comport with the sovereignty of the people?”397  
The treaty was submitted to the United States Senate, in special session, on 
June 8, 1795.  After two and half weeks of heated debate, and with pressure 
from the president, the Senate ratified the treaty on June 24th, by a vote of 20-
10.  Seven of the ten votes in opposition came from the South.  With 
supporters of the measure coming from the Federalist camp, and opponents 
from the Republican camp, the vote on the Jay Treaty was the first major 
national question that was decided along party lines.  The unity of the post-
Revolutionary period had been supplanted by partisan rancor as the debate 
became increasingly personal.  
Despite Senate ratification, the clamor over the treaty did not diminish.  On 
July 10, 1795, a Town Meeting was held at Boston’s Faneuil Hall with over 
1500 people in attendance.  There was unanimity in opposition to the treaty, 
with speakers arguing that not only did the treaty favor Britain over the United 
States, but also that it would signal to republican France that America had allied 
itself with “class conscious England.”  Opponents argued that by ratifying the 
treaty, the Senate’s action was “highly injurious to the commercial interests of 
the United States, derogatory to the national honor and independence and may 
be dangerous to the peace and happiness of our citizens.”  In addition, speakers 
complained that according to the treaty, the United States would not be 
indemnified by the British for the commercial losses incurred as a result of 
British occupation of the western frontiers for twelve years.  Perhaps most 
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insulting of all, however, was the fact that the seizure of American vessels and 
the impressment of American sailors would continue unabated.398  
Gore reported to King that Governor Sam Adams, the man who had 
convinced Hancock to permit the escape of a French privateer a few years 
earlier, was now the leader of the Boston ‘mob’ against the treaty.399  He added 
that “it is much to be regretted that Boston gave the example of a Town 
meeting on this subject – had they remained silent, or had the schemes of Jarvis 
& others, on the occasion, as heretofore, been disappointed, we should have 
had no meeting here, and the country would have escaped that Fever into 
which it is likely to be thrown.  You must exert yourselves in procuring a right 
conception of the Treaty – if understood, it will not be disapproved.”400  
Gore, who put so much stock in British reasonableness, never admitted he was 
disappointed with the treaty.  Though many northern Federalists had 
misgivings about the agreement, Gore unequivocally defended every position.  
He was grateful to Jay for his fine work because he believed it would help 
Massachusetts commercial interests.401  This, it would seem, was always central 
in Gore’s thinking.  He rejected the argument that the treaty enabled Britain to 
control the commerce of the United States as though it were still a colony.  He 
also refused to condemn Britain’s unwillingness to accept the United States’ 
interpretation of the rights of a neutral nation.   
Gore was the leading Federalist voice in support of the treaty in Massachusetts.  
Writing under the name Federalist, he wrote a series for the Centinel entitled 
‘Objections to the Treaty Refuted.’  With lawyerly precision, he set out to challenge 
each of the principle objections outlined at the Boston Town Meeting.  His 
main goal was to assure readers that the agreement would not harm 
Massachusetts commerce, nor be “derogatory to their national honor and 
independence.  He began his argument with a plea that the people of Boston 
support their federal government and the men who manned it.  “Duty to 
ourselves demands that we should respect the legal and constitutional doings of 
those we have appointed to administer our public affairs.”  It would be 
dangerous, he warned, to declare to the world that the Senate did not enjoy the 
confidence of the people.  “Men who love their country will endeavor to 
support its government.”402                                                          
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In response to the complaint there were no provisions in the treaty for 
indemnification for United States losses resulting from their twelve-year 
exclusion from the western frontiers, Gore argued simply that the Treaty of 
1783 had created confusion and failed to clearly resolve possessory rights in the 
west.  The United States should be very pleased with the return of the posts, he 
reasoned, particularly since both sides were wrong in their interpretation of the 
treaty.  Indeed, he claimed, Britain “would so humiliate herself” if she were “to 
confess she was the only party who acted wrong,” that the treaty wouldn’t be 
acceptable to the British people.  The result, he concluded, was the best for 
which the United States could hope.403  
Another objection raised by Boston Town Meeting was the fact that the treaty 
included no indemnification to United States citizens for property taken at the 
close of the war.  Gore defended the Treaty provision, observing that the major 
bone of contention related to the removal of “Negroes,” most of whom were 
located behind British lines at the time the war ended.  Gore suggested that the 
British considered them as having been captured and therefore no longer the 
property of Americans.  Appealing to readers on moral grounds, Gore insisted 
that Britain had pledged their faith to these people and that it would have been 
wrong to return them to their masters.  Finally, he argued, the value of the 
property taken, as estimated by American complainants, had been greatly 
exaggerated.  He insisted that at most, 3,000 slaves had been taken, and that 
many of them had been free negroes and many others had been either very old 
or very young.  Consequently, he concluded, the true value of the loss was “by 
no means sufficient to press” indemnification “in hazard of our peace, and 
other articles of the treaty which may be considered beneficial to the United 
States.”404  
A major source of contention over the Treaty, however, particularly among 
Boston merchants, revolved around the requirement that aggrieved Americans 
who had their vessels or property seized by the British would have to submit 
their claims to British Admiralty courts.  Consequently, many merchants 
complained that they would have no voice in the final determination of such 
cases.  Gore, sounding more like a British subject than an American citizen, 
insisted that most of the seized vessels were privateers, and “that every British 
subject has a right which neither King nor minister can deprive him of, to have 
his cause tried in the courts of his country.”  Furthermore, he added, “the trial 
by admiralty courts has long been accepted, “according to the law of nations.”                                                          
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Reciting the tradition of trials by British admiralty courts, Gore took great pains 
to reassure American merchants, concluding: “thus the law and customs of 
nations has been stated by the ablest and most respectable citizens of the 
present age.”  Acknowledging that there would undoubtedly be cases where 
compensation, “for whatever reason couldn’t be made through the courts of 
justice,” he referred to Article Seven of the Treaty which called for claims to be 
presented to the government.  He assured readers that Jay had “induced the 
British government to use all the means in her power and make 
compensation.”405  
In response to the Treaty provision that excluded Americans merchants from 
the British West Indies, Gore simply restated the obvious: “It ought to be 
remarked that according to the rights claimed by all nations having colonies, to 
which all other nations have acceded, we have no positive right to go to any of 
the colonies of the British crown; and that unless such right is obtained by 
treaty, the British may prohibit our trading or even entering the ports of their 
colonial possessions, without affording us any just cause of complaint.” He 
added, however, that the restrictions were not as numerous as some people had 
suggested, because the language of the Treaty was not as clear as it could have 
been.  He argued that the prohibition of trade along the coast of the British 
colonies, for example, despite the seemingly definitive terms, were intended 
merely “to prevent a right by implication, which the generality of the terms 
expressing our authority to trade there, might be construed to include.”406     
Gore’s vigorous support for the treaty almost immediately bore fruit, as many 
Boston merchants began to have a change of heart.  George Cabot observed a 
month after the July meeting that many merchants who initially expressed 
misgivings about the treaty had gradually came around to support it.  He wrote 
to King in early August, after all four of Gore’s articles had been published, 
that “although I have reason to believe that the treaty is now generally 
approved by,” the Boston merchants, “yet so many of them had indiscreetly 
censured it, that it is doubtful how far they will incline formally to express their 
present opinions.”407  Gore echoed these sentiments on August 14, noting that 
many of those who had initially objected to the treaty, had come around to the 
support the document, ….so long as the President endorsed it.  Indeed, the 
chief concern among these people, according to Gore, was that they couldn’t 
understand why President Washington had not yet ratified the treaty.  “For                                                         
405 Columbian Centinel, July 25, 1795. 
406 Columbian Centinel, July 29, 1795. 
407 Cabot to King, August 4, 1795, King, II, 20. 
 130 
whatever may be the motive of the Executive,” he wrote, “it will be attributed 
either to dislike of the instrument, or the influence of the opponents.”408   
Although Washington had signed the treaty opponents remained convinced, 
that it could still be defeated.  After a July meeting in Boston, and at various 
times and places throughout the town over the next several weeks, there were 
loud and active demonstrations against the treaty.  The Centinel acknowledged 
that the crowds were comprised mostly of boys and it portrayed their actions  
over seven nights as highly dangerous and disruptive.  It was reported they 
carried “poles rinds of watermelons cut into the likeness of the human 
countenance, hideously distorted, and illuminated by candles,” and “kept the 
town in alarm and commotion, breaking windows and threatening with 
personal violence the leading Federalists.”409  They purportedly “threatened to 
attack” some houses of those who supported the treaty and otherwise 
disturbed “the peace and order of the town, and frightening the women and 
children.”410  
Of the alleged ringleaders of the protests, the Centinel reported that “these 
pretended democrats” and “Jacobin disorganizers” had promoted the “riots” to 
oppose “the government of the Union” and “to counteract the measures of the 
executive, relative to the treaty with Britain.”  During the daytime, the paper 
alleged, “they are occupied in preaching sedition at the corners, and in the 
market, in declaiming upon liberty, equality and the rights of man; and in the 
night, they assemble to form their arrangements for trampling on those very 
rights, and for counteracting and subverting our existing government.”  
Though the Centinel intimated violence beyond the breaking of windows, they 
added “it is more congenial with the spirit of our religion, to conceal, with the 
veil of charity, their follies and vices.”  It was wise and patriotic, they argued, to 
“hide from the public view, those depraved examples, which can tend only to 
corrupt the morals and principles of others.”411  
Other papers in Boston, however, including the Independent Chronicle and Boston 
Gazette, raised no such alarm and saw no danger in the actions of the protesters.  
A contributor to the Gazette, for example, suggested that the Centinel had 
exaggerated the violence and damage caused by the protesters.  “The tools of 
British tyranny had their “venal presses” working against the people.  “Witness 
the Centinel of Wednesday last, wherein the town of Boston is pictured in all the                                                         
408 Gore to King, August 14, 1795, King, II, 23. 
409 Amory, Life of Sullivan, I, 300. 
410 Columbian Centinel, October 31, 1795. 
411 Columbian Centinel, September 26, 1795. 
 131 
horrors of a bloody massacre.”  Not true, he insisted.  “These men [at the 
Centinel] toil night and day to destroy the character of the people. – My friends 
their cause is bad and they think to prop it up a little longer by 
misrepresentation and lies.”412  Indeed, the potential threat posed by the 
protesters may not have been as great as suggested, at least during the first few 
nights, for as the Centinel acknowledged, several citizens “compelled” the 
protesters to stop their parade by destroying their effigy and lit melons.413  
Governor Samuel Adams was similarly unimpressed with the cries for action.  
According to the Centinel, the governor ignored several requests to suppress 
these “scenes of riot and disorder.”  The chief executive, they argued, “affected 
to treat the matter with an air of levity and ridicule, observing that it was 
nothing more than the amusement of boys in water-melon season.”414  Gore 
petulantly expressed the anger of many Federalists towards the governor for his 
handling of what they considered mob activity.  Writing to King, he 
complained: “the governor is assailed in all quarters to adopt efficient 
measures; but he has evaded and will evade all requests of this nature, so long 
as he thinks the mob aim only its vengeance against national men and national 
measures.  Indeed, the weak old man is one of the loudest bawlers against the 
treaty, and the boldest in proposing schemes of opposition to the federal 
government.”415   
While both sides viewed the details of the demonstrations differently, there is 
evidence that on the sixth night of protest, tempers were raised and at least the 
threat of violence was real.  The Centinel reported that a “vast multitude had 
assembled round a large bonfire,” in Liberty Square, and that Attorney General 
James Sullivan, joined by the sheriff of Suffolk County, walked into the crowd 
and asked them to disperse.  Sullivan, it was reported, read out a legal warning 
to the gathering and asked them to go home, reminding them of the danger 
they were inviting with their actions.  He managed to convince “the more 
influential of their leaders,” to persuade the crowd to disperse.  As Sullivan and 
the sheriff were exiting the crowd, however, they were allegedly threatened and 
jostled by several of the angrier men.  Although they were able to escape 
without injury, the Federalist leaning Centinel shrilly reported that “the law 
prostrate, the magistrates literally trodden under feet, the peace of the town 
disturbed during the hours of the night, women and children frightened, and 
bonfires made the center of the town; oaths and imprecations, united with                                                         
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threats to tear the hearts of the magistrates from their breasts, and roast them 
at the fire.” 416  Sullivan was angry, however, that the Centinel suggested that 
because of his efforts to stop the protests, that he had supported the Jay 
Treaty.   
Writing to the Centinel, Sullivan set the record straight, informing readers that 
he did not support the agreement.  Nonetheless, he said, that did not mean he 
did not support the government, and the laws that govern their conduct.  While 
he may have personally disagreed with the treaty, he stated, once the United 
States Senate accepted it and President signed it, he [Sullivan] would abide by it.  
Then, in an effort to calm the political waters, Sullivan assured the readers that 
the people who disagreed with the administration, “whatever their opinion may 
be in regard to the treaty with Great Britain, or upon any other measure in the 
administration of the federal government, yet they are by no means hostile to 
that government, nor would they consent to anything that would oppose the 
execution of its authority, or injure the national character of the Union.”417  In 
classic Sullivan style, he added that “the citizens of this commonwealth are 
possessed of so much good sense and patriotism, that they will never oppose 
the government because they are not satisfied with the expediency or propriety 
of a measure, adopted in the administration of it.”  Sullivan’s republican 
argument was that contentious issues should be resolved according to law and 
tradition, in the legislature, in the courtroom, or, if necessary to raise public 
awareness, in the press, but certainly not in the streets.  The September protests 
marked the high water mark of opposition to the Jay Treaty in Boston.   
John Quincy Adams, writing from Europe, voiced his continued support for 
the Jay Treaty despite continued British assaults on American neutrality.  
Desirous of keeping the United States out of war, Quincy Adams wrote in 
October 1795, that “if resentment were a good or a safe foundation for 
political measures, few Americans perhaps would be disposed to go further 
than I should.  But of all the guides that a nation can follow, passion is the 
most treacherous, and prudence the most faithful.”418  
In November 1795 Gore was pleased to report to King that public sentiment in 
Boston had turned against those who had participated in the Jay Treaty “riots 
in September.”  He reported that the husbandmen of Massachusetts agreed 
that that those who committed the outrages had “very different motives than a 
regard for the public good.”  Gore then lobbied his friend for his help in                                                         
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securing one of the commissioner positions, called for under the Jay Treaty.  
“If Great Britain shall ratify this instrument on her part,” he wrote “and 
commissioners are appointed to determine the claims of Americans, I should 
be pleased to be one of them.”419  When, in January 1796, Gore received word 
that he had been offered the position of commissioner, he could not have been 
more excited.  After thanking King for his intervention, he immediately 
accepted.  “My answer by this post,” he wrote, “is explicitly in the affirmative.”  
Other than meeting with Washington for instructions, he suggested that there 
was nothing “to hinder my immediate embarkation for Europe.”420  
In March 1796, Gore was formally selected by President Washington to 
represent the United States government on the Anglo-American claims 
commission established under Article VII of the Jay Treaty.  It was a coveted 
post that carried a great deal of prestige.  William Pinckney, a Republican from 
Maryland, who had opposed the Constitution a decade earlier, joined Gore, a 
Federalist.  For the next eight years, Gore and Pinckney lived in London and 
represented the United States on the five man Anglo-American board that 
evaluated claims made by Americans against the British for the seizure of 
vessels and cargoes.  This board also handled British claims against the United 
States for their losses alleged to have been sustained through American 
violations of neutrality.421  While there is no suggestion in Gore’s 
correspondence that he was particularly eager to leave the United States, the 
prospect of occupying an important political post in London, a city where he 
already had many political and business contacts, must have been appealing to 
him.  In addition, Gore’s decision to move to England would have been made 
easier by the fact that King and his wife would be close by in London.  
Rufus King had, as a result of the fight over the Jay Treaty, expressed growing 
frustration with public service.  Upon hearing that his brother Thomas had 
been elected to the General Court, King wrote: “when he has toiled as long as I 
have, I think he will agree with me that it would have been wiser altogether to 
have abstained from political engagements…”422  King was tired of his work in 
the Senate and was anxious to try something new.  Writing to Hamilton in May 
1796, he said “you must know that I am not a little tired with this separation 
from my family and drudging in the Senate.  The work now before us being 
finished, I think I am entitled to a dismission.”  In a letter to Hamilton, King 
suggested “it would be agreeable to me to spend a few years abroad, and if I do                                                         
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not misconceive the interests of the country, I think I could render some 
service to the public at the present period in England.”423  
Hamilton agreed that King would be an excellent choice to succeed Thomas 
Pinckney as Minister to Great Britain.  He wrote to King that “in the event of 
Pinckney’s return to this country, I am of the opinion, all circumstances 
considered, it is expedient you should replace him.”424  On May 20th, Hamilton 
wrote to the president that: “the importance of our security, and commerce, 
and good understanding with Great Britain, renders it very important that a 
man able and not disagreeable to that Government, should be there,” and that 
“the gentleman in question [King], equally with any who could go, and better 
than any willing to go, answers to this description.”425  Washington agreed, and 
within the week, King was nominated for the position of Minister to Britain.  
His colleagues in the Senate quickly ratified his nomination, and he left the 
United States on June 20th, arriving in London on July 23rd with his wife and 
four young children.  Their transition was made easier by the fact that Gore 
and his wife, who had arrived in London a few months before the Kings, had 
made arrangements for and otherwise assisted the Kings in settling in their new 
home.  Gore had previously written to King: “As circumstances prevent our 
living near each other in our own country, I rejoice exceedingly that we are 
destined to be neighbors in a foreign land.”426  
Shortly after assuming his new post, King was confronted with the growing 
deterioration of American relations with Britain.  American merchants were 
filing new complaints every week because British vessels continued to target 
and seize American vessels.  Writing to John Quincy Adams in November 
1796, King referred to the seizures, but added that the continued impressment 
of American sailors by the British was potentially even more damaging to 
Anglo-American relations.  Indeed, touching on the subject that would 
contribute significantly to the formation of political parties in the United States, 
King observed that “though we have reason to be dissatisfied that so many of 
our vessels are captured, still I think the injury and injustice we experience in 
the impressments of our Seamen is a more serious cause of discontent.”  He 
added, however, “it is no more than candor to confess that some of the 
captures have been but too well justified,” and observed that some American 
vessels were being used to “cover enemy goods.”427  Despite the diplomatic                                                         
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tensions with Britain and France, America was nonetheless enjoying a period of 
general prosperity, as domestic exports and domestic consumption doubled.  
Supporters of the Jay Treaty were quick to warn that if the treaty were not 
implemented, prosperity would disappear.428  The result was that between 
August 14, 1795, when Washington signed the treaty, and April 30, 1796, when 
the House of Representatives voted the funds to give it force, the case for 
holding out against the treaty grew weaker and weaker.  The political landscape 
in Massachusetts had changed dramatically because of the treaty.  It played a 
decisive role in splitting the nation into two hostile and organized camps.   
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Chapter VI 
Growth of Republicanism  
In the months leading up to the presidential election of 1796, the issue of party 
politics took center stage in state as well as national politics.  Unlike the 
previous two presidential elections, the election of 1796 was hotly contested.  
President Washington, who had refused to run for a third term, saw the coming 
partisan storm and warned of the dangers of parties in his farewell address.  
“The alternate domination of one faction over another,” he suggested, 
“sharpened by the spirit of revenge natural to party dissension, which in 
different ages and countries has perpetrated the most horrid enormities, is itself 
a frightful despotism.”429  As much as he deplored parties, however, the 
president had not been able to stem their growth.  
A. Federalists v. Republicans 
John Adams, who had been involved in politics for over thirty years, was the 
obvious Federalist choice to succeed the president.  Like Washington, Adams 
detested parties, later declaring they were “violent Friends of Order, Law, 
Government, and Religion, when in Power; and all parties Libelous, Seditious, 
and rebellious, when out of Power.”  The Republicans chose Thomas 
Jefferson, who, remaining at Monticello, showed little enthusiasm for the 
coming contest.   Nonetheless, Adams and the Federalist Party defeated 
Jefferson in the election of 1796 by only three electoral votes.  Under the 
electoral rule then in place, Jefferson the second place finisher became Vice 
President.430  
As Adams prepared himself for the presidency, the people of his home state 
were getting ready to elect a new governor.  With the departure of Samuel 
Adams in 1797, party politics took on added significance in Massachusetts, as 
voters now had a clear choice between the two competing philisophies.431  The 
time had arrived “when purely personal leadership in the politics of the state,” 
gave way to “men representing national parties and programs.”432  Of the four 
subjects of this study, Gore, King, and Quincy Adams grudgingly accepted 
political parties, while Sullivan perceived parties as inextricably tied to 
republicanism.  The major candidates for governor in 1797 included Federalist                                                         
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Increase Sumner, and Republicans Moses Gill and Sullivan. Because 
Republicans continued to be identified with the French cause, Sumner 
benefited from the national strength of the Federalist Party, a healthy economy, 
and the deteriorating relationship between France and the United States. 
Consequently, Massachusetts Federalists were able to capture both houses of 
the legislature as well as the governor’s office, and begin a period of dominance 
in Massachusetts that would last for almost a decade.433  Gore boasted of the 
Federalists’ dominance. “You may be confident,” he told his friend Theodore 
Sedgwick, “there never was a time, when the general government was so much 
and so generally admired as now, and its administration so universally and 
sincerely approved.”434 
Despite the Federalist landslide, Sullivan was re-elected as attorney general, the 
lone Republican holding statewide office.  He remained a regular contributor to 
local journals on the important issues of the day.  In April 1797, Sullivan, 
writing under the name Plain Truth, articulated his many objections to the 
growing anti-French sentiment, as the prospect of war became a real possibility.  
In particular, he was critical of the Centinel for irresponsibly encouraging anti-
French sentiment, which amounted to nothing more than a ‘war whoop.’ 
“Arming of private vessels for resistance or reprisal, as recommended by the 
federal press,” Sullivan argued, “would inevitably lead to hostilities.”435  War 
with France would destroy American commerce; damage the fishing industry; 
result in the loss of jobs for seamen; decrease the value of real estate; increase 
the price of foreign commodities; ruin public and private credit; and otherwise 
threaten American’s “liberties and rights.”  Since Sullivan believed that 
American foreign policy should be based on republican principles, he argued 
that America must stand with republican France against aristocratic, imperialist 
Britain.  “An alliance, offensive and defensive, with royalty, against liberty; the 
remaining trade of the country in the hands of British factors; English habits 
and manners; perhaps even English troops again quartered in our capitals” 
would be intolerable.436  
The foreign policy crises of the late 1790s sharpened not only the political 
differences between the two parties, but also between two branches of the 
Federalist Party.  The High Federalists, based largely in New England, and 
sometimes called the “extreme” Federalists, which included members of the so-
called Essex Junto, tended to take their cue from Alexander Hamilton.  Gore                                                         
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was a member of this group.  The moderate Federalists, on the other hand, 
who tended to outnumber the High Federalists, even in New England, 
generally supported the president and were opposed to war with France.  The 
High Federalists tended to be more vocal, however, and, with the exception of 
the office of the presidency, held more positions of power than their moderate 
brethren.  They would continue to feed the growing anti-French mood and 
stood as an obstacle to the president throughout his term.  
To Quincy Adams, a moderate Federalist, the union was all-important.  Even 
though he disagreed with “southern [Republican] politics,” he was inclined to 
at least listen to their demands rather “than break the chain that binds us 
together.” “For there is no one article of my political creed more clearly 
demonstrated to my mind than this,” he told his brother Charles, “that we shall 
proceed with gigantic strides to honor and consideration, and national 
greatness, if the union is preserved.”437  Though Quincy Adams was opposed 
to war with France, he did view the French government as a danger the Union 
because, he argued, they sought to exploit American political differences for 
their benefit.  “The French government,” he told his father, “have been led to 
believe, that the people of the United States have but a feeble attachment to their 
government, and will not support them in a contest with that of France.”438 
“Our government and people,” Quincy Adams told King, “must find and use 
all their means of defense, or submit to the dictates of the Directory.”  There 
were no other alternatives left, he insisted.  “They calculate much upon our 
internal divisions, and upon a party prepared rather to assist than oppose their 
projects of plunder.”439   
The Alien and Sedition Acts passed by the Federalist controlled Congress in 
June and July 1798 were aimed at punishing those who criticized the 
government, and denied the vote to those who would threaten Federalist 
control of the government.  Republicans charged the Federalist Congress with 
targeting, among others, the ‘wild Irish’ who tended to sympathize with the 
French and gravitate towards the Republicans.  The most offensive piece of 
legislation was the Sedition Act, passed on July 4, 1798.  This legislation made it 
a crime to utter or publish “any false, scandalous, and malicious writing or 
writings against the Government of the United States, or either House of the 
Congress of the United States, with intent to defame … or to bring them into 
contempt or disrepute.”440  The scope of this legislation was limitless, as                                                         
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arguably any column or editorial, or indeed any uttered comment, deemed to be 
critical of any government official or the government in general, was 
punishable.  The Sedition Act stated that anyone “opposing or resisting any law 
of the United States, or any act of the President of the United States,” could be 
imprisoned for up to two years.  Though the act was certainly an assault on the 
First Amendment rights of speech and the press, Jefferson argued that it 
violated the Tenth Amendment that stated “the powers not delegated to the 
United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are 
reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”  Consequently, Jefferson 
and other Republican leaders argued that the Federal government was 
exercising un-delegated powers with the passage of the Sedition Act. 
Attorney General Sullivan found himself in the unenviable position of having 
to prosecute individuals with whom he sympathized, and who were guilty of 
doing nothing more than what had he been doing for over thirty years, namely 
critically questioning the decisions of government leaders.  In the spring of 
1799, Sullivan prosecuted Abijah Adams, a junior editor of the Independent 
Chronicle, a Republican leaning newspaper that had long been printing his own 
critical essays.  Despite his personal opposition to the Sedition Act, Sullivan 
believed he was obliged to follow through with the prosecution, much to the 
dismay of his Republican friends.  He avoided the Sedition Act by relying upon  
the principles of common law libel to prosecute the young editor, and the 
benefit of a shorter sentence, rather than the hated statute.  Nonetheless, to 
Sullivan’s chagrin the defense team argued that the prosecution of Adams was 
“inconsistent with … Republican principles.”  (Though the Centinel never 
referred to their longtime friend Sullivan by name, they did note that the case 
was “zealously argued by the states Attorney General.”)  Adams was convicted 
of libeling the legislature on March 5th in the spring of 1799, and sentenced to 
prison.441  The Chronicle reported Adams was discharged on April 24th, after 
serving “a confinement of thirty days under the operation of the Common Law 
of England.”442  
The election of 1800 pitted Federalists John Adams and Charles Pinckney 
against Republicans Thomas Jefferson and Aaron Burr.  Jefferson was fifty-
eight years old in 1800, and better prepared to fight for the presidency than he 
had been in 1796.  Unfortunately for Adams, he not only had to deal with 
Jefferson, but with the increasingly confident and hostile element in his own 
party.  The pro-war Federalists, however, found themselves in a predicament.                                                          
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As much as they opposed the president’s peace policy, they did not want to 
desert him for fear of handing over the election to Jefferson.  Led by Hamilton, 
they publicly supported Adams, but privately worked for his running mate, 
Charles C. Pinckney.  As a result of the split, Adams found himself the unlikely 
beneficiary of some Republican support in Massachusetts.443  
Since the Federalist Party dominated Massachusetts politics in 1800, the 
Republicans of the state knew that Jefferson could not possibly carry 
Massachusetts in the upcoming election.  Therefore, in order to defeat the pro-
war Federalists, many Republicans supported President Adams.  This shift had 
been manifested in the state elections eight months earlier.  Elbridge Gerry was 
the Republican candidate for governor, pledged to Adams and campaigning 
against the ‘war hawks.’”444  Sullivan was in an awkward position.  He 
appreciated Adams’ integrity and ‘patriotic services’ and was disappointed that 
Adams, a fellow Massachusetts man, had been deserted by many of his 
Federalist supporters.  At the same time, Sullivan respected and admired 
Jefferson and agreed with most of his policies.  Therefore, Sullivan initially 
announced he would take no part in the upcoming election, but it must not 
have surprised anyone who knew him that he couldn’t resist taking pen in hand 
as the election approached.445  Specifically, Sullivan was infuriated by the false 
accusations being leveled against Jefferson and the constant barrage of anti-
Jefferson propaganda being disseminated in Massachusetts.  The Federalists 
repeatedly insisted that Jefferson would align America with France and bring 
the country to war against Britain, and that he would: “turn every federal man 
out of office; destroy the funding system, and with it public credit; and make 
war upon Great Britain.”446    
The inflammatory comments leveled against Jefferson in Massachusetts that led 
Sullivan into the election battle were contained in a series of letters appearing in 
the Centinel under the name Decius.  Decius insisted Jefferson was responsible for 
everything bad and dangerous in the country and that if elected president he 
would remove all Federal officers and substitute “hungry Jacobins, without 
credit and without principles.”  Jefferson, he argued, also aimed to destroy 
pubic credit, because his Southern friends “possess little or no part of the 
public debt [and] they feel jealous and envious of their brethren in the Eastern 
states, who, with more economy and foresight have possessed themselves of 
their full share of it.”  For this reason Southern Republicans also refused “to be                                                         
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taxed to pay the interest of the national debt,” which they claim supports 
Eastern states.  Finally, Decius charged Jefferson with labeling “all holders of 
public funds [as] monarchy men.”447  
Despite his initial reticence Sullivan responded quickly to these and other 
charges.  Thereafter, his support for Jefferson was loud and unequivocal.  He 
lamented “the bitterness of the federal writers, in the Centinel, against the most 
respectable characters [Jefferson and his supporters] in the United States,” and 
observed “the history of this uncommon man had impressed my mind with a 
high degree of respect for his wisdom and moderation.”  To the charge that 
Jefferson would turn qualified men out of office, Sullivan disagreed, suggesting 
that “the folly of the Federalists, the rocks upon which they have been 
shipwrecked, would teach them other conduct than turning good men out of 
office.”  He even criticized President Adams indirectly by alluding to the Alien 
and Sedition Acts. “If the press is preserved free, and most assuredly the 
Jacobins, of all men, will not avail themselves of the precedent displayed by the 
Federalists to destroy it, with the channels of information unobstructed, and 
surrounded by public vigilance, always awake and ever attentive.”448  
Sullivan was particularly critical of Decius for attributing letters to Jefferson that 
Jefferson claimed never to have written.  “Would it not be just as reasonable to 
draw inferences on the character of Mr. Jefferson from any other anonymous 
publication.”  “It is manifest,” Sullivan concluded that Decius “has been 
employed merely to vilify and abuse the first and firmest of the peoples 
friends.”  Jefferson is a “column of granite placed in our political plain which I 
trust all the roaring artillery of his and our enemies can neither move nor 
injure.” He is to be applauded for the “unshaken firmness of his republican 
sentiments.”449  
Thomas Jefferson was inaugurated in March 1801.  Perhaps in an effort to calm 
people’s fears after such a bitter campaign, and no doubt anxious to appeal to 
moderate Federalists, Jefferson took pains in his Inaugural Address to extend 
the hand of reconciliation.  Indeed, while few doubted that a revolution in 
American politics had taken place, “the new president seemed anxious to prove 
that there had been no revolution at all.”450  He extended an olive branch to the 
Federalists.  “Let us restore harmony and affection to our society,” Jefferson 
urged, “and banish all political intolerance as we have banished religious                                                         
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intolerance.”  He added “that the agonies and agitations of Europe should have 
reached our shores and divided our opinions over proper measures of national 
safety is hardly surprising, but every difference of opinion is not a difference of 
principle.”  He concluded with the reassurance that “We have called by 
different names brethren of the same principle.  We are all Republicans; we are 
all Federalists.”451  
Jefferson’s victory in 1800 did not automatically alter the structure of power 
within the states, but it did create a more favorable climate in which 
Republicans could thrive.  Still, Massachusetts Federalists dominated at the 
polls. Federalist Caleb Strong defeated Republican Elbridge Gerry in 1800 and 
held the governor’s chair for the next seven years.452  Nonetheless, with the 
election of Thomas Jefferson in 1800, the seeds of a two party state had been 
planted in Massachusetts, and Sullivan became the leader of the state’s 
Republican Party.  Four years later Jefferson carried the state in the presidential 
election of 1804.  Two years later, in 1806, the Republicans would capture the 
Massachusetts legislature, and a year after that, the governor’s office itself.453  
With Jefferson’s election Quincy Adams fully expected to be recalled from 
Europe, though he didn’t think it appropriate to ask the president to be 
removed, declaring “I certainly will never ask him for any place, nor will I 
complain if he removes me from that which I already hold.”  He did not have 
to wait for Jefferson to act, however, for shortly after the election President 
Adams thought it appropriate to recall his son from Europe.  Quincy Adams 
returned home from Prussia in June of that year with the intention of living in 
Boston and resuming the practice of law.  
B. Senator John Quincy Adams  
Quincy Adams’ desire to stay out of politics was short lived.  In the spring of 
1802, he was sworn in as a state senator from Suffolk County.  As a freshman 
senator, it didn’t take long for him to reveal an all too familiar independent 
streak that would later define his public career.  After only one day in office, he 
boldly recommended to his Federalist colleagues that there should be 
proportional representation on the Council of the Commonwealth, meaning 
that the Republicans should occupy four seats.  His colleagues rejected his 
idea.454                                                          
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Perhaps in effort to remove his independent voice from state politics, several 
Federalist colleagues suggested that Quincy Adams run for Congress in the fall 
1802 election.  He jumped at the chance, and though he lost to incumbent, Dr. 
William Eustis, he did quite well, losing by only 59 votes out of 3,739 cast. 455  
Quincy Adams soon had another opportunity.  Both Massachusetts United 
States Senate positions opened up, with one incumbent stepping down and the 
other deciding not to run for re-election.  Although the Federalists held a 
majority in the legislature, the party was split.  Timothy Pickering and his 
conservative allies who had opposed President Adams represented conservative 
wing of the party, and moderate Federalists the other.  The Federalists desire to 
retain both seats, however, overcame their differences and the two groups 
reached an ‘arrangement.’  After voting was completed on February 3, 1803, 
John Quincy Adams and Timothy Pickering were elected to the United States 
Senate.456  Though the arrangement seemed to satisfy most Massachusetts 
Federalists the elevation of these two men with very different political 
philosophies set in motion a series of events that would have lasting 
consequences for them, their party, their state and their country. 
Before Quincy Adams assumed his new role in the United State Senate, he 
completed his term in the Massachusetts Senate.  His actions over the next few 
weeks certainly would have caused anxiety among Federalist leaders.   
Specifically, the state legislature was considering an application for a new bank 
in Boston.  The Republicans opposed the application, which enjoyed strong 
support among Federalists.  Only one day after he had been elected to the 
United States Senate, Quincy Adams made the following notation in his diary: 
“Otis took me into one of the lobbies to talk with me upon the subject of the 
application for a new bank in the town of Boston.  He said I had no 
conception of the interest and agitation which this affair had excited; that the 
application embraced a great multitude of the most respectable persons in this 
town, and almost the whole commercial interest; that it appeared to be an 
opinion among them that it depended entirely upon me, and he had heard I 
had objections against the plan, which he wished to remove if possible.”  The 
concern among Federalists if the bill were to be defeated, according to Otis, 
was that “the Jacobins would undertake and carry through a bank of their 
own.”  Otis had correctly gauged that Quincy Adams had objections to the 
bank bill, but was unable to alleviate them.  Quincy Adams merely assured Otis 
that he would “promote every thing they [Federalists] should desire, so far as 
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might be consistent with my duty.”457  After considering the matter over the 
weekend and listening to further debate, he concluded on February 7th that 
support for the measure was not consistent with his duty.  “Mr. James Lloyd 
called and conversed with me on the subject of the bank.  He was very desirous 
that I should give it not only my vote, but my support.  I stated my objections, 
and my intentions, particularly of proposing a general subscription, to which he 
strongly objected.”458  
There were objections to the small number of stock subscriptions, and also to 
the fact that the Commonwealth of Massachusetts would not have a stake in 
the bank, as they did in the Union Bank.  A writer identified as ‘Steady’ 
presented the Federalist argument against legislative intrusion and for a limited 
number of investors.  “It is surely questionable,” Steady argued, “how far the 
Legislature may with propriety attempt to monopolize and engross bank stock 
to the state.”  He pointed to Spain as an example of what happened when the 
government reserves “the most valuable branches of trade to itself.”  [Spain’s] 
involvement in banking “damped the ardor of its subjects” to such a degree 
that they discouraged business and innovation.  On the other hand, Steady 
offered Great Britain as an example of how a government should handle the 
banking business.  “By giving to their citizens every possible facility and 
encouragement in their business, have enabled them to extend their trade far 
beyond any other people.”  Expressing a fundamental tenet of the Federalist 
Party, Steady declared that “it will not be denied that the institution of Banks in 
commercial countries have ever been, and will be beneficial by furnishing 
means to men of enterprise to extend and improve commerce, manufactures 
and agriculture.”  He further insisted that by opening the door for 
“speculators” to participate would “introduce confusion and disorder.”  He 
concluded that if the people felt they were shut out, they should “apply for 
institution of their own.”459   
A contributor to the Independent Chronicle offered a Republican reaction to the 
legislation.  “It’s simple,” the writer declared: “He who is not in the bank 
becomes dependent on him who is.”  “Bank incorporations are nothing more 
than squads of Aristocracy,” and they were “no more nor less than establishing 
by law a privilege to certain monied men to issue double the quantity of their 
capital, and if any demand should be made upon them, they are indemnified by 
paying 10 shillings in the pound.  This mill gives them this advantage, but in 
their monied negotiations every man who borrows is called upon to pay utmost                                                         
457 John Quincy Adams, Memoirs, I, 259. 
458 John Quincy Adams, Memoirs, I, 261. 
459 Columbian Centinel, February 9, 1803. 
 145 
farthing.”  He concluded: “the multiplicity of Banks increases the evil, as it 
brings forward a new phalanx of monied men to extend their pecuniary 
influence.”460  Just as the Federalists feared, Quincy Adams sided with the 
Republicans.  He objected to the bill because the stock was limited to select 
group of men and not available to the general public.  He also delivered a 
speech in opposition to the Bank bill, proposing that the subscription to the 
stock “should be open to all citizens of the Commonwealth.”  After his 
proposal was rejected, he voted against passage of the bill.461   
The banking bill aside, Quincy Adams wrote King updating him on the current 
state of political affairs in the United States.  Despite their attacks on Jefferson, 
the Federalist Party was, according to Quincy Adams, quickly losing ground 
throughout the country.  “The strength of the present administration is 
continually increasing,” he noted, and “it has obtained and preserves an 
irresistible preponderance in thirteen of the sixteen State legislatures, and the 
resistance in the three others scarcely maintains its ground.  In both houses of 
Congress the majority is already decisive, but at the ensuing Congress, will be 
much larger.”462  Despite their gains the Republicans were fearful that they 
could just as quickly lose their newfound strength, as “the leaders are all 
sensible how sandy a foundation it is.”463  Quincy Adams, however, was not so 
sure they should be so anxious, observing that “the concern of the 
Republicans, as they stile themselves, is the result of consciousness, rather than 
of real dangers.”  He candidly admitted, “the power of the [Jefferson] 
Administration rests upon the support of a much stronger majority of the 
people throughout the Union than the former administrations ever possessed 
since the first establishment of the Constitution.”  “Whatever the merits or 
demerits of the former administrations may have been,” Quincy Adams 
concluded, “there never was a system of measures more completely and 
irrevocably abandoned and rejected by the popular voice.  It never can and 
never will be revived.” “The only risk to which they are exposed is the 
shallowness of their waters.”464  
Despite Quincy Adams’ gloomy prediction as to the Federalists’ future on 
February 22, 1804, Rufus King accepted his party’s nomination as the 
Federalist candidate for Vice President, with General Charles Cotesworth 
Pinckney as the nominee for President.  Hamilton had previously suggested to                                                         
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King that he become a candidate for governor of New York in 1804 in order to 
prevent the election of Aaron Burr.  Hamilton felt King would be an ideal 
candidate for the Federalists to rally behind because he had been away “during 
the time in which party animosities have become matured and fixed.”465  King 
had become the toast of the town in Federalist circles.  Indeed, Henry Adams 
would later remark that “of all Federalist leaders, moderate and extreme, Rufus 
King, who had recently returned from London, stood highest in the confidence 
of his party.”466    
One of the reasons King was so popular, particularly among moderates, was 
that he had the political stature to offset the influence of High Federalists, like 
Timothy Pickering.  Following the Louisiana Purchase, which had been 
opposed by the Federalists because of their fear that New England was being 
shut out of power at the hands of the Southern slave states, Pickering and other 
Federalist leaders first began floating the idea of New England separating from 
the rest of the Union.  The first mention of the proposal came in a letter from 
Pickering.  Moderate Federalist leaders like Hamilton and King, however, were 
opposed to the idea.467  Similarly, King’s friend George Cabot expressed his 
opposition to the proposal in a letter to King almost immediately after the idea 
was first discussed: 
An experiment has been suggested by some of your friends to which I 
object this it is impracticable, and, if practicable, would be ineffectual.  
The thing proposed is obvious and natural, but it would be thought too 
bold and would be fatal to the advocates as public men: yet the time may 
soon come, when it will be demanded by the people of the N. & East, 
and then it will unavoidably take place.  I am not satisfied that the thing 
itself is to be desired.  My habitual opinions have been always strongly 
against it and I don’t’ see in the present mismanagement motives for 
changing my opinion.468 
Though there is no evidence that King ever responded to Cabot’s letter, he did 
verbally express his opposition to the plan to other Federalist leaders.  During a 
trip from Washington to Massachusetts in the April 1804, John Quincy Adams 
was detained for several days in New York, where he spent a great deal of time 
with King.  Quincy Adams remarked that on April 8th, as he entered the King’s 
home, he saw Pickering sitting with him in the library.  After Pickering left,                                                         
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King said to Quincy Adams: “Colonel Pickering has been talking to me about a 
project they have for a separation of the States and a Northern Confederacy.”  
Since Quincy Adams had heard talk of the proposal and was very much against 
it, he must have been pleased to hear King say “I disapprove entirely of the 
project; and so, I am happy to tell you, does General Hamilton.”469  
King again played the part of the calm, moderate statesman, and helped temper 
the feelings of his more conservative colleagues.  Indeed, respected by party 
extremists as well as party moderates, King would play a critical role in 
Federalist Party politics for many years to come.  In the spring of 1804, he and 
his party had to contend with the fact that not only was the country being led 
by the Virginians and their Jacobin followers, but that Jefferson was continuing 
to grow stronger.  King spent much of the summer of 1804 at the Waltham 
home of Mr. & Mrs. Gore, who had recently returned home from London.470  
C. Governor James Sullivan 
Republican electoral success at the national level in the early 1800s eventually 
filtered down to the Federalist stronghold of Massachusetts.  The election of 
James Sullivan as governor of the Commonwealth would be the fruition of his 
lifelong effort to articulate and implement a republican ideology.  As the 
Chronicle declared, “Judge Sullivan has given as great proof of attachment to a 
republican government and republican principles as any other man in the 
state.”  In particular, he would seek to involve more people in the electoral 
process.  Since the drafting of the state constitution in 1780, Sullivan had been 
to expand the franchise, and provide equal access to opportunity.  He was, his 
supporters insisted, “a man of the people,” and “not the favorite of a Boston 
dictatorial faction.” 471  Sullivan spoke for those who believed that government 
should provide equal opportunities to all its citizens and not to create wealth or 
special privilege to any specific group of people.  In addition, he would 
embrace the concept of nationhood and spoke of the need for a “uniformity of 
sentiments” throughout the states, with the president serving as the central 
voice of authority.  Efforts to achieve this national consensus were challenged, 
however, by the resumption of war between Britain and France and by 
continued British aggression against American shipping and American seamen.  
In the presidential election of 1804, Thomas Jefferson was easily re-elected, 
defeating Federalists Charles Pinckney and Rufus King and carrying every state                                                         
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in the union except Delaware and Connecticut.  Jefferson received 162 out of a 
possible 176 electoral votes.  President Jefferson’s popularity baffled 
Christopher Gore.  He couldn’t understand how the country could turn its 
back on the Federalist Party, which had established a new government and 
equipped it with “sound finances, adequate defense, and the respect of foreign 
nations.”472  Gore’s feelings to the contrary, the extent of Jefferson’s victory 
illustrated that the Republican Party had struck a chord with the American 
people, while Gore and his Federalist brethren were left to come to terms with 
a changing political landscape. 
Disappointed Federalists throughout the country found it difficult to accept the 
fact that the Republicans had taken such a firm control of the government.  
Not only had the Republicans retained the White House, but they had 
expanded their majority in Congress.  Republicans controlled 116 seats out of 
141 in the House of Representatives, and 27 seats in the Senate, compared to 
only seven for the Federalists.  Two of the seven Federalist seats in the senate 
in 1804 were occupied by Massachusetts men, John Quincy Adams and 
Timothy Pickering.   
Pickering confided in King and sought to keep him up to date on all matters 
before Congress.  If the Republican Party continued to “progress in the course 
they have rapidly traveled two years past, and before Mr. Jefferson’s second 
presidency expires,” Pickering wrote, “I shall not be surprised, if I live so long, 
to see bloody victims of their ambition, inexorable malice and revenge.”473  
Pickering knew his own party was in trouble nationally, and believed that it was 
actually weaker than it appeared.  Particularly disconcerting to Pickering was 
the fact that the party was “crumbling away in New England.”474  In their 
pessimism, Pickering and other conservative Federalists continued to speak of 
the possibility of forming a new federation, with New England and possibly 
New York separating from the rest of the country.  Moderate Federalists like 
King and Quincy Adams bristled at such suggestions, further highlighting the 
gulf that existed within Federalist ranks.475  
One reason for Pickering and Kings close relationship was that they shared a 
mutual admiration of Great Britain.  Writing to Pickering after hearing news of 
the death of Pitt, King observed: “As no nation is more reasonable, more 
docile, more loyal than England, when wisely governed, so none has great                                                         
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firmness, longer patience, nor higher courage than our ancestors.”  He 
concluded that “I feel a strong presentment and hope that the high spirit and 
ancient glory of the Nation will enable them to contend against, & finally to 
triumph over their gigantic adversary [France].”476  These comments to 
Pickering, written in March, 1806, represented the strongest expression of 
support for Britain and denunciation of France that can be found in King’s 
correspondence.  Though he had in the years after the Revolution always 
admired Britain, never had he expressed such a strong personal attachment to 
the nation that continued to threaten American political and economic 
interests.  Indeed, it is noteworthy that at a time when the British were seizing 
American vessels at an alarming rate, resulting in heightened tensions between 
the United States and Britain, King would express such strong sentiments in 
support of the English.  Given Britain’s continued aggression against American 
shipping and American seamen, there is little evidence to support King’s 
assessment that Britain was being reasonable, docile or loyal to the United 
States.  Nonetheless, Pickering wrote back a few weeks later, agreeing 
wholeheartedly with King’s sentiments and adding that France was indeed the 
world’s adversary.477  This notable shift in tone by King preceded a period of 
heightened political activity on his part.  
With the departure of such luminaries as Washington, Hamilton and Adams 
from the national scene, the identity of the Federalist Party changed 
dramatically.  Without the giants of the Revolution to lead them, Federalist 
leaders were now obliged to defend policies that were increasingly at odds with 
a growing number of Americans.  Pinkney argued that “having neither leaders 
of commanding stature nor a constructive program of wide appeal and refusing 
to flatter the ordinary voter whose opinions they distrusted, the Federalists 
shrank to a minority and admitted their inability ‘to conquer the vast body that 
keeps the field.’”478  
In addition to their electoral defeats at the national level, Federalists were 
growing increasingly alarmed at the prospect of losing power and influence in 
Massachusetts.  “We are now in the fever heat of our annual Election,” Gore 
wrote in the spring of 1806, “and such are the charges against [James] Sullivan, 
& so well supported, that no man who has the least regard to property or 
reputation, one would think could vote for him; and yet he will probably have 
more than 30,000 votes.”479  In order to help benefit the ‘cause of order,’ Gore                                                         
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returned to the Massachusetts General Court.  He though “men of 
consideration should not resign the government into the hands of a different 
class.”  This one line, more than any other, reflected Gore’s political 
philosophy.  He firmly believed men of wealth had a responsibility to assume 
the reigns of government, and that those of lesser means were not qualified to 
lead. Therefore, Gore called upon his fellow Federalists stand by “our friends 
& our country in the hour of peril, … when our advice & experience may be of 
use to them and ourselves.”480  While this view may have been in keeping with 
‘classical republicanism,’ that the wise and well to do should govern, it no 
longer fit reality.  
The ‘fever heat’ to which Gore referred in the spring to describe the political 
climate in Massachusetts climbed even higher in the hot months of the 
summer.  On August 4, 1806, a contributor to the Chronicle expressed his 
disgust for the Federalists of Boston. “Federalism [is] the curse of our 
country,” he declared.  They “have become the greatest nuisance in society, 
[because] they are constantly endeavoring to injure the country in every foreign 
and domestic concern.”  In particular, he complained, “the Federal papers are 
the vehicles of defamation against the administration, and undermining the 
efforts of American ministers abroad.”  Because of these actions, he insisted, 
“they are CONSPIRATORS against the happiness, peace and prosperity of the 
United States.”  He went on to compare the Boston Federalists to the Tories of 
the Revolutionary period, noting that they were furnishing “the enemy with 
every intelligence.”  Comparing the Hutchinson and Oliver ‘junto’ of pre-war 
Massachusetts to the existing ‘federal junto’ in Boston, the writer concluded 
that “the Federalists, if possible, are worse than the Tories, for they [Tories] 
were avowed enemies, but the former are pretended friends, though in reality 
the most desperate and implacable foes.”481  On the same day this entry 
appeared, two other “notices,” written by staunch partisans, one in the 
Federalist leaning Centinel and the other in the Republican leaning Chronicle, 
precipitated a senseless act of violence.   
Benjamin Austin, a wealthy Republican who for many years denounced the 
Federalist ruling class, was considered by many as “ill tempered and irascible.”  
He had written numerous anti-lawyer articles several years earlier under the 
name Honestus.  Thomas Selfridge was a Federalist lawyer, who, by all accounts, 
was just as loud and abusive towards Republicans as Austin was towards 
Federalists.  Selfridge had been hired to collect from Austin and his Republican                                                         
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committee a debt that allegedly arose from a Fourth of July celebration.  After 
Austin accused Selfridge of initiating the suit to embarrass the Republicans, 
Selfridge announced in the Boston Gazette that Austin was “a coward, a liar and a 
scoundrel.”482  Having been made aware of what Selfridge was posting, Austin 
responded in the Independent Chronicle on the same day, declaring that Selfridge 
was being ‘insolent and false’ in his accusation, and that if anyone was 
“desirous to know the facts on which his impertinence is founded,” he would 
be pleased to provide the information.483  Had the matter ended there, it would 
have been little different from most petty political disputes.  Unfortunately for 
both parties, it didn’t end there.   
Charles Austin, the eighteen-year old son of Benjamin, had just returned home 
from Harvard when he decided to confront Selfridge.  He allegedly obtained a 
large hickory stick, stood next to a barbershop on Boston’s State Street and 
waited for the Federalist lawyer to walk past.  Selfridge, who had been warned 
of the young man’s intentions, brought a loaded gun with him as he walked 
down the street that afternoon.  As Selfridge walked past the building, Austin 
stepped out in front of him.  After words were exchanged, Austin may or may 
not have struck Selfridge with the stick, before Selfridge shot him in the chest.  
After a brief struggle, as later described by James Sullivan, young Austin “soon 
grew weaker and he sank dying on the pavement.484 
The response to the incident was loud and immediate, as Bostonians quickly 
divided along party lines.  Republicans accused Selfridge of murder, and alleged 
that young Austin had not even struck him once before being shot.  After 
expressing outrage at the death of the young Harvard student, the Chronicle 
reported: “On Monday last, T.O. Selfrigde, a lawyer of this town, about 34 
years of age, was committed by Justice Gorham, for [Austin’s] MURDER, 
perpetrated on the same day, a little after one o’clock.”  They added “we do not 
mean to anticipate a trial, which will be more affecting and interesting than any 
one which has taken place in our country; but the public anxiety demands a 
statement of this unhappy affair, so far as it can be given with propriety.”  The 
Chronicle referred to a coroner’s jury findings calling for “an inquest for 
murder.”  The paper also quoted witnesses who testified that less than one 
minute after the two men met on the street, Selfridge removed a pistol from his 
side pocket “and discharge it upon Austin.”  It was only at that point, witnesses 
testified, that Austin first struck Selfridge with his stick.  Selfridge then threw 
his gun at Austin’s head and grabbed the stick from Austin’s hand.  According                                                         
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to witnesses, “Selfridge beat him with the stick and continued to beat him until 
some persons came up, and with great force prevented his proceeding 
further.”485  
The town’s Federalist leaning papers made no reference to the coroner’s jury or 
the testimony of the witnesses.  In its “Mortuary Notice” for Austin, the Boston 
Gazette reported: “The particulars of this unfortunate and melancholy affair are 
so variously represented by contradictory reports that were it in any respect 
proper, it would be impossible for us to give any correct detail.”486  The Centinel 
included the same information as the Gazette, adding “we merely understand 
that a dispute of a personal nature had taken place between the father of the 
young gentleman deceased, and Mr. Selfridge.”487  The Gazette described the 
funeral procession, moving from the Austin family home on Cambridge Street, 
to the Chapel Burial Ground, preceded by the president, faculty, and senior 
class of Harvard University.488  
Gore wrote to King on August 5, 1806, the day after the incident.  After setting 
forth the facts as he understood them, he suggested that perhaps the people 
might “endeavor … to make this a Party Affair,” but that he thought the 
matter would pass once the “first passions have subsided.”  Gore was correct 
in the first instance and wrong in the second. Gore reported to King:   
Sullivan and Austin are endeavoring to avail themselves of the death of 
the son of the latter to blacken the Federalists and promote their 
political views, but I cannot permit myself to doubt that when a public 
trial shall disclose every fact of the transaction, which led to the event, 
every man will be satisfied, that it was the individual meanness, and base 
lying spirit of old Austin, with respect to Selfridges professional conduct, 
wherein politics or party were no way interested, that produced the 
quarrel between these two; and to the same false & dastardly temper of 
old Austin, joined to a malignant desire of revenge at any expense, but 
his own personal safety, will be imputed the destruction of his son.489  
The Chronicle’s account differed from Gore’s.  The paper reported that during a 
July 4th celebration on the Taunton Green, a large number of Federalists had 
gathered to sing songs and make toasts abusing Republicans in general and 
James Sullivan in particular.  Sullivan had been the Republican candidate for                                                         
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governor in 1806 and was presumed to be the Republican standard bearer in 
1807 as well.  “Is it possible,” the Chronicle decried, “that such a mass of 
unqualified scurrility should ever be admitted on a public occasion.”490   
Also in July, a contributor to the Chronicle gave “A Description of Federalism.”  
The maxim of Federalists “is that the people are incapable of maintaining an 
elective republic, and cannot exist as a sovereign power without an hereditary 
executive, and one branch of a legislature independent of the people.  The 
English government (for England has no constitution) is the standard of 
political perfection for them” and “nonconformity is an unpardonable crime.”  
He concluded “Federalism may be considered as another name for the love of 
monarchy.”491   
A few weeks later, the Chronicle ‘s editor opined, “There is something insolent 
and audaciously impudent,” about the recent Federalists’ exclamations.  “Their 
papers are devoted to the interest of the English government, and to the ruin 
of the U.S.”  The goal of the Federalists was to “provoke a war between the 
U.S. and enemies of England, … to force us into alliance with Great Britain, to 
fight her battles with all the world.”492   
The Chronicle argued the Federalist press was downplaying the Austin-Selfridge 
incident.  “Party spirit may operate to give silent countenance to inferior 
events, but when murder stalks predominant in places of such mutual resort, it 
becomes the duty of the whole community to portray it in all its horrors.”  In 
response to the suggestion that Selfridge was merely protecting himself, the 
Chronicle asked “why has an unfortunate young man, whose life has paid the 
forfeit of antagonist, after repeated warnings of his danger, barbarously 
fracturing the skull of his opponent.  Talk no more of honor or integrity; and 
above all, stop your mouths as to silence on the murder.”493  
Because the case was seen as a test of strength between the two parties, 
accusations and denunciations were exchanged between Federalists and 
Republicans in the months leading up to the trial.  The grand jury charged 
Selfridge with manslaughter, contrary to the initial finding of the coroner’s jury.  
The legal teams on both sides of the case reflected the partisan nature of the 
trial.  The prosecutors in the case were Republicans, Solicitor General Daniel 
Davis and Attorney General Sullivan.  Two Federalists, Samuel Dexter and 
Gore defended Selfridge.  As if the trial needed any further drama, the jury                                                         
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foreman was Revolutionary War hero, and ardent Federalist, Colonel Paul 
Revere.  The presiding judge, Isaac Parker, was also a Federalist.494   
The trial of Selfridge on the charge of manslaughter took place in December 
1806.  Gore and Dexter presented a case built around the fact that Selfridge 
feared for his life.  Sullivan and Davis were forced to focus primarily on the 
“dangers of permitting a man to take the law into his own hands.”495  Sullivan 
took the lead in the case against Selfridge, despite the fact that one of his 
children recently had died.  After the witnesses had been heard and the cases 
presented, Sullivan gave a lengthy and wide ranging closing argument.  The 
closing arguments of the two sides revealed some of the underlying differences 
between the Republican and Federalist Parties. 
Sullivan noted the large crowd that had gathered to observe the proceedings. 
“The insinuation respecting the crowd in this court-room glances at party 
spirit,” he began. But, he added, “It is of no consequence who are the parties, 
or what the facts on which the issue rests, otherwise than to call into 
examination the principles which are to guide you in your verdict.”  Sullivan 
reminded the jurors that “the principles on which the cause it to be tried must 
stand or fall by themselves, without any regard to the parties.”  In a clear 
allusion, however, to the difference between the two parties, as he viewed 
them, Sullivan suggested that “a monarchy and aristocracy, mixed together to 
form a government, support a state of servile dependence, where the hopes of 
favor and interest exclude the idea of reward for merit, bring patriotism and 
public virtue into base contempt, and render fraud, deceit and cunning, the 
insolent claimants of the rights of truth, talents and integrity.”  “It is in a free 
government alone,” Sullivan told he jury, “that principles, founded in the 
nature of social virtue, can claim the decision of what is right between man and 
man, between the individual and civil society, without the corruptions arising 
from the destruction or irregularity of rights and privileges from party 
distinction.”  He hoped to undercut the assumption that Selfridge’s party 
affiliation and social status would stand in his favor with the jury.  He asked for 
example, what would be their verdict if the defendant had been the victim.  He 
urged the jury to disregard “the misconduct of the newspapers, in publishing 
matters relative to a trial while it is pending.”496  
During his argument, Sullivan also made reference to his adversary, Gore.  In 
his continued effort to paint the defendant, and even the defense team, as                                                         
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members of a presumptuous ruling class who expected to be treated differently, 
Sullivan said that Gore spoke “with an elegance of manner and strength of 
language peculiar to himself.”  He said he would “imitate him [Gore] in some 
degree, but will address you as all entertaining opinions similar to my own.”  
Sullivan returned again and again to party differences and tried to paint the jury 
into a corner.  “If you prefer our democratic institutions to a monarchy, an 
aristocracy, or a mixed government, we all think alike.  Is there one of you who 
would alter our system of jurisprudence or relinquish the inestimable right of 
trial by trial.”497  Sullivan tried to convince the jury that it was their duty, as 
good republicans, not to accept the unstated assumption by some that Selfridge 
was a ‘gentleman’ and therefore deserving of additional protection.  By 
convicting Selfridge, Sullivan intimated, the jury would reject such aristocratic, 
non-republican, assumptions. 
For the defense, Dexter focused on the fact that the deceased was “young, 
athletic, active and violent,” while the defendant was “feeble and incapable of 
resisting him.”  After presenting a powerful argument in support of the claim 
of self-defense, he then pursued a curious, and in Sullivan’s mind, predictable 
course.  He argued that the defendant believed that: 
from the violence of his [Austin’s] passion, he would destroy me: by 
beating me he must disgrace me, [and that] this alone destroys all my 
prospects, all my happiness, and all my usefulness.  Where shall I fly 
when thus rendered contemptible? Shall I go abroad?  Every one will 
point at me the finger of scorn.  Shall I go home?  My children – I have 
taught them to shrink from dishonor.498   
Rather than rely exclusively on the argument that Selfridge was in fear for his 
life, the defense instead suggested that he was also concerned about his honor.  
Sullivan pounced on the word ‘dishonor’ as a possible justification for killing 
another man, suggesting that it was a presumed excuse for a certain class of 
privileged people:   
Are there men, nay, a multitude of men, who have a natural right, from 
their feelings, from their high sense of honor, to defend themselves 
when and where others of less feeling may not?  Is it the voice of nature, 
which makes this distinction?  Is this sense of honor, are these feelings, a 
privileged exception to certain individuals which raises them above the 
rules of the gospel….. Is there any distinction between the would be                                                         
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nobleman and the chimney sweep? .. for we are to suppose, from the 
distinction taken by the defendant’s counsel, that these are the Alpha 
and Omega, the head and the tail of the links that form civilized 
society.499  
Sullivan then asked: “why are duels criminal, if the men who engage in them 
have this privilege of maintaining their own honor.”500  
After the arguments were made, Judge Parker instructed the jury that if 
Selfridge “had no view but to defend his life, … and not purposely throw 
himself in the way of the conflict, … then the killing was justifiable homicide.”  
Though there is disagreement in the record as to the political affiliation of the 
jurors, what is known is that it took only fifteen minutes for them to come 
back with a verdict of acquittal.501  
Outraged Republicans compared the affair to the Boston Massacre and 
promptly nominated Sullivan for governor.  “As it respects Mr. Sullivan’s 
political character,” the Chronicle wrote, “his opinions and manners are 
congenial with the democratic republican constitutions of the national and state 
governments; and he is attached to the present happy and prosperous 
administration of Mr. Jefferson.  These excellent traits are not to be found in 
the character of [Federalist] Governor Strong,” who was “consequently, unfit 
to be the Governor of this Republican State.”502  The Republican strategy in 
1807 was clearly to identify Sullivan with the Jefferson administration.  The 
editor and contributors to the Chronicle invariably invoked the name of the 
popular president as a reason to support Sullivan’s candidacy.  Under the 
headline announcing the unanimous selection of Sullivan as the Republican 
candidate for governor, the editor observed that it was his “wish to preserve a 
unity of sentiment in the administration of this Commonwealth with that of the 
union.”  As he would many times, Sullivan also voiced support for “the 
virtuous administration of the Federal Government under the guidance of 
Jefferson.”503  
In addition to praising Jefferson and Sullivan, the Chronicle consistently and 
stridently attacked the Federalists.  Under its regular feature entitled “Truth its 
Guide, Liberty its Object,” the Chronicle sought to demonize the Federalists and 
to paint them as treasonous opportunists.  In the January 15th installment, the                                                         
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writer, identified as Franklin declared: “There is a party in this country who call 
themselves Federalist.  That party is headed and urged on by leaders who are 
restless as the sea, cruel as the most fierce anger, and relentless as the grave.  
These leaders command their own and their party’s wealth, and which, in 
Massachusetts, by an artful change in the form of riches, from individual and 
corporate possessions, embraces, nearly, the wealth of the whole state.”  
Furthermore, he charged, these “disorganizing, traitorous [Federalist] leaders 
induce their deceived party to maintain a great number of gazettes.”  In 
Federalist newspapers, “the truth, in regard to the neutral and real interest of 
the country, can never be admitted.  Slanders against the rulers of the nation, 
against the administration of government, and against foreign powers, fill half 
the columns.  The other half is devoted to eulogies on the English government, 
her fleets and troops – with a manifest intention to disturb our neutral ground 
and to involve us as an ally of England in her European contests.” Franklin 
labeled Federalist connections to Britain, “Cunning, deceit, and hypocrisy, are 
the evil spirits by which the world in involved in misery.  Avarice, speculation, 
and swindling are their agents in the United States.”504    
The Centinel was no less strident in their attacks on Sullivan and the 
Republicans, warning the people of Massachusetts “the enemies of your liberty 
are straining every nerve and exciting every power in their hand, to impose on 
you a Governor whose tyranny has already been demonstrated.  See! See! They 
are caucusing over the Commonwealth; they are contriving to rend asunder 
your Constitution, the Magna Carta of your liberties.”505  One contributor from 
Portland compared Sullivan and the ‘democrats’ to “shallow animals” for the 
political tricks they were alleged to have played: “We laugh to scorn the 
miserable devils, who resort to paltry tricks to carry electioneering points,” 
whereas, “our [Federalist] policy is open an magnanimous, and must ultimately 
be crowned with triumph.”506 
The legitimate political differences that separated Strong and Sullivan in 1807 
tended to get lost in the increasingly harsh rhetoric, by both sides.  As election 
returns began to filter in, however, it soon became apparent that Sullivan was 
doing substantially better than he had the year before.  Shortly before all the 
votes were counted, the Centinel seemed to accept the inevitable.  Singling out 
the towns of Boston, Salem and Plymouth for their support of Strong, the 
paper added, “if Massachusetts is fated to fall, the world will say, they are 
innocent.”  Boston elected several Federalists’ state senators, including                                                         
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Christopher Gore.  With 3,146 votes, Gore received the second highest 
number of votes in a field of ten candidates.507  
After years of frustration, the Chronicle gleefully reported on April 20, 1807, 
“We can now, we think, with safety announce to our friends and the public, the 
late great and important election.  It has arrived as nearly as possible to a 
certainty that the Hon. James Sullivan is elected Governor, and the Hon. Levi 
Lincoln, Lieutenant Governor of this Commonwealth, by a majority of 
thousands.”  They added that the Republicans had been “determined to effect 
her reformation,” and persevered, despite being “confronted by wealth and 
influence,” of the Federalist Party.  A few days later, it was reported that 
Sullivan had defeated Strong, 41,092 votes to 36,809 respectively.508  
After it was clear that Sullivan had been elected governor, the Centinel noted 
simply “If Mr. Sullivan is proclaimed governor, we hope the democrats will 
learn to respect the constituted authority of the state – they have effected the 
change with zeal and every evil work; we hope they will bestow on the object 
of their choice, their confidence and esteem.”509  The Chronicle ignored the call 
for moderation, complaining that the Federalist press had  “outraged every 
moral and political principle to degrade” the new governor, and had 
“attempted to render him odious and detestable in the minds of his fellow 
citizens, in a way unparalleled in civilized society.”   “As Judge Sullivan has 
already experienced the full vengeance of federal outrage,” the Chronicle wrote, 
“he has nothing to fear from the malice of his enemies, nor nothing to expect 
from their friendship.  He never can do anything to please them, so far as to 
reconcile them to his administration.  As it is with President Jefferson, let him 
do what he will, the Federalists will never be satisfied.”510  As the weeks passed, 
the Chronicle continued to remind readers of past offenses against Sullivan.  One 
contributor, identified as Virgil, recollected that the Governor-Elect “has been 
insulted by the grossest misrepresentations, … these several years past, by the 
oligarchical party.”511  
For the first time since the retirement of Samuel Adams in 1797, the 
Republican Party in Massachusetts had won control of every branch of 
government.  Furthermore, with the election of Sullivan in Massachusetts, 
Republicans now reigned supreme in all of the states of New England, except 
Connecticut.  Four days after his election, Sullivan wrote to President Jefferson                                                         
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and discussed for the first time his belief in the importance of a central voice of 
authority to achieve a national consensus: 
I conceive that a uniformity of sentiments in matters of Government  
throughout the States is of great consequence.  This can never be 
affected unless there shall be a central point of communication and 
influence, to which the leading characters in the States can repair, as to a 
center of union and information.  You Sir ought to assume the trouble 
of being that center, that Governors of the several States, being 
Republicans, may communicate with you, and learn what general 
principles of policy will unite the nation.  This will consolidate the union, 
and enable as to appear as a nation, though we consist of many 
independent sovereign governments.512  
This national consensus or “uniformity of sentiments” of which Sullivan spoke 
represented the end of a long journey for a man, who, twenty years earlier, had 
warned of national intrusion into state interests.  Though he still spoke of 
“many independent sovereign governments,” the idea of a “central point of 
communication,” was not only appealing to the new governor, but essential.  
His embrace of centralization and consolidation would not have been 
surprising to his older colleagues, because it was reminiscent of his calls for the 
centralization of state finance in the 1770s and 1780s.  According to the 
governor, many of his Federalist opponents were “disorganizers,” fomenting 
discord, while defending only regional concerns and foreign powers, at the 
expense of national unity.  Indeed, words like “consolidate,” “centralize,” and 
“union” often appeared in his speeches and correspondence.  As for his 
election to the governor’s office, Sullivan believed he had been called by the 
people to head the state government “under the expectation that I would 
consolidate the commonwealth and strengthen the national union and 
energy.”513  The new governor of Massachusetts was in complete agreement 
with the president in his efforts to strengthen the union and speak with one 
voice.  
Governor Sullivan had no illusions that his new job was going to be an easy 
one, as the election had left in its wake a great deal of bitterness.  In his first 
public message, Governor Sullivan, determined to highlight the difference 
between his party and the Federalist Party, declaring “the power of government 
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must be exerted to give equal advantages to all its subjects; not to create wealth, 
or exclusive privileges to any.”514  
Gore lamented the fact that the party of “demagogues, democrats and 
disorganizers,” were now in control, and that the affairs of state would be “as 
bad as Vice & Folly can make them.”515  Writing to King later that year, Gore 
complained of having to deal with Sullivan and the Republican dominated 
legislature, and suggested that his chief function and that of his Federalist 
colleagues was to prevent the state from “doing evil.”  “My own 
determination,” he declared “was never to oppose his [Sullivan’s] measures, 
except bad, but individually never to make the smallest advance towards 
conciliating such a Wretch; and of course I never see him but on business.”  He 
concluded that Sullivan “has and will bend to his Council in everything, and 
that is composed of the most violent & revengeful class of Democrats.”516  
Like Sullivan, Gore was prone to use harsh rhetoric in both his public and 
private conversations.  He understood, however, that as a member of the 
minority party, he would have to bide his time. 
If Sullivan was bothered by snubs from Gore and other Federalists in the 
legislature, he never mentioned it.  He did, however, take great satisfaction in 
the defeat of the Massachusetts Federalists and was not above gloating.  After 
suggesting to Jefferson that he should make a tour of the northeast, he 
concluded with his assurance that the “Federalists are completely 
vanquished.”517  A few weeks later, in June 1807, Sullivan wrote to the 
president again citing his belief that the Federalists were completely defeated, 
and bragging that “they are fawning at my feet.”  He added “the serpent is 
torpid with cold, looking with but little hope for the return of the searching 
beams of federalism.”518     
Sullivan, like Gore, seemed to view the conflict between Republicans and 
Federalists as a death struggle, with the goal being the total destruction of the 
ideas for which the opposing party stood.  Indeed, more important than the 
destruction of the opposing party itself was the prospect of advancing their 
own ideology.  Sullivan’s Republican victory signaled the triumph of 
republicanism and the end of top-down authority and deference to a natural 
elite and presumed favored class.  Within a few months of Sullivan’s elevation,                                                         
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however, a foreign crisis occurred and the hopes of Federalists everywhere 
would be significantly renewed and the ideological struggle would continue.  
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Chapter VII 
Defining Battle 
The growth of Republicanism in Massachusetts was not only tied to the success 
of Governor Sullivan at the state level, but also to the success of the Jefferson 
administration in Washington.  Jefferson, like Washington and Adams before 
him, watched events in Europe with great trepidation, and, just as his 
predecessors had done, Jefferson did his best to pursue a policy of neutrality. 
As war between Great Britain and France began to escalate in early 1807, 
however, the president was forced to consider how renewed hostilities would 
impact American foreign policy and American trade.  Given the fact that 
United States merchants, including a very large number in Massachusetts, 
traded extensively with Britain as well as with several countries on the 
continent, including France, the ability of the United States to remain a neutral 
observer was going to be difficult.  Decisions made by Jefferson in the summer 
of 1807 would have lasting consequences in the Commonwealth of 
Massachusetts. 
A. Massachusetts and Jefferson’s Embargo 
On June 21, 1807, the American frigate Chesapeake, on a routine patrol, was 
attacked by the British ship HMS Leopard.  Hailed by the Leopard, the captain of 
the Chesapeake, James Barron, assumed the British vessel merely wanted to 
deliver a simple communication, since the United States was not at war with 
Britain.  Consequently, Barron stopped the Chesapeake and permitted several 
British officers and sailors to board his ship.  The British officer in charge 
promptly demanded that Barron turn over four sailors whom he claimed were 
deserters from the British navy.  Barron refused.  As soon as the British 
officers were back on deck of the Leopard, they opened fire on the Chesapeake, 
killing three men and wounding eighteen.519  Because it had been unprepared to 
fight, the American vessel was forced to surrender and turn over the sailors.  
Once word of the attack and seizure reached home, Americans were furious. 
The actions of the British ship were in clear violation of international law, and 
Americans in every seaport were demanding vengeance, “and looked to the 
president for stern measures of retribution.”520  If American vessels and cargo 
were subject to British seizure, and her sailors subject to impressments, they 
asked, what would be next?  President Jefferson quickly understood the danger                                                         
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that confronted him.  In the war between Britain and France, America was 
caught in the middle, and neither of the two combatants would respect 
America’s rights as a neutral nation.  Meanwhile, in Massachusetts, Sullivan had 
been governor for less than one month. 
Public reaction was strong and swift.  In Boston, the Chronicle asked: “What will 
the British agents and tories say to this? … Will they talk to us again about a 
navy and fortifications, and lay the whole blame on us?... This is the 
government we are called on the admire, this is the power which our tories 
wish may conquer in Europe.”521  President Jefferson immediately issued a 
proclamation “requiring all armed vessels bearing commissions under the 
government of Great Britain, now within the harbors or waters of the United 
States, immediately and without any delay to depart from the same.”  He also 
forbade any intercourse with these ships and prohibited “all supplies and aid 
from being furnished to them.”522  Jefferson also directed Governor Sullivan 
and all governors to begin training and arming their state militia.  On July 10th, 
a large gathering of Republicans and moderate Federalists, including John 
Quincy Adams, gathered at the State House in Boston to formally protest the 
actions of the British, and to express outrage at the seizure of American sailors.  
After Elbridge Gerry was chosen to be moderator, the gathering resolved 
unanimously “that the late aggression committed by a British ship of war on a 
frigate of the United States, for the avowed purpose of taking from her by 
force a part of her crew, was a wanton outrage upon the persons and lives of 
our citizens, and a direct attack on our national sovereignty and independence.”  
The group also expressed their full support for President Jefferson and his 
request that all state governors train and equip their militia.  They added: “We 
are ready cheerfully to cooperate in any measures, however serious, which they 
[the government] may judge necessary for the safety and honor of our country, 
and will support them with our lives and fortunes.”523   
Conservative Federalists like Timothy Pickering refused to condemn the British 
for fear of an escalation in tension between the United States and Britain.  
Many moderate Federalists, however, did join Republicans in condemning 
Great Britain.524  Gore was not one of them.  Both the Chronicle and Centinel 
reported that on July 16th, between 1,500 – 2,000 people gathered for a Town 
Meeting at Faneuil Hall to formally protest the actions of the British.  A bi-
partisan committee was appointed to “draft suitable Resolutions” for Town                                                         
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Meeting consideration.  Two of the committee members nominated were John 
Quincy Adams and Christopher Gore.  It was reported that the Resolutions 
were “agreed to without division” and “universally accepted” by the Town 
Meeting.525  The evidence suggests, however, that despite being nominated to 
the bi-partisan committee, Gore did not participate in the proceedings, nor did 
he even attend the meeting.526  Gore historian, Helen Pinkney, contends that 
his refusal to attend the Boston Town Meeting “foreshadowed his alliance with 
the ultra-Conservative Federalists.”527  
King, in New York, was also desirous of seeing the matter resolved quickly, 
and suggested that both sides were at fault.  Writing to Gore in early September, 
1807, he said “I think the officers of both countries have done wrong; our 
Commodore was guilty of a military indecorum in engaging Seamen, knowing 
them to be deserters from the English ships of war.”528  If King had evidence 
to support this allegation, however, he never presented it.  Nonetheless, King, 
Gore, Pickering and other Federalist leaders were furious with Quincy Adams 
who had called upon his colleagues to stage a protest meeting.  They declined. 
As the weeks passed, both France and Britain were interfering with American 
shipping on an unprecedented scale.  It was becoming increasingly risky for the 
ship owners, and hazardous for the seamen, to travel from the United States to 
any foreign port.  Jefferson was faced with the most important decision of his 
presidency.  With American vessels and their cargo subject to seizure by both 
Britain and France, and with American sailors subject to impressment, he 
confronted a serious international crisis that would test Republican principles 
and ideals.  Recognizing first and foremost that American neutral rights had to 
be respected, Jefferson ignored the advice of some Federalists that the United 
States should do nothing, that it could afford such losses because American 
trade had grown so significantly during the previous five years.  As far as the 
president was concerned, however, the issue went far beyond profit and loss.  
The sovereignty of the United States was being challenged, and American 
citizens were being taken by force.  Besides, most Americans were demanding 
that some form of action be taken. 
Jefferson was reluctant to resort to military action for two reasons.  Firstly, the 
United States was not in a position, militarily, to defend its worldwide shipping.  
Secondly, resolving the conflict through war was not in keeping with                                                         
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Republican philosophy.  Determined, therefore, to avoid war, Jefferson had 
few options.  After all, if the United States resorted to war, they would be no 
better than the old world despots.529  Historian Forrest McDonald has argued 
that Jefferson and his followers had nobody but themselves to blame for the 
president’s lack of options.   
In their eagerness to retire the public debt, the Jeffersonians tried 
diligently to economize. Toward the end, they slashed military and naval 
appropriations so much as to render the United States incapable of 
defending itself – at a time when the Western world was at war.  They 
lucked out for the first few years, but “from 1803 onward, however, 
each turn of the international wheel was less favorable to the United 
States.530   
Indeed, the Americans lacked the strength to make even a token show of force 
against Britain.  As McDonald noted: “Thus in 1807, when both Britain and 
France forbade the United States to engage in international commerce except 
as tributaries to themselves, the embargo – a policy of pusillanimity and 
bungling, billed as a noble experiment in peaceful coercion – was the only 
course open to them.”531  On November 11, Britain issued an Order in 
Council, announcing that all vessels trading with France or its allies and their 
colonies would be subject to confiscation unless they first entered a British port 
and obtained a license for each voyage.  America had two choices, as far as the 
British were concerned; trade with and through Britain, or not trade at all.532  
Thomas Jefferson opted for the latter.  Acknowledging that the Non-
Intercourse Act of the year before had been a half measure at best, and that it 
was totally ineffective as an economic weapon, Jefferson believed that only a 
total embargo could force the European powers to respect American neutrality.   
Both houses of Congress quickly approved Jefferson’s plan. The Embargo Act 
of 1807, which took effect in the last week of December, 1807, “provided a self 
blockade of the United States’ international commerce, prohibiting American 
shipping to foreign ports and foreign shipping into American ports.”533  The 
only Federalist to support the measure in the Senate was Quincy Adams. The 
act was amended several times in the weeks and months ahead, adding more 
harsh penalties for violations, including the forfeiture of cargo and imposition 
of heavy fines.  Not only would an embargo protect American ships, cargo and                                                         
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crew, it would also, the president hoped, intensify economic pressure on Britain 
and France.  Jefferson believed that the European powers would, after awhile, 
be so desirous of resuming trade relations with the United States that they 
would acknowledge and respect American neutrality, and revoke the orders and 
decrees that had damaged their relations with the United States.  Economic 
pressure, the president insisted, though risky, would, in the long run, be the 
most effective weapon.  Meanwhile, the Jefferson administration continued 
using diplomatic channels to resolve the international crisis. 
While the Embargo Act may have been viewed favorably by most Americans 
shortly after its passage, Jefferson realized that the Embargo would likely have 
to stay in place for a long period of time, and that the patience of the people 
would be sorely tested.  Governor Sullivan of Massachusetts wrote the 
president on January 28, 1808, commending the national government for their 
wise, dignified and energetic measures “in relation to the violation of our 
neutral rights and more especially to the outrageous attack on the American 
frigate Chesapeake.”  He was pleased to inform Jefferson that “we consider the 
imposing of the Embargo a wise and highly expedient measure.” Sullivan wrote 
the president again on February 8th and referred to a resolution from the 
Massachusetts legislature commending the President and his administration.  
He also noted that Jefferson received all the electors in Massachusetts in his last 
election [1804], and suggested he would be supported again if he ran for 
another term.534  
For the Federalists, however, the Embargo was seen differently.  After hearing 
of the dramatic steps taken by the government, King sounded almost desperate 
in a letter to Gore.  Though he didn’t challenge the constitutionality of the 
Embargo, King was convinced that the measure was misguided and could very 
possibly lead to war: “The embargo has excited the most profound alarm, and 
will here [New York] occasion real and extended distress,” he began.  “I have 
never seen so much anxiety and indecision in men of all descriptions.”  He 
ended with a plea for action, because “facts of immense importance, and of the 
most suspicious nature, but of which the country are utterly ignorant, are 
believed to have taken place – a war with England must be prevented…”535  
King was not alone in his fear and anger.  Several conservative, or “High” 
Federalists, for example, including Senator Pickering, wasted no time in 
condemning the Embargo as outrageous and unconstitutional.  Seizing the 
opportunity to advance the Federalist cause, they also attacked the president                                                         
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personally, accusing him of being an agent of Napoleon.536  Pickering was 
particularly concerned at how the British would interpret the legislation.  He 
hoped they would not view it as an act of war, and instead realize that “though 
aimed directly against her, will do most injury to ourselves.”  Indeed, he added, 
Britain will soon be “smiling at the sufferings inflicted by the folly and 
wickedness of our idolized rulers,” and that they will be “content with the 
commerce of the world; of which we voluntarily give her the monopoly.”  
Insisting that Jefferson never intended to enter into a treaty of amity or 
commerce with Britain, for fear of what Napoleon would think, Pickering 
concluded that “the popular mass are dupes of his [Jefferson’s] imaginary 
virtues; while great majorities in both Houses repose a blind confidence in his 
supposed wisdom.”537  Federalist leaders everywhere were decidedly 
sympathetic to the British and disgusted with Jefferson.  
Governor Sullivan wrote to the president, expressing shock at the behavior of 
Federalist leaders.  He noted that several of them were “coming forward in the 
federal gazettes excusing and justifying the late English aggression,” and that 
several of the Federalist judges, who could not be removed, supported the 
British.  Sullivan assured the president, however, that he and other Republicans 
agreed with him on the issue of impressments, noting that “everyone agrees 
that we can never allow the British to man their navy from our citizens by 
coercion.”538  Support for the Embargo, however, would become increasingly 
tenuous in Massachusetts.  Indeed, though Jefferson knew he was asking 
Americans to make major sacrifices, it soon became apparent that the state 
most impacted by the Embargo would be that headed by Sullivan.  Indeed, at 
the time of the passage of the Embargo Act, there were more ships owned in 
Massachusetts than in any other state, and Massachusetts “ranked first in the 
country in registered tonnage, and it held four-fifths of the nation’s fishing 
fleet.”539  The Massachusetts economy relied extensively on foreign trade, and 
with foreign ports now closed to American vessels, the economic impact of the 
Embargo on Massachusetts was going to be tremendous.  In response to the 
charge that the Embargo seemed to violate the Republican ideals of 
decentralized power and economic freedom, the president appealed to national 
security and independence.540  
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Federalists like Pickering, saw something deeper in Jefferson’s thinking on the 
matter of the Embargo: “You know the hostility of Jefferson and Virginians 
and other Southern men, to our carrying trade.”  He asked whether Jefferson 
“would continue the Embargo to the destruction of the navigation of the 
northern states,” and whether the latter will “sit still with folded arms and 
submit to ruin.”541  King also remained convinced that the country was headed 
to ruin, and that England must be helped, not hindered, in her ongoing war 
with France: “If England sink, her fall will prove the grave of our liberties; 
believing this, as I most firmly do believe it, ought not the country to be 
alarmed at the conduct of the Executive, whose errors, or the indulgence of 
whose prejudices, may, & I fear will, prove the ruin of this country.”542  In a 
letter to Gore later that month, King reiterated his concerns about the 
embargo, but asked Gore not to mention his name to anyone on the subject.543  
Among those Federalists who took a leadership role in attacking the Embargo, 
none were more vocal than Gore and his good friend, Senator Pickering.  In a 
letter to King, Gore asked “whether the states to the East of the Delaware 
might not combine for the purpose of preventing a war with Great Britain,” 
and that “if this be probable, whether a convention of merchants might not be 
advantageously assembled to deliberate on their affairs, and the 
embarrassments they suffer in consequence of their being deprived of their 
accustomed business.”544  It would be more than six years before likeminded 
Federalists would come together at the Hartford Convention to consider steps 
to oppose another Republican president.  It was Pickering, however, who 
would take on the most visible and vocal role in the attacks on Jefferson and 
what they perceived as misguided policy.  In February, 1808, Pickering initiated 
a campaign to strengthen the Federalist Party in time for the coming elections 
with a withering assault on President Jefferson and his administration, using the 
Embargo as his chief weapon.  He began his campaign with an open letter to 
Governor Sullivan, denouncing the president and questioning his motives, and 
declaring his belief that Jefferson was being influenced by Napoleon.  He called 
upon Sullivan and the Massachusetts government to take action against the 
Embargo, calling for its nullification, and proposing that a convention of 
commercial states be called in order that they may make a coordinated and 
unified attack against the embargo and Republican foreign policy.545  
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Governor Sullivan refused to present the letter to the legislature, returning it 
instead, unopened, to its author.  Having read the letter previously in a 
newspaper, Sullivan penned his response to Pickering and suggested: “Your 
temper, urged to an extreme by your disappointment in not having your own 
opinion the rule of national measures over the majority of Congress, has 
carried you too far.”546  He insisted to Pickering that his letter was a “seditious, 
disorganizing production,” and that he was in no way obligated to present the 
letter to the legislature.  Sullivan declared: “The people of Massachusetts called 
me to the head of this state under the expectation that I should consolidate the 
commonwealth, and strengthen the national union and energy: I shall not, 
therefore, be made a tool of by you, for effecting directly opposite purposes.”  
He added: “If we are anything, we are a nation under the organization of the 
general government.  I will not waste time here to inquire whether that 
government is right in regard to the embargo or not.  No government is always 
right.  You may take it for granted, if you please, that the embargo act was an 
error, yet it was a constitutional act.”547  
Sullivan argued: “If the senators of Massachusetts, when they happen to be in a 
minority in Congress, can appeal to their state, why cannot Rhode Island, 
Connecticut, New Hampshire, and those of the other states do the same?  And 
where will this end but in an overthrow of the national government?”  In 
addition, he suggested: “If the legislature of Massachusetts could, on the 
communication of even both its senators, jointly made, by the governor, as 
their involuntary organ, control the national councils in regard to our concerns 
with foreign powers, why should not the legislatures of each of the other states 
do the same?”  Sullivan concluded with a request that this letter would close 
their correspondence, because “I have not time to waste in this way.  I can gain 
the end of my political year as governor without your aid; and as a private 
citizen I want no information from you.”548  
Pickering elected, however, to continue their correspondence.  Writing to 
Sullivan a month later, he vented his contempt for the governor and the 
Republicans.  He accused Sullivan and his colleagues of having “blind 
confidence” in Jefferson, and that they had neglected to ask the difficult 
questions when the Embargo was first enacted.  He didn’t limit his criticism to 
Republicans.  Indeed, “when the people of Massachusetts see a man Mr. 
[Quincy] Adams acknowledged abilities and learning advancing such 
sentiments; when they see a man of his knowledge of the nature of all                                                         
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governments, and of his intimate acquaintance with our own free republican 
government, and of the rights and duties of the legislature; especially of their 
right and duty to consider, to deliberate, and according to their own judgment, 
independently of executive pleasure, to decide on every public measure,… 
when I say, the people of Massachusetts see this, will they wonder if a majority 
in Congress should be overwhelmed by the authority of the executive 
recommendation?”549  
Pickering took particular exception to Sullivan’s charge that his letter was 
“seditious, and disorganizing, and tending to excite rebellion.”  He suggested to 
the governor that he could produce letters from “statesmen and lawyers of the 
first distinction in the United States who have honored me with their 
approbation and thanks.”550  Sullivan must certainly have struck a chord with 
Pickering, for the senator proceeded to give a year by year history of his 
political life, from Lexington and Concord, when he marched with the local 
militia, to 1791 when President Washington appointed him Post-Master 
General.  He identified the great men he had known and the friendship and 
confidences they shared as a defense to the charge that he was seeking to 
destroy the union.551      
While Governor Sullivan may not have been pleased with Pickering’s actions, 
Gore applauded the senator’s efforts and hoped that it “would arouse our 
people from their sleep, which really appears like the sleep of death.”  To 
people like Gore, the president’s policies were a “deliberate attack upon 
Federalist wealth and power.”  Gore and Pickering made sure that copies of the 
letter were distributed throughout the state.552  Pickering also held several 
meetings with the special British envoy to the United States, George Rose, and 
proposed the formation of a pro-British party in New England.  Incredibly, he 
even encouraged Rose to urge that Britain continue taking a hard line against 
the United States.  Pickering was convinced that if pushed, the Jeffersonian 
Republicans would be forced to take even more extreme measures to enforce 
the Embargo, and that such action would be political suicide.553  
Continued British aggression against American shipping, however, angered 
most Americans and quieted many critics of the Embargo.  In addition, some 
Federalists supported the measure, including William Gray, one of the                                                         
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wealthiest merchants in the country.554  The most prominent Federalist 
politician who supported the president, however, was Senator John Quincy 
Adams.  Quincy Adams argued that the Embargo was “an experiment to see 
how far the Government might calculate upon the support of the people for 
the maintenance of their own rights.”555  A few weeks before the Massachusetts 
state elections in 1808, Quincy Adams wrote a long and detailed letter to the 
Massachusetts Senate President, and staunch Federalist, Harrison Gray Otis, 
stating his disgust over Pickering’s letter and his support for the Embargo.  
After stating that millions of dollars worth of American property were already 
detained in British hands, he suggested “tenfold as many millions of the same 
property would have been at this moment in the same predicament, had they 
not been saved from exposure to it by the embargo.”556  He added that Britain’s 
Orders of Council: 
strike at the root of our independence, [and that] they assume the 
principle that we shall have no commerce in time of war, but with her 
dominion, and as tributaries to her.  The exclusive confinement of 
commerce to the mother country, is the great principle of the modern 
colonial system; and should we by a dereliction of our rights at this 
momentous stride of encroachment surrender our commercial freedom 
without a struggle, Britain has but a single step more to take, and she 
brings us back to the stamp act and the tea tax.557    
Adams argued that “the wisdom of the embargo is a question of great, but 
transient magnitude, and omission sacrifices no national right.  Mr. Pickering’s 
object [in his pamphlet] was to dissuade the nation from a war with England, 
into which he suspected the administration was plunging us, under French 
compulsion.  But the tendency of his pamphlet is to reconcile the nation, or at 
least the commercial states, to the servitude of British protection, and war with 
all the rest of Europe.”558 
Quincy Adams couldn’t believe or abide what his colleague, Senator Pickering, 
was proposing.  “Proceeding from a Senator of the United States, specially 
charged as a member of the executive with the maintenance of the nation’s 
rights, against foreign powers, and at a moment extremely critical of pending 
negotiation upon all the points thus delineated, this formal abandonment of the 
American cause, this summons of unconditional surrender to the pretensions                                                         
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of our antagonist, is in my mind highly alarming.”  According to Quincy 
Adams, Pickering was simply coddling the British to win their protection for 
American commerce.559  
Sounding more like Governor Sullivan and other Republicans on the issue of 
impressments, Quincy Adams added: “I cannot stay to account for the wonder, 
why, poor, and ignorant and friendless as most of them [sailors] are, the voice 
of their complaints is so seldom heard in the great navigating states.”560  
Insisting that he was no apologist for France or Spain, Adams added that “I 
have no national partialities; no national attachments but to my own country.  I 
shall never undertake to justify or to palliate the insults or injuries of any 
foreign power to that country which is dearer to me than life.”561 
In his discussion of the source of the problem, Quincy Adams referred to two 
political groups in England.  The first group was “the liberal party,” who were 
“reconciled to our independence; and though extremely tenacious of every 
right of their own country, are systematically disposed to preserve peace with 
the United States.”  The other group, he observed, were the opponents to the 
liberals, who “harbor sentiments of a very different description.” According to 
Quincy Adams, “their system is coercion.  Their object the recovery of their 
lost dominion in North America.  This party now stands in high power.”562  He 
believed that it was their purpose to “force us into war with them or with their 
enemies; to leave us only the bitter alternative of their vengeance or their 
protection.”563  
In response to Pickering’s charge that Jefferson was attempting to bring the 
United States into a war, Quincy Adams insisted that “the suspicions of a 
design in our administration to plunge us into war with Britain, I never have 
shared,” he said.  “Everything that can distinguish a state of national freedom 
from a state of national vassalage, is to be surrendered at discretion.”564  Quincy 
Adams added:  
If she [Britain] issues orders of universal plunder upon our commerce, 
are we not to withhold it from her grasp?  …. For what purpose are we 
required to make this sacrifice of every thing than can give value to the 
name of freemen, this abandonment of the very right of self-                                                        
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preservation?  Is it to avoid war?  Alas! Sir, it does not offer even this 
plausible plea for pusillanimity.  For as submission would make us to all 
substantial purposes British colonies, her enemies would unquestionably 
treat us as such, and after degrading ourselves into voluntary servitude to 
escape a war with her, we should incur inevitable war with all her 
enemies, and be doomed to share the destinies of her conflict with a 
world in arms.565  
Quincy Adams ended his letter with the observation that “If we must fall, let us 
fall, freemen.  If we must perish, let it be in defense of our RIGHTS.”566 
Though his defense of Jefferson and challenge to Pickering was well received 
throughout the country, the Federalists were furious and would never trust him 
again. 
 B. Massachusetts Federalists Fight Back  
In the weeks leading up to the state election of 1808, Governor Sullivan 
remained optimistic that the Republicans would do well.  Writing to President 
Jefferson on April 5th, the governor said the “Republicans seem assured of 
success, and their enemies despair,” adding however, that “the deep laid plot of 
Pickering’s letter, added to the Embargo, gave them fresh confidence, and 
uncommon impudence.”  Indeed, he said, “they come out, … openly and 
avowedly upon the position of a dissolution of the national government, and a 
separation of the Northern from the Southern States.”567  
Gore’s hope that Pickering’s letter would arouse the people in Massachusetts 
from their sleep at election time was justified.  Pickering’s letter, copies of 
which had been distributed throughout the commonwealth in the weeks 
leading up the state election, had its desired effect as Federalist candidates fared 
well.  In addition, with the loss of foreign trade, many people in Massachusetts 
had been adversely impacted, including fishermen, shipbuilders, merchants, 
seamen, planters and farmers.568 
In the wake of Pickering’s letter, the gubernatorial race in Massachusetts was 
particularly bitter and contentious.  Sullivan, running for re-election, was 
opposed by his old nemesis, and political ally of Pickering, Christopher Gore.  
The Chronicle and the Centinel took the leading role in praising the candidate of 
their choice and criticizing the opposing party and their candidate.  Unlike                                                         
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1807, the Chronicle spent less time praising Sullivan and Jefferson, and more 
time criticizing the opposition, with particular emphasis on Pickering.  The 
name Pickering appeared far more often in the Republican press than either 
Sullivan or Gore in the weeks leading up to the election.  Contributions to the 
Chronicle were filled with attacks against Pickering and his ‘letter.’  “What 
arrogance is displayed by Pickering in thus attempting to force his private 
opinion on the Legislature of Massachusetts.”  The Chronicle took pains to 
attach Gore as closely as they could to Pickering and his ‘treasonous behavior.’  
One contributor suggested that “the debates in our Senate, by Mr. Otis, Gore, 
etc, are more unfriendly to the government, and more derogatory to the 
country, than what proceeds from the British ministry,” and concluded that 
“Gov Kit (Gore) cannot expect to be helped in his election by …” Pickering’s 
maneuvers.569   
In addition, the Republicans questioned Gore’s response to the Chesapeake 
incident and his refusal to condemn the British:  
He [Gore] took care to be governed by the Essex Junto in the business 
of the Chesapeake frigate.  We did not find the heads of the Junto 
assemble at town meeting to express their detestation of the conduct of 
the British in killing seamen.  Though the selectmen did not call the 
citizens together till they were obliged to, yet the full-blooded Essex 
Junto (alias Pickaroons) never attended.  As to the political sentiments of 
Mr. Gore, they have been openly hostile to the measures of the present 
administration… Even the violent attack on our neutral rights by the 
Leopard, and the killing of our seamen, did not rouse him to take part in 
vindication of his country.  He never attended the town meeting, and 
though nominated as one of the committee, did not act with them.  He 
kept himself entirely aloof on the subject.570 
Unlike the year before when the Chronicle referred often to the popular 
president, they seldom mentioned the name Jefferson in 1808.  The Republican 
press focused instead on Gore’s alleged attachment to Britain, and even 
introduced the issue of Gore’s father:  “His British connections are numerous.  
His own personal intercourse, together with the residence of his father (who 
was a refugee) in England has extended his acquaintance, and perhaps excited a 
national partiality, which the citizens of Massachusetts ought to consider as an 
unfavorable quality in the first magistrate of Massachusetts.”  The charge that 
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Gore would “get this country into an alliance with England” was a constant 
theme in the Republican press.571   
Another Republican charge repeated often in the days leading up to the 
election, was that Gore had volunteered to defend Thomas Selfridge: “As 
Christians, we cannot desire a governor who would volunteer in such a 
service.”  The Chronicle suggested that Gore had accomplished very little and 
did not compare favorably with former governors: “We would wish to know 
what important services have been done by Christopher Gore, Esq., for which 
he has not already received ample consideration, without our being obliged to 
give him a further consideration by electing him governor…. He has been well 
rewarded for his agency in England.”572  Therefore, while the Republican press 
promoted Sullivan as an active participant in the Revolutionary struggle 
alongside his friends, Hancock, Adams, Otis, Warren, and Bowdoin, they 
attached to his challenger the names Pickering and Britain: “Christopher Gore 
and Timothy Pickering! One climbing and the other boasting, at this years 
election.  Huzza for British Politics.”573  They charged that the cause of 
Federalism must be desperate indeed, when such a notorious character as 
Timothy Pickering comes forward as its prominent champion.”574  
The Centinel not only attacked Governor Sullivan, but they vehemently 
defended Gore and Pickering.  They were particularly critical of Sullivan’s 
refusal to forward Pickering’s letter to the legislature:  
It now appears avowed, that Governor Sullivan, instead of 
communicating the very excellent and able letter of Mr. Pickering to the 
Legislature, as was his duty, has, fearful of its influence, sent it back to 
our senator.  This bold and unprecedented step, for which Governor 
Strong and Governor Sumner, if they had dared to have so done, would 
have been impeached, is in fact the highest compliment to Colonel 
Pickering which his Excellency could have paid.575 
In response to the often-repeated charge by Sullivan and the Republicans that 
Pickering and Gore were promoting disunion, several Federalist contributors 
focused on freedom of speech and ridiculed the governor, a respected lawyer, 
for his willingness to punish free speech.  One contributor observed: “Does the 
Constitution prohibit speculations on the subject of government, or division of                                                         
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the states.”576  Indeed, they would allege, “no sooner had the present ‘Sons of 
Freedom’ obtained power, then they denounced the liberty of opinion.”577  The 
Centinel also sought to portray Sullivan as a Jacobin who removed dedicated 
public officers because of their political affiliation, despite having benefitted 
from Federalist generosity himself.  They reminded readers that as attorney 
general, Sullivan was himself, “an illustrious example of the long suffering, the 
forbearance, the noble generosity of the Federalists.  A conspicuous member of 
the Jacobin Club, denounced by Washington, he was …  continued in office by 
Sumner and Strong.”578     
The editor of the Centinel suggested to his readers what the Republican Party 
had stood for in the recent past:  
Let the adherents of Shays, and the opposers of the Constitution; the 
enemies of Washington, and the friends of French murder, exile and 
confiscation; the friends of Jefferson, and the enemies of commerce; the 
enemies of peace and the friends of the Embargo; the approaching 
election, be constitutionally proscribed as unfit and inadequate to 
manage the complicated interests of a great and enlightened 
commonwealth; let them tremble at the indignant voice of the people.579 
With the controversial Pickering often seen as the face of national Federalism, 
the Centinel invoked the name of their former leader to bolster Gore.  They 
suggested that Gore was a “disciple” and friend of Washington, and “held two 
important offices under that Great Man.”  Furthermore, they argued, “he was 
always a firm and ardent Whig,” who, “as soon as his age would permit, … was 
chosen to represent his town in the General Court.”   He was also “a colleague 
of Hancock and Adams in the Convention of Massachusetts which ratified the 
Federal Constitution and was one of its most able advocates.”580  He was, in 
short, a legitimate and influential player in Massachusetts politics dating back 
several years. 
Though few would have imagined it possible as recently as a year earlier, the 
Federalist Party regained control of the Massachusetts legislature in the spring 
of 1808.  They obtained a majority of forty seats in the House and secured 23 
seats in the Senate, compared to seventeen for the Republicans.  They were 
unable, however, to unseat the Republican governor, James Sullivan.  In what                                                         
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must have been a particularly satisfying consolation, Sullivan defeated his long-
time legal and political nemesis, Christopher Gore.  Also, despite the 
widespread opposition in Massachusetts to the Embargo, which the governor 
still defended in public, Sullivan was victorious.  Indeed, Sullivan’s ability to 
win re-election in the spring of 1808, illustrated the extent of his popularity in 
Massachusetts.  Though the people of Massachusetts had clearly expressed 
their unhappiness with the depression that resulted from Republican economic 
policies, they still supported the man who defended those policies, and 
appreciated his efforts to alleviate the worst of the suffering.  Sullivan had been 
acutely aware of the hardship caused by the Embargo, and took measures to 
help those impacted.  Among other things, the governor provided federal jobs 
for unemployed seamen, contributed extensively to soup kitchens and fought 
to provide state aid to those hit particularly hard by the worsening economy, 
even if it meant stretching the limits of the Embargo.581  For example, Sullivan 
licensed flour imports far in excess of domestic requirements, which certainly 
would have encouraged illegal trading outside the ports of Salem and Boston.  
Sullivan strongly defended these measures to Jefferson, insisting that all the 
foodstuffs that arrived on these ships were needed to feed his ninety thousand 
urban residents.582 
Historian Samuel Eliot Morison has suggested that the primary reason for 
Sullivan’s election was Gore’s lack of appeal:  He argued that the Federalists 
would have been better off had they nominated Harrison Gray Otis instead of 
Gore, who was the choice of the Essex Junto.  Morison writes: “Christopher 
‘Kit’ Gore, a gentleman of means and culture, lacked Otis’s appeal.  His 
manners were stiff and formal, and he displayed his wealth to no political 
advantage, prancing around the countryside in a handsome coach with liveried 
servants.”583  
After failing to win the governorship in 1808, Christopher Gore was elected to 
the state legislature by the people of Suffolk County where he wasted little time 
in making his presence felt.  When the General Court convened in May, one of 
the first orders of business for the Federalists was the expulsion of John 
Quincy Adams from their ranks, and the naming of his successor to the United 
States Senate, nine months before his term expired.  Quincy Adams had voted 
for the Embargo and openly challenged Senator Pickering, arguing instead for 
moderation and national unity.  Because he defended the policies of the 
Jefferson administration, he was viewed by many Federalists as a deserter.                                                           
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On June 3, 1808, Sullivan wrote to President Jefferson, informing him “the 
Federal Party in this State have obtained the government.”  He added that their 
principal object at present appears to be the political and even the personal 
destruction of John Quincy Adams.”  He went on to suggest that perhaps the 
president could rescue Adams “by finding him a foreign appointment of 
respectability.”584  Indeed, State Representative Gore charged that Quincy 
Adams had “conspired to produce much of the evil we now experience,” and 
to make certain that Quincy Adams would stay in line during the last months of 
his term in the senate, Federalist Party leaders in Massachusetts drafted a set of 
detailed instructions for him to follow.585  It could not have surprised many 
people when Quincy Adams chose to resign his office rather than follow the 
dictates of party leaders.  Weeks later, Gore wrote to Rufus King that he had 
recently seen Adams in Boston, and pettily observed that “he [Adams] walks 
into State Street at the usual Hour of Exchange, but seems totally unknown.”586  
While the Federalist Party may have spurned Adams, his words in defense of 
national sovereignty were embraced by a large segment of voters.  Indeed, as 
the Federalist Party was enjoying its last hurrah, before eventual extinction, 
John Quincy Adams, the unionist, continued to receive the support of 
Massachusetts voters for another forty years.  
Momentum against the Embargo continued to build, and nowhere was the 
opposition more vocal than in the Massachusetts legislature.  Acting on the 
suggestion made in Pickering’s pamphlet that Massachusetts legislators inform 
Congress of the extent to which the people of Massachusetts opposed the 
Embargo, Representative Gore drafted a set of resolutions which did just that.  
Like Pickering, Gore denounced Republican policy, criticized Jefferson 
personally, challenged the constitutionality of the Embargo, and detailed the 
fear and anxiety that gripped the state as a result of its enforcement.  In 
particular, he expressed fear at “the operation of an Embargo of …. unlimited 
duration, by which not only foreign commerce is annihilated, but the most 
grievous restraints and embarrassments imposed upon the intercourse between 
the different states.”  Calling the Embargo a “novel and dangerous 
experiment,” Gore then called on citizens to support the national government 
only when it provided for their common defense and general welfare.”587  
Though the resolutions were opposed by Republican lawmakers, the Federalist 
dominated General Court adopted the resolutions by a vote of 248-219, and 
forwarded them to Senator Pickering.  Republican legislators drew up a protest                                                         
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for entry in the House Journal, challenging the resolutions because they 
insinuated “that the Embargo is the cause of present difficulties whereas the 
cause is conflicting ordinances of the belligerent nations of Europe.”588  
After securing a victory with the adoption of their resolutions, Gore and other 
Federalist leaders began to focus their attention on taking back the White 
House.  After all, a Federalist victory in November would certainly mean the 
end of the hated Embargo.  In order to guarantee the appointment of 
Federalist electors in 1808, they sought to change the manner in which electors 
were chosen by the state.  Traditionally, the legislature would submit their 
choices to the governor for his approval.  Since Sullivan was still governor and 
would presumably reject Federalist candidates, the Federalists sought to 
remove the governor from the process.  They devised a plan whereby federal 
electors would be selected by a majority vote of the two houses of the 
legislature.  Gore wrote to King that some members of their party were 
reluctant to take such a step because it departed from procedures followed by 
all other states, “but I trust they will accede to our wishes.”589  Gore had little 
faith in Republican attempts to stop them: “They will endeavor to push 
Sullivan, to some desperate act in relation to the electors, but he is so vacillating 
and feeble, that I have no great apprehensions on this score.”590  When they 
heard of the Federalist plan to remove the governor from the selection process, 
Sullivan and other Republicans did object, arguing that it was unconstitutional.  
Gore, speaking before the House, insisted that “the federal constitution left the 
manner of selection to the discretion of the state legislatures and that the 
General Court could therefore make the choice by an order.”  The Federalist 
controlled legislature agreed with Gore and adopted the proposal.  Christopher 
Gore was growing more confident every day.  After he and other Federalist 
leaders in Massachusetts traveled throughout New England, in anticipation of 
the upcoming presidential election, Gore said to King that “I think the 
Federalists were never more united or more encouraged than at present,” … as 
the “Embargo is producing real & extensive distress.”591  
Among those who were distressed was the president himself.  In the final 
months of his presidency, Jefferson had become increasingly frustrated.  In a 
letter to Dr. Thomas Leib in late June, 1808, Jefferson noted that there was still 
a segment of the Federalist Party who were good people, ‘duty bound to 
support the constituted authorities of every branch, and to reserve their                                                         
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opposition to the period of election.”  There was another group, however, 
which not only opposed the government, but were doing their utmost to 
undermine their government.  They:  
disapprove of the republican principles & features of our Constitution, 
and would, I believe, welcome any public calamity (war with England 
excepted), which might lessen the confidence of our country in those 
principles & forms.  I have generally considered them rather as subjects 
for a madhouse.  But they are now playing a game of the most 
mischievous tendency, without perhaps being themselves aware of it.  
They are endeavoring to convince England that we would suffer more 
by the embargo than they do, & that if they will but hold out awhile, we 
must abandon it.  It is true, the time will come when we must abandon 
it.  But if this is before the repeal of the orders of council, we must 
abandon it only for a state of war.  The day is not distant, when that will 
be preferable to a longer continuance of the embargo.  But we can never 
remove that, & let our vessels go out & be taken under these orders, 
without making reprisal.  Yet this is the very state of things which these 
federal monarchists are endeavoring to bring about; and in this it is but 
too possible they may succeed.  But the fact is, that if we have war with 
England, it will be solely produced by their manoevres (sic).  I think that 
in two or three months we shall know what will be this issue.592  
Jefferson’s Embargo of 1808 forever changed the political landscape in the 
United States and laid the groundwork for the development of national 
consensus.  A controversial measure aimed at defending American sovereignty, 
the Embargo struck at the heart of Federalist fears that the Republican Party 
was determined to destroy the wealth and power of the northeast.  Historians 
like Hofstadter have often charged that by alienating the commercial northeast 
Jefferson had not only created a climate of hate, but destroyed national unity.  
This is only partly true.  While the Embargo had certainly inflamed tensions 
throughout the country, it did not destroy national unity.  On the contrary, it 
cemented it.  After the attack on the Chesapeake, the Embargo gave proud and 
defiant citizens a chance to rally around the flag.593  Despite the ill effects of the 
Embargo on the economy, the failed policy played an important role shaping 
America’s identity, appealing to its sense of nationalism and helping to prepare 
it for eventual war with Britain a few years later.  Jefferson’s Embargo was the 
first national initiative that announced to the Old World that the United States                                                         
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would not tolerate interference and helped lead to the development of a 
national consensus. 
As the Federalists prepared for the presidential election of 1808, they not only 
considered party stalwart Charles Pinckney of South Carolina, but also 
Republican George Clinton of New York, because of his strong opposition to 
the Embargo.  Gore wrote to King that he and other Federalist leaders in 
Massachusetts preferred a candidate from New York rather than South 
Carolina, “under the idea that he would support and cherish Commerce, and 
further that they could make a Bargain with which he would comply, as to the 
principal measures and officers of the Government.”594  
The Federalist convention opened in New York in late August, 1808, and 
Massachusetts was represented by Gore, Harrison Gray Otis and James Lloyd.  
The proceedings were held in near complete secrecy, as newspapers didn’t even 
reference existence of the convention.595  Despite Gore’s preference, the 
majority of the delegates, confident with their support in the northeast, 
nominated the southerner Charles Pinckney of South Carolina as their 
candidate for president.  For the vice-presidential slot, they again selected 
Gore’s good friend, Rufus King.  The Federalists were unable to capitalize on 
public sentiment against the Embargo, however, faring only slightly better in 
1808 than they had in 1804.  Republican James Madison defeated Pinckney, 
receiving 122 electoral votes to 47 for Pinckney.  The Federalists carried only 
Delaware and the New England states, except for Vermont. 
On December 10, 1808, shortly after the election of fellow Republican James 
Madison over Pinckney and King, Governor James Sullivan died at the age of 
64.  Though suffering through a long and painful illness, perhaps congestive 
heart failure, Sullivan continued working until a few days before his death.596  
John Quincy Adams delivered his eulogy and observed that: “supported by 
none of those artificial props which mediocrity derives from opulence, or 
family connections, every mark of distinction bestowed upon him was at once 
the proof and reward of his superior endowments,” and that Sullivan had been 
a self-made man and remained committed to those who started with as little as 
he had when he began his legal career.597  In his funeral sermon, Rev. Joseph 
Buckminster touched on Sullivan’s legacy: “the poor often found him an 
unrecompensed advocate, the distressed a willing benefactor, ...and the public a                                                         
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servant, continually engaged in some project of utility, who has at last left 
behind him only the small remains of a fortune, which, in many other hands, 
would have been greatly accumulated.”598  
At the time of Sullivan’s death, the effects of the Embargo were increasing, and 
Federalist leaders in Massachusetts, having recently lost the national election, 
turned their attention to the General Court where they could continue their 
assault on the unpopular legislation.  According to State Senator Gore who 
wrote to Senator Pickering shortly after Sullivan’s death, opposition to the 
Embargo had grown tremendously in Massachusetts and that the general 
feeling was that people “see nothing but destruction of their property, and 
slavery in their persons, in the present course, and indeed he must be a man of 
strong view who can discern a ray of light whereby we can extricate ourselves 
from this labyrinth.”  Gore sought counsel from Pickering as to how best to 
unite opposition to Jefferson and his hated policy.599  The reason for Gore’s 
confidence that the people of Massachusetts opposed the Embargo was 
twofold.  Firstly, the Federalists had reclaimed control of General Assembly the 
previous Spring, and secondly, no Massachusetts jury had yet convicted an 
alleged violator of the Embargo in the federal court.  Douglas L. Jones 
conducted a study of the Massachusetts Federal District Court for this period 
to determine whether Jefferson’s Embargo was enforceable in Massachusetts.  
He concluded that while Judge John Davis, a Federalist, did rule in favor of the 
constitutionality of the Embargo, federal juries were simply unwilling to 
enforce the politically unpopular law.  Indeed, during the two-year period when 
Embargo cases were heard, 1808 and 1809, the discrepancy in convictions by 
judge versus jury was stark.  In cases appearing before a jury in 1808, when 
Gore wrote to Pickering, the conviction rate was 0%, compared to a rate of 
88% for cases heard by a judge only.  In 1809, the conviction rates were 
somewhat closer, 26% for cases heard by juries and 47% for cases heard by a 
federal judge.  Jones concluded: “The juries low conviction rates reaffirm that 
the Embargo was not only unpopular in Massachusetts, but almost 
unenforceable except by a federal judge.”600  Indeed, after the 1808 session, 
John Quincy Adams observed that the “district court after sitting seven or eight 
weeks, and trying upwards of forty cases, has at length adjourned.  Not one 
instance has occurred of a conviction by a jury, and finally one of the jurymen 
                                                        
598 Ibid., 342. 
599 Gore to Pickering, December 20, 1808, HA 375-376. 
600 Douglas Lamar Jones, “The Caprice of Juries: The Enforcement of the Jeffersonian Embargo in 
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is said to have declared, that he never would agree to convict any person under 
these laws, whatever might by the facts.”601   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                         
601 Quincy Adams to William Branch Giles, January 16, 1809, Writings, 287-288. 
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Conclusion                                                                                                                               
 
In his essay, A Candid State of Parties, James Madison expressed his opinion as to 
the fundamental difference between the Federalists and the Republicans.  One 
party, he argued, consisted of those who through habit and temperament were 
“more partial to the opulent than to the other classes of society; and having 
debauched themselves into a persuasion that mankind are incapable of 
governing themselves, it follows with them … that government can be carried 
on only by the pageantry of rank, the influence of money and emoluments, and 
the terror of the military force.”  The second party, he added, was comprised of 
those who, “believing in the doctrine that mankind are capable of governing 
themselves, and hating hereditary power as an insult to the reason and an 
outrage to the rights of man, are naturally offended at every public measure 
that does not appeal to the understanding and to the general interest of the 
community, or that is not strictly conformable to the principles, and conducive 
to the preservation of republican government.”602  While Madison was certainly 
partial to one party over the other and had more than a passing interest in 
seeing one party prevail over the other, he did express a legitimate argument to 
explain the underlying disconnect that existed between the Federalists and 
Republicans.   
After the American Revolution had been won and as the United States matured 
and political differences intensified, leaders of both emerging “factions” had 
very different views as to who should build and lead the new government.  
Colonial leaders had always been drawn from the ranks of the wealthy and the 
social elite.  After independence had been achieved, however, and as new men 
with different backgrounds were becoming involved in government, the 
willingness of Americans to defer to rank and privilege soon disappeared.  For 
many Federalist leaders, this change in attitude was difficult to accept.  In 
addition, prior to the war, political leaders in Massachusetts had seldom looked 
beyond the issues that impacted their own state.  With the onset of war, 
however, and with their future success inexorably tied to the fortunes of the 
other states, they were forced to deal with new and complex political and 
economic realities.  The ability of some leaders to consider events and measure 
policy from a national perspective became much more complicated.  
Depending on which of the two emerging parties an individual belonged, the 
national view was markedly different.                                                          
602 Hofstadter, Idea of a Party System, 82. 
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Between 1783 when the American Revolution came to a close and 1807 when 
James Sullivan was elected governor of Massachusetts, a series of domestic and 
international crises initiated a period of intense local and national political 
combat between the two emerging parties.  Sullivan, Christopher Gore, Rufus 
King and John Quincy Adams each contributed significantly to the political 
debate during this tumultuous period, as both parties struggled for control of 
the federal and state governments.  Though they never shared a single national 
republican perspective, all four men were influential political leaders at a time in 
American history when the principles of modern political and economic theory 
were being put into practice, and when the still vulnerable country was faced 
with one international crisis after another.  When it was over, the Federalist 
Party, which grew around such luminaries as George Washington, Alexander 
Hamilton, John Adams, John Jay, and John Marshall, had all but disappeared.  
The lives of Sullivan, King, Gore and Quincy Adams present a lesson on the 
influence of birth in determining one’s political philosophy and on the 
influence of personality in determining political success.  The personal 
characteristics of each of these four men could not have been more different.  
More significantly, however, their stories detail the birth of American party 
politics in post-Revolutionary Massachusetts.  The words and actions of these 
four men tell the story of how Massachusetts evolved from a Federalist 
stronghold into a legitimate multi-party state firmly committed to the national 
union.  
Born to modest means in the backwoods of the District of Maine, James 
Sullivan was a self made man.  Forced to overcome economic hardship and 
serious physical disabilities, he went on to become a leading political figure in 
post-Revolutionary Massachusetts.  At a time when the Federalist Party 
dominated the political landscape in the state, Sullivan stood out as an avowed 
and passionate Jeffersonian, committed to the ideals of republican government.  
As the most visible and most successful Republican politician in Massachusetts 
during this period, he spoke for a growing number of citizens who challenged 
the established order.  He was a colonial who learned to look beyond the 
parochial needs of his own state and embrace the concept of union.  As one of 
the first and most vocal Republican leaders in the state to understand the 
importance of supporting, and more importantly funding, the then fragile 
national government, Sullivan was uniquely suited to help guide the people of 
Massachusetts in coming to terms with the political and economic changes that 
were taking place in the early years of the republic.  From the darkest days of 
the Revolution until the time of his death in 1808, Sullivan was committed to 
the larger national purpose, declaring: “to preserve a union of interest and 
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sentiment, so absolutely necessary to our existence as a nation, jealousies are to 
be laid aside, charity cherished, and a reciprocity of affection and civility to be 
exhibited.  All the States must be the country of the citizens of each, and each 
State the country of all.  Our national union, glowing on the public opinion, is 
the best defense of our sovereignty.”603  
Above all else, however, Sullivan spoke for those who believed that 
government should provide equal opportunities to all its citizens and not to 
create wealth or special privilege to any specific group of people.  The fact that 
he passionately and vocally rejected any notion of favoritism or assumptions 
regarding a so called favored class or ruling elite made him a popular figure in 
Massachusetts and help explain how he was able to serve as the state’s attorney 
general from 1790 – 1807 and how he was able to win the governorship in 
1807 as a Jeffersonian Republican in a state still dominated by Federalists.  
Comfortable in the presence of all ranks of society, Sullivan was a classical 
liberal who consistently fought for the liberty of individual citizens.  He was, as 
Linda Kerber notes, a “man of the center,” who “consistently took some 
positions that were more progressive than any articulated by John Adams, 
Thomas Jefferson, and many other contemporaries more famous than he.”604  
At the other end of the political spectrum was Christopher Gore.  A wealthy 
and well-connected attorney who spent his spent his public career serving as a 
spokesman for the New England merchant class, Gore became a leading force 
in the conservative wing of the Federalist Party.  For those who saw commerce, 
competition and profit as the driving force behind the new government, they 
had the single-minded support of Gore.  At a time when most Americans 
embraced the idea of a growing national union, however, Gore opposed 
westward expansion and stubbornly defended the economic interests of the 
northeast exclusively.  As Gore biographer, Helen Pinkney, concluded: “his 
overwhelming concern for the political and economic grievances of 
Massachusetts and his refusal to compromise with an expanding democracy 
removed him from the mainstream of American life and hastened the end of 
the very thing to which he had devoted a lifetime of service.”605   
Gore represented a new breed of politician.  Unlike the old-school Federalists 
of the Revolutionary period, Gore was impatient, hard edged, and far more 
reluctant to compromise with political opponents than were his old school 
Federalist colleagues.  He was unable conceal his contempt for Republicans.                                                          
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David Hackett Fischer has argued that there was something unique about Gore 
and a few other Federalists of similar age.  He was part of a small group of 
Federalists who were “too young to find old school doctrines acceptable,” and 
too old to acquiesce in new realities.”  Hackett Fischer suggested that “as 
political events progressed from bad to worse in the 1790s, these transitional 
figures were driven to desperate expedients,” and that “in fear and confusion, 
some of them looked with favor upon extreme anti-popular restraints which 
were rarely countenanced by gentlemen of the old-school.”606  When the 
traditional ruling elite were challenged by political newcomers and as the 
northeast began losing its national clout, Gore defied the trend and harshly 
criticized his opponents.  The opposition in turn criticized Gore for his English 
bias, his aristocratic dress and manners, and his unapologetic display of wealth.  
As a member of the social elite who passionately believed that the government 
could only be led by men of his standing and background, Gore fought a losing 
battle to retain a way of life that no longer existed.    
Gore’s closest friend and political confidant, Rufus King, was only slightly 
more comfortable in his dealings with the common man.  Though King did 
share Gore’s English bias and also exhibited aristocratic manners, he did not 
antagonize his political opponents.  Indeed, he managed to remain on the 
national stage longer than any other Federalist leader, do in large part to his 
political skills and his understanding of sensitive issues.  In addition, unlike 
Gore, King never engaged in the practice of stock speculation that angered so 
many Americans.  In a letter to Gore on the subject, King observed: “In regard 
to the speculators in stocks, they have no claim to the public sympathy.  No 
general or public interest was a motive with these persons to speculate in funds, 
or bank stock, it was not only purely selfish motives, but self, as it might or 
might not be at the expense of the public, that induced them to embark in this 
speculation.”607  
King was a successful diplomat who enjoyed the confidence of the most 
powerful leaders in both parties.  Though he had always disagreed with 
Republican philosophy, it did not prevent him from working with Republicans, 
as evidenced by his role as Minister to Britain during the early years of the 
Jefferson administration.  Like Gore, however, King resisted westward 
expansion because the proportional share of political and economic power 
enjoyed by the northeast would be lessened, and he stubbornly challenged the 
benefits of an expanding union.  Upon his return to the United States, King                                                         
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was identified as one of the chief spokesmen for the Federalist Party.  It wasn’t 
until the United States declared war on Great Britain in 1812, however, that 
King would begin to publicly criticize the president and his Republican 
administration.  While serving in the United States Senate, he challenged the 
Republican administration on the conduct and the financing of the war and 
grew increasingly frustrated with the Republican led government. 
In the years after the death of Sullivan, it was John Quincy Adams who became 
the most influential political leader in Massachusetts.  Though much younger 
than Sullivan, King and Gore, Quincy Adams matured early and participated in 
every critical debate which took place after the ratification of the Constitution.  
In habit and custom he identified with the first generation of Federalist leaders 
and naturally joined the party of his father.  From the beginning, however, 
Quincy Adams proved to be supremely independent.  In retrospect, he 
understood better than most the implications of British and French aggression 
against American shipping and the importance of supporting the Republican 
president in defense of national honor.  He lost his Senate seat, was ridiculed 
by his fellow Federalists and expelled from the party his father had helped 
establish.  Ironically, Quincy Adams went on to serve his country in one 
capacity or another for another forty years, long after the Federalist Party had 
ceased to exist.   
Of the Federalists, Quincy Adams would later write that he found them 
“honest in the belief that all of the wisdom of the nation is in their heads, and 
all of its virtues in their hearts,” and, he added, “they have erected their whole 
political system upon the perverted axiom that the part is greater than the 
whole.”608  Quincy Adams endured and achieved electoral success because he 
had the ability to look beyond narrow party and regional interests, and embrace 
a national view of events.  He became a Republican because he instinctively 
knew that they better represented the ideals of union.  His resignation from the 
Senate over his support for Jefferson’s Embargo in the wake of Chesapeake 
Affair, represented the first building block in the development of a national 
consensus, and his political transformation reflected the change in attitude that 
was taking place in Massachusetts and throughout the country.    
When the people of the United States elected their first president in 1788, few 
could have imagined that within a few short decades the Federalist Party would 
cease to exist as a national force.  How did the party of Washington, which had 
so skillfully overseen the ratification the Constitution, so completely lose the                                                         
608 Quincy Adams, Writings, VI, 138. 
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confidence of the American people in so short a period of time?  The national 
consensus which grew during Madison’s presidency reflected the extent to 
which the Republican Party and the American people had rejected the second 
generation of Federalist leaders.  Richard Hofstadter has argued that in their 
attempt to unify the country under one party, the Republicans “had no 
intention of accepting Federalist men.”  For the Republicans, “the essence of 
Federalism lay not in the various elements of its program but in the perverted 
principles and intransigent spirit of its longtime leaders.”609  This observation 
suggests the central issue.  The American people did not just reject the policies 
pursued by the Federalists, … they rejected the Federalists themselves.  There 
was no place for old school deference and Federalist assumptions in a 
republican society.     
The Federalists desire to perpetuate the dominance of the wealthy elite was 
rejected by an overwhelming number of Americans, and this shift in attitude 
was best measured in the state where the Federalist Party had always enjoyed 
their greatest success, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.  The nature of 
Massachusetts politics had changed dramatically since the end of the war, and 
as the trial of Thomas Selfridge revealed, there was a clearly defined cultural 
gap that existed between the two parties.  Sullivan, the first Republican to be 
elected governor of Massachusetts, personified the fundamental differences 
between the two parties.  His belief in equal access to power and opportunity, 
and his commitment to the idea that the law existed to provide equal justice to 
the weak and the poor, stood in stark contrast to his Federalist opponents.  By 
1807, a majority of the voters in Massachusetts agreed with him.  For men like 
Gore and King, it was difficult to accept the realities of an expanding 
democracy.  Though the Federalist Party would linger on for another decade at 
the national level, and another two decades in Massachusetts, the dye had been 
cast.  The actions of the Federalist leaders in the aftermath of the attack on the 
Chesapeake had initiated the long final act of their existence.  
This narrative has demonstrated that in the early years of the nineteenth 
century, the growth of Massachusetts Republicanism was directly linked to the 
efforts of James Sullivan and John Quincy Adams.  These two men, who I 
contend were THE two central transition figures in post-Revolutionary 
Massachusetts, were ahead of their times in many respects.  As Gordon Wood 
observed: “The Revolution did not just eliminate monarchy and create 
republics; it actually reconstituted what Americans meant by public or state 
power and brought about an entirely new kind of popular politics and a new                                                         
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kind of democratic officeholder.”610  Sullivan, who came of political age during 
the American Revolution, was in the vanguard of this movement, and not only 
encouraged but influenced a new generation of officeholders to challenge the 
established order.  He served as a bridge between the Hancock faction of the 
Revolutionary period to the Jeffersonian Republicans of the early nineteenth 
century.  He also served as a mentor of sorts to the man who would succeed 
him as the most prominent Republican in Massachusetts, … John Quincy 
Adams. 
That Sullivan would be more “egalitarian” in his thinking than his Federalist 
adversaries is no surprise.  What is surprising, however, is that this Jeffersonian 
Republican argued for a stronger national union before Gore, King and many 
other Federalist leaders.  Sullivan embraced the significance of the larger 
national purpose before most of his contemporaries, of either emerging party.  
Indeed, contrary to the perception that Republicans were more concerned with 
safeguarding state sovereignty, Sullivan was among those who understood the 
necessity of empowering and sufficiently financing the national government.  
He had long recognized the importance of resisting British aggression on the 
high seas as a matter of national honor, and, in the wake of the attack on the 
Chesapeake, a growing number of Americans agreed with him.   
In his discussion of Jefferson’s Embargo, Paul Goodman argues that the 
growth of Republicanism in Massachusetts was partially sustained by farmers in 
the inland towns and those living in the port communities who “were imbued 
with a youthful nationalism and dedication to the ideals of union, which 
inspired men in every class and section to endure sacrifice in defense of 
national dignity.”611  According to Goodman, Republicanism “tapped a deep 
well of nationalism,” and Jefferson, through the Embargo was able to identify 
the party with a larger sense of national purpose.  Massachusetts Republicanism 
framed a patriotic defense of the union and Sullivan, now governor of the 
Commonwealth, led the way.  He was comfortable in his defense of Jefferson 
because he had been warning of the same dangers for decades.  Now, he 
pleaded, “It is time that we had become one people.”612     
Historians have long overlooked the role played by Sullivan in the growth of 
Republicanism in Massachusetts and in the growth of nationalism at this critical 
juncture in American history.  Throughout the course of his high profile battle 
with the state’s senior senator, Timothy Pickering, Governor Sullivan received                                                         
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the strong and vocal support of the state’s junior senator.  While Quincy 
Adams has been recognized, and rightly so, for suffering the censure and 
ridicule of his former party for choosing to support the Republican president 
and Republican governor in their effort to pursue a policy that would cause 
economic harm to his own state, … his defection reflected the growing 
recognition that some issues transcended economic advantage. 
James Sullivan and John Quincy Adams were critical figures in Massachusetts 
and American political history.  Not only did they embrace the fundamental 
republican ideal that Americans should no longer defer to rank and privilege, 
but they insisted that this ideal serve as a guiding principle in America’s dealings 
with other nations.  Specifically, the United States should no longer defer to 
England, and British aggression could no longer be tolerated, regardless of the 
economic advantage.  They not only understood, but advanced the notion that 
in order for the union to thrive and grow, its political leaders would have to set 
aside regional jealousies and look beyond parochial interests.   
In the last years of his life, Sullivan earned the trust and friendship of Quincy 
Adams, the man who for years had viewed him with suspicion.  The younger 
statesman came to appreciate Sullivan’s devotion not only to Massachusetts, 
but to a larger national purpose.  As a member of the first generation of 
Massachusetts political leaders, Sullivan was among the loudest to voice 
support for the nationalist cause.  Quincy Adams, who would lead the second 
generation of Americans with a more global nationalist view, understood that 
Sullivan had been right all along. 
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